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This Thesis explores the impact of the European Union´s (EU) Cohesion Policy (and its 
structural and investment funds) on the transnationalization and subsequent transformation 
of state in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The Cohesion Policy is commonly known as a 
redistribution framework which transfers developmental aid from the West European core 
to the less developed periphery of South Europe and CEE through the EU budget. The Thesis 
explores the impact of this core-peripheral redistribution from a critical perspective in the 
Comparative Capitalism (CC) scholarship. More concretely, it focuses on the so-called 
Visegrád states – Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – and their dependent market 
economies between the EU eastern enlargement in 2004 and the mid-2010s. This generates 
the first main contribution by bringing the EU structural funds into the CC debates on CEE 
which are mostly preoccupied with the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the 
transnationalization of Visegrád states. The contribution is impossible without historicizing 
the role of Cohesion Policy in shaping the EU historical core-peripheral relations since the late 
1980s. Such a historization facilitates the second main contribution when examining how the 
post-2004 CEE integration transforms these core-peripheral relations in return. Without 
neglecting their material and institutional effects, the Thesis inspects especially the 
developmental purpose of such transformations, while theoretically conceptualizing the 
Cohesion Policy as a transnational regulation of peripheral development (TRPD). Through the 
study of primary documents, it proceeds via an inter-scalar (incorporated) comparison of the 
three – EU supranational, Visegrád national, Visegrád subnational – scales of European 
integration. Thanks to it, the TRPD is not only conceptualized theoretically but substantiated 
empirically as well. 
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1.  Introduction 
The Cohesion Policy and its Structural Funds constitute one of the major institutional 
domains of the European Union (EU) policymaking. They have been also at the epicentre of 
political debates in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) since the late 1990s and the region´s EU 
membership after 2004. In 1988, the Cohesion Policy developed officially from the reform of 
European Communities´ Regional Policy when uniting the existing funds – European Social Fund 
(ESF), European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), and later the Cohesion Fund (CF) – under 
one institutional roof.1 This seemingly path-dependent evolution represented a historical 
conjuncture between the old and the new socioeconomic orders in Europe. The new order was 
institutionally underpinned by the EU (Ryner and Carfuny, 2016). Having originally emerged on 
a redistribution consensus between the new Southern and the old North-Western European 
member states, the Cohesion Policy reoriented to mediate the new East-West core-peripheral 
relations after 2004. Its eastward expansion aimed at transforming the so-called less developed 
CEE from a socioeconomic threat to the opportunity of the EU´s global competitiveness. 
The impact of cohesion funding on CEE state-society complexes was ambivalent in the 
programming periods of 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 under review in this PhD Thesis. Covering 
especially these two programming periods of Cohesion Policy, I study them in the 
interrelation with the CEE´s post-2004 integration and the management of global economic 
and Eurozone debt crises up to the ascending populist turn between the late 2000s and the 
mid-2010s. The policy´s n+2/n+3 rule allows this as it extended the later period to officially 
end in 2016, while overlapping with the new 2014-2020 period. The Cohesion Policy 
intermediates transfers of development capital from the core economies of Western Europe 
to fill the gap in the internal funds of the EU´s peripheral economies. I study how these capital 
flows problematize the development trajectories in recipient states as they condition the 
asymmetric transformation of CEE states through their dependent integration into the EU. 
There is a seldom research on how and in what ways the Cohesion Policy impacts on the 
 
1 By the mid-2010s, the structural and investment funding included also the pre-accession funds Phare, ISPA, SAPARD, IPA in various periods. 
It also included the guidance section of European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF).  
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state transformations and market integrations of CEE social formations. Much of this is due 
the lack of political economy research. I strive to change it by synthetizing the following 
literatures: The EU studies scholarship dominates the research programme (Bachtler and 
Mendez, 2013), while narrowing it to public policy inquiries into the policy´s institutional 
performance. This prevents to ask broader questions on the its role in reordering the 
socioeconomic inequalities and power asymmetries inherent to core-peripheral relations in 
Europe. Meanwhile, the political economy scholars in the Comparative Capitalism (Ebenau et 
al., 2015) and critical European Studies (Carfuny and Ryner, 2012) fields remain mostly silent 
on the topic. There is thus only a forgotten knowledge of early European dependency 
scholarship on structural funds (Weissenbacher, 2018). What is more, the exceptions from 
the rule (Streeck and Elsässer, 2015; Gill, 1998: 14; Offe, 2001: 467; Becker et al., 2016) in 
both mainstream and critical political economy disregard it as irrelevant for and thus marginal 
in the study of European integration. Against this background, I open space for the broader 
inquiry exactly by mutually engaging the problem-solving EU studies with the heterodox CC 
literatures on both EU and CEE integrations. 
Foregrounding core-peripheral relations, I do not ascribe CEE the peripheral position due 
to my theoretical bias. Rather, this bias allows me to address the overlooked fact that the 
management of core-peripheral relations is explicit in the knowledge-production and policy 
practices of the EU Cohesion Policy. The management is inherent to the main role of Cohesion 
Policy: to fix the EU as a coherent regional order through the regulation of Europe´s uneven 
capitalist development (Smith, 1984/2010; Harvey, 1985; Jessop, 2012). European integration 
is driven by the political promise that the integration eventually leads to the mutual 
socioeconomic convergence through the equalization between Europe´s (semi)core and 
(semi)periphery in the deepened and expanded Single Market and Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). The Regional turned Cohesion Policies embodied this promise under the 
heading of economic, social and territorial cohesion (Single European Act, 1986; Treaty of 
Lisbon, 2009). The continuing differentiation in core-peripheral relations begs, however, a 
question on whether this promise is not only a “developmentalist illusion” (Arrighi, 1990). 
The illusion drags accordingly the (semi)peripheral societies into equalizing catch-up which 
inevitably ends up in their ongoing differentiated integration. The lack of critical political 
economy scholarship on the Cohesion Policy in (Central and East) European integrations 
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makes this question underresearched. 
Inquiring into this question, I study the experience of the so-called Visegrád model of 
capitalism which is a cluster of Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Visegrád economies 
are often observed as successful integrationist examples of semiperipheral catch-up during 
their post-2004 EU membership which remain moreover resilient to the global economic 
crisis (Myant and Drahokoupil, 2012; Bohle, 2017). Far from being homogenous, the Visegrád-
type capitalism can be differentiated as a political-economic model from the rest of the EU 
(Bohle and Greskovits, 2007a), all post-socialist transition economies (Myant and 
Drahokoupil, 2011), and other cases of (semi)peripheral integration in the global South under 
neoliberal globalization (Nölke et al., 2015). To explain this dependent model, most CC 
scholars focus narrowly on the transnational power relations and socioeconomic effects of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) with the West European origin. However, the FDI bias fails to 
fully acknowledge the impact of EU integrations on the FDI trajectories. As a prelude to this, 
the Table 1.1 identifies the Western origins of both cohesion investment and FDI in the 
Visegrád material dependence. Bringing in the EU funding, I also foreground the heterodox 
political economy perspective to further close this knowledge gap with respect to both 
Europe´s core-peripheral relations and CEE´s dependent development.  
For exploring this dual dependency, I offer a transdisciplinary concept of transnational 
regulation of peripheral development (TRPD). The TRPD provides a conceptual framework 
which allows to explore how and in what ways the Cohesion Policy fixes the uneven and 
dependent development in Europe´s core-peripheral relations. The TRPD facilitates also a 
conceptual coherence and theoretical-empirical bridge for the Thesis and this introduction. 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, I introduce the other concepts related to the TRPD: 
development fix, dependent developmental state, and rescaled dependency. These concepts 
make sense of the Europeanization-led effects of the structural funding on the supranational 
scale of EU regional ordering, as for the development fix, and the two – national and 
subnational – scales of Visegrád model of capitalism with regard to the dependent 
developmental state and the rescaled dependency. Second, I explain how the method of 
inter-scalar (incorporated) comparison operationalizes these concepts for researching the 




1.1. Europeanization: Development Fix in Europe´s Capitalist Order 
As I show in the theoretical chapter 2, the EU studies scholarship on Cohesion Policy has 
only a limited understanding of Europeanization. It is able to grasp the “institutional 
manifestations“ of Cohesion Policy but ignores the interrelated „dimension of [its] social 
purpose“ which allows the scholars to „predict the form of the [European] international 
order, but not its content“ (Ruggie, 1982: 382). Therefore, the mainstream scholarship is 
unable to address its own elephant in the room: the regulation of uneven and dependent 
development in Europe. In this Thesis, I focus especially on the ideological content or 
developmental purpose, as I denote it later, without however neglecting the institutional and 
material realms of this TRPD. Addressing the elephant in such a way, I offer the concept of 
development fix. The concept explores the Cohesion Policy as an institutional part of the EU´s 
broader cohesion agenda. Accordingly, the institutional form only intermediates the material 
and ideological dimensions of such a developmental agenda. The development fix is only a 
contextual and concrete variation of spatiotemporal fix that is inspired by David Harvey (1981, 
2003) and Bob Jessop (2006, 2013). As other spatiotemporal fixes, it helps to understand how 
the EU strives to establish a political regulation of its crisis-ridden economic heterogeneity to 
restore its “structured coherence” as a transnational regional order (Jessop, 2006; Harvey, 
Table 1.1 Correlation between EU Net Payers and Major Investors in Visegrád states 
(descending order from the larger to lower value)  
Net Payers into EU budget 
Average net operating balances in the EU multiannual 
financial framework, 2004-2013 
Main Investors in Visegrád states 
FDI stock positions by country of origin in Visegrád states 
(aggregate sums), 2004-2013 
Germany Germany 









Luxembourg United Kingdom 
Source: Own preparation; EU Financial Reports (annual) and Central Banks of Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia 
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2004: 101-102). By doing so, the concept captures all the three dimensions – material, 
institutional, and ideological – of such fixing with respect to the Cohesion Policy as a TRPD.  
The most exemplary case of a spatiotemporal fix was the Marshall Plan in the post-1945 
Western Europe which underpinned the trans-Atlantic capitalist order under the US state-
capital leadership (Harvey 2003: 120; van der Pijl, 1984/2012: 138-187). Hence, I interpret the 
Cohesion Policy agenda as a more comprehensive Marshall Plan-type arrangement which 
materially, institutionally, and ideologically matured into the TRPD during the EU integration 
since late 1980s. This happened under the West European core state-capital leadership. Indeed, 
the European Commission (henceforth as Commission) (1996: 92) described it in this way: 
“One comparison for the appreciation of the scale of assistance under EU cohesion 
policies is that of the Marshall Plan, the archetypal structural aid programme for 
the reconstruction of post-war Europe, which was equivalent to 1 % of US GDP and 
contributed on average about 2 % of the European annual GDP over the period 
1948-51. The Community's effort is some 0.5 % of Union GDP per year but it is a 
longer-term commitment which will have amounted cumulatively to 6.5 % of 
Union GDP over the decade 1989-99, compared to 4 % of US GDP committed by 
the US between 1948 and 1951.“  
The development fix, according to Harvey, must be always “literal” or material as much as 
“metaphorical” or ideological (Harvey, 2003: 115). According to the original Regulation 
Approach (Aglietta 1979/2015; Jessop and Sum, 2006), these two levels are institutionally 
fixed in the material-economic regime of accumulation and the ideological-political mode of 
regulation. Institutions intermediate the relationship of both levels, while researching their 
content allows for analysing the EU´s capitalist accumulation and political regulation as 
mutually constituted. From this perspective, the essential problem of European integration is 
to transnationally fix the “heterogeneity” of various national regimes of accumulation and 
modes of regulation within European capitalist diversity (Sharpf, 2002; Höpner and Schäfer, 
2012a). I analyse thus the role of Cohesion Policy with respect to the material flows of 
cohesion investment and ideational transfers of development strategies which condition 
them. Then, I ask how they shaped the EU-driven reordering of the “incompossible” 
heterogeneity of core-peripheral capitalist institutions (Jessop, 2014a). More precisely, I 
study the role of Cohesion Policy in organizing the “transnationally (inter)dependent regimes 
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of accumulation on the one hand and the mode of multi-level regulation that has emerged 
on the other” (Bieling et al., 2016: 65) in the EU. 
Given my interest in the metaphorical content of TRPD-based development fix, I follow 
neo-Gramscian regulationists when analyzing the multi-level mode of transnational 
regulation (Bieler and Morton, 2001; Apeldoorn, Drahokoupil and Horn, 2009; Bieling et al., 
2016). The neo-Gramscian analysis ignores Cohesion Policy even when investigating the 
peripheral integrations of Southern Europe and CEE peripheries (Holman, 1998; 2004a). At 
the same time, it traces the social purpose of European integration (Van Apeldoorn, 2002). 
Neo-Gramscians contextualize it also into the global structural changes. Following them, I can 
inquire into the purpose of Cohesion Policy in the change from the post-1945 Fordism to the 
post-1980s post-Fordism and up to the post-Fordist crisis in the mid-2010s (Jessop, 2002; 
Ryner and Carfuny, 2016). 
Fordist strategies of political regulation and capitalist accumulation favoured nation state 
as its primary scale of production relations. National varieties of embedded liberalism 
constituted their social purpose. Post-Fordism tended to favour a dual transnationalization of 
capitalist accumulation and political regulation which relativized the national scale of 
production relations. Its social purpose turned into a variously contested and hybridized 
forms of embedded neoliberalism. According to Brenner (2003), inherent to such post-Fordist 
projects was moreover the transformation of spatial strategies through state rescaling. 
Therefore, the transnationalization shifted the political regulation of nation-state governance 
up to the supranational and down to the subnational levels of governance. In sum, the neo-
Gramscian emphasis on extra-economic hegemony allows us to research what I consider a 
developmental purpose of Cohesion Policy as inherent to the broader social purpose of EU´s 
multi-level mode of regulation. In relation to the argument on the post-Fordist embedded 
neoliberalism, I ask thus on whether this developmental purpose could be defined as a type 
of “neoliberal developmentalism” (Sum and Jessop, 2013: 296-324) under emergence since 
late 1980s. 
If durable and hegemonic, political regulation of any regional order must be regularized 
into “institutional compromise” (Jessop, 2006) through such a development fix. It is thus 
pertinent to ask if and how Cohesion Policy underpinned such an institutional compromise. A 
hegemonic order must regularize the core-peripheral relations into an interdependent, yet 
7 
 
asymmetric inter-state consensus (Cox, 1983, 1987). Through their expansion, capitalist 
orders avoid the tendency to economic crises by interconnecting core with new markets, 
investment locations or sources of raw materials and cheaper labour power. The expansion 
skews the economic interests and innovations of class relations in favour of capitalist core 
and subordinates the peripheral interests. As no hegemonic order can however durably exist 
on pure relations of domination and exploitation, there must be “economic concessions” to 
peripheral populations (Jessop, 2006). Such concessions underpin a redistributive consensus 
that co-opts peripheral elites into the general interest to avoid economic crises within the 
normality of established political and economic hierarchies. In the EU, the institutionalized 
consensus fixes them into the multi-level mode of transnational regulation. Indeed, the 
concept of multi-level governance was firstly described by scholars (Marks 1992, 1993; 
Hooghe, 1996) studying the emergence of the EU with respect to the Cohesion Policy. 
Accordingly, the EU has been transnationally organized through the multi-level networks 
dominated by the Commission in this emergent multi-level polity. Neo-Gramscians 
understood these public-private networks as embedded in the broader networks of global 
governance and analysed how the Commission navigated them to hierarchically produce and 
naturalize the hegemonic purpose of the EU as a globalized regional order (Gill, 1998; Van der 
Pijl, 1998; Van Apeldoorn and Hager, 2008). 
Considering the literal meaning, the regulationists´ view on the EU as a transnational 
capitalist order of (inter)dependent regimes of accumulation is also helpful. It allows us to 
realize the material role of Cohesion Policy as primarily an economic concession in patterning 
the uneven (inter)dependence into temporarily coherent order. These concessions return us to 
the need to research how the Cohesion Policy defines their developmental purpose and thus 
also the strategies of this pattering in peripheral states. For Harvey (1981: 413-445; 2003), 
capitalist orders expand through the export of social relations of production and consumption 
from capitalist cores to capitalist or non-capitalist peripheries. The durability of this expansion 
is, however, impossible without investment into immobile infrastructures or the so-called 
“fixed capital” (Harvey, 1981: 204-238) so that mobile forms of capital can circulate through the 
globalizing accumulation process (Harvey, 2001). In other words, the internal intensification in 
and external expansion of the EU as a capitalist order depends on its continuing investment 
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into social and physical infrastructures which enable and interconnect the circuits of capital 
such as FDI, trade exchange, and other (non-)material flows. 
In capitalism, state and public investment overtake the task to organize and territorialize 
such primary conditions for a sustained accumulation (Harvey, 1976) in core and also 
peripheral catch-up strategies (Gerschenkron, 1962; Skocpol et al., 1985; Nölke, 2012). South 
European and CEE states were historically unable to generate internal funds to guarantee 
own infrastructural investment, which made them dependent on capital transfers from core 
states to fill own internal funds (Janos, 1989). Aware of this, I inquire into the developmental 
purpose of Cohesion Policy and which strategies of infrastructural integration into the EU it 
has promoted in the Southern Europe and CEE in particular. 
Development fix is metaphorical and literal at once. While considering the literal 
dimension, the theoretical chapter 2 and empirical chapters 3 and 4 inquire especially into its 
metaphorical dimension to illustrate how it underpinned the Cohesion Policy as TRPD. I 
explore how the TRPD aimed at reordering the EU´s capitalist heterogeneity into a structurally 
coherent order through the regulation of its uneven and (inter)dependent development. This, 
as I show, was a historically contingent process which, though managing development 
assistance from European cores to peripheries, strived to organize the transnational political 
pattering of uneven accumulation regimes in the EU. Regarding the mode(s) of regulation and 
regime(s) of accumulation, I also show how the development fix formed through the mutual 
constitution of (literal) infrastructural fixing, (intermediating) socio-institutional fixing, and 
(metaphorical) semantic fixing within the TRPD. In other words, I ask how the development 
fix was mediated on institutional level of more ideological regulation and more material 
accumulation patterns in Europe´s variegated landscapes of core-peripheral relations. 
1.2. Structural Funds: Dependent Developmental State 
Therefore, I argue against the claim that there was no Marshall-plan type arrangement for 
CEE (Ivanova, 2007). I rather develop a research agenda which identified the EU´s 
transnational integration as providing development programs or policies in CEE, albeit 
insufficient in the illusory promise of intracontinental equalization (Bruszt and McDermott, 
2012; Bruszt and Vukov, 2017). As discussed in the theoretical chapter 2, I extend the   
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argument and go beyond its institutionalist view to explore whether and how the 
development fix translated into a variety of dependent developmental state in the Visegrád 
variety of capitalism. Again, I am interested more in the developmental purpose of this 
translation but consider the institutional and material conditions of these process, too. I focus 
on Visegrád capitalism because it was already epitomized as a FDI-based “dependent market 
economy” (Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009) which emerged in the late 1990s and remained 
resilient during the global economic crisis by the mid-2010s. There is already an inquiry into 
the role of EU funds in these FDI-based regimes of accumulation as a new source of material 
dependence (Medve-Bálint, 2014; Jacoby, 2014; Bohle and Greskovits, 2018). The scholarship 
does not straightforwardly research the dual dependence, as documented in the Graph 1.1, 
in the actual complementarity between the FDI and cohesion investment. By inquiring into 
the strategic purpose of these Visegrád development state projects, I also complement the 
institutionalist inquiries into the developmental effects of Cohesion Policy in CEE.  
 
Graph 1.1 Comparison of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Cohesion Investment (CI) Inflows 
(annual, % GDP) 
 








2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Czechia - FDI Hungary - FDI Poland - FDI Slovakia - FDI
Czechia - CI Hungary - CI Poland - CI Slovakia - CI
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State projects are, according to the regulationist state approach (Jessop, 1990; 
Drahokoupil, 2009a), accumulation strategies which translate the modes of regulation into 
comprehensive political regulation. I bring the Cohesion Policy in to nuance thus the 
understanding of this (trans)national regulation of Visegrád dependent development in 
comparison to the rest of the EU and the world. First, I ask how the Cohesion Policy shapes 
the development capacity and relative autonomy of these FDI-based state projects 
(Drahokoupil, 2009a; Myant and Drahokoupil, 2012; Drahokoupil and Myant, 2015). Visegrád 
experience is commonly derived from the comparison with the East Asian developmental 
states as superior peers of semiperipheral catch-up on the one hand and the West European 
market economies as core development patterns on the other. The comparison is historical 
as much as geographical. While the later cases are institutional products of the post-1945 
embedded liberalism, the Visegrád model fully institutionalized under the conditions of post-
1980s embedded neoliberalism (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007a). Visegrád accumulation 
strategies lack the East Asian scale of autonomous development and capacity in their catch-
up trajectories (Wade, 1990; Evans, 1995; Schmidt, 1996; Amsden, 2001). This proves to be 
an impossible trajectory under the emerging neoliberal globalization even for East Asia due 
to the intensifying “internationalization” of states (Amsden et al., 1994; Glassman, 1999; 
Wade, 2018). Nevertheless, the globalist reindustrialization has appropriated Visegrád state 
projects, along with Slovenia, with more coherent developmental capacity to the rest of post-
socialist world and, as the mid-2010s crisis revealed, Southern Europe (Bohle and Greskovits, 
2007a; Bohle, 2017). 
Second, and more importantly, I inquire into whether the Cohesion Policy tendentially 
shapes the accumulation strategies along the lines of TRPD-based neoliberal 
developmentalism. Asking about a neoliberal developmentalist, I rely on the ongoing 
research on the Visegrád regime of “dependent embedded neoliberalism” (Bohle, 2009). Such 
a regime is characterized as combining the neoliberal reforms and FDI-oriented industrial 
strategies with the social appeasement of otherwise less protected and cheap but skilled 
labour. The historical genesis of this regime is based on the strategies privileging the 
institutional and social embedding of globalist outward-looking competition over the FDI 
(Drahokoupil, 2009a). In the late 1990s, these strategies replaced the nationalist inward-
looking strategies and opened the intra-Visegrád competition over the same-type FDI which 
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resulted into the intra-Visegrád convergence on similar accumulation regime since the early 
2000s. Following the post-crisis challenge of inward-looking and developmentalist program 
of nationalist forces in Poland and Hungary in the mid-2010s (Bluhm and Varga, 2019), its 
content remains rather resilient or undergoing a heterodox adaptation at best (Bohle and 
Greskovits, 2018; Toplišek, 2019). These inquiries into the content of state strategies 
remained often on the level of formal policies with respect to the accumulation regimes. 
Focusing on the Cohesion Policy, I am interested in demasking the Commission´s role when 
regulating these development strategies (Jacoby, 2010; Medve-Bálint, 2014). Furthermore, I 
go beyond the formal policies to study the developmental purpose on ideological level of 
state projects which can be identified as a neoliberal developmentalism. 
In the same manner, I inquire into whether the multi-level nature of Cohesion Policy 
resulted in the rescaled dependency with respect to Visegrád subnational or inter-local 
relations (Brenner, 2004, 2019). By the rescaled dependency, I describe the strategies though 
which the Visegrád states regulate their uneven regional development. That is by shifting the 
management of Visegrád dependency downwards to the regional actors. Through state 
rescaling strategies (Drahokoupil, 2009a), the FDI have sociospatially polarized the intra-
national development into leading and lagging regions (Brown et al., 2007). As an accession 
conditionality for the EU funds, the EU enforced the formation of multi-level governance 
which formed diverse landscapes of regional and local governance in Visegrád states (Bruszt, 
2008). What is more, the redistribution of structural funding has moreover reinforced the 
polarizing pattern rather than alleviating it (Medve-Bálint, 2018). As our inquiry into the 
strategies of rescaled dependency shows, the this was due to the fuelling the both the inter-
local competition over the cohesion investment as complement to the parallel competition 
over the FDI. Beyond these institutionalist inquiries, I thus investigate the Cohesion Policy and 
its varied translations to survey whether its rescaling developmental purpose legitimizes this 
polarization (Lang et al., 2015; Lang and Görmar, 2019). The rescaled dependency presumes 
a turn in the development responsibilities to lower tiers of subnational governance and 
expects the selective privileging of entrepreneurial strategies of inter-local competition not 
only intra-nationally but within the whole EU. 
The dependent developmental states are thus projects inherent to the TRPD. As I show in 
the theoretical chapter 2 and empirical chapters 5 and 6, they represent state projects at the 
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intersection of transnational integration and national embeddedness. This variegated 
integration is exemplified in chapters 2, 5 and 6 which document these development projects 
as tendentially rescaled. First, I am interested in how the development fix translated into 
these state projects. My aim is not to analyse the funds as only a new source of dependency 
next to the FDI but inquire into their complementarity. Although equally analysing its material 
and institutional manifestations on the regime level, I am interested especially in the 
development ideology promoted by the Cohesion Policy. What is more, this involves the 
inquiry into the change of state-space relations because the multi-level emphasis of Cohesion 
Policy invites into the research on how it mobilizes city-regional competition in Visegrád 
states.  
1.3. Comparative Capitalisms Methodology: Incorporated Comparison  
The heterodox understanding of Cohesion Policy as a TRPD allows us to decipher its 
transformation as co-constitutive with Europe´s historically changing core-peripheral 
relations. I use this heterodox potential of the CC field at the transdisciplinary conjunction of 
International, Comparative, and Geographical Political Economy. This potential is 
methodologically operationalized in the incorporated comparison which prefers substantive 
to the formalistic comparative approach (McMichael, 1990, 2000). The incorporated 
comparison embeds the inter-scalar comparison of the three – EU, national and subnational 
– scales of European integration. We can thus analyse the EU´s spatial and historical 
reordering and its post-2004 eastward expansion as interrelated, while avoid various 
methodologically centrist traps (Jessop et al., 2008). As practiced already by Drahokoupil 
(2009a), this substantive strategy builds a single-case oriented multi-scalar approach which 
puts the in-depth study of Czech case in Cohesion Policy into the centre of analysis. We can 
firstly understand the TRPD as an interlinking variable which takes different, yet interrelated 
scalar articulations as (i) development fix on the EU scale, (ii) dependent developmental states 
on the Visegrád state scale, and (iii) rescaled dependency on the Visegrád subnational scale. 
Observing such general tendencies, the single-case oriented multi-scalar approach allows for 
then for their concrete substantiation.  
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The substantivist approach departs from the critique of neo-institutionalist EU studies and 
CC mainstream literatures in order to arrive at a critical materialist CC standpoint. The critical 
perspective reconciles the problem-solving inquiries into institutional performance with focus 
on socioeconomic inequalities and power asymmetries. More concretely, we can thus 
decipher how these inequalities and asymmetries between cores and peripheries shape but 
are simultaneously being regularize or normalized in the social purpose of EU governance or 
better the developmental purpose of Cohesion Policy. The critical materialist CC stream 
combines critical realist and historical materialist standpoints to understand social life as 
historically ordered into open-ended and contingent material structures which pre-exist and 
thus limit human agents but are simultaneously (re)produced by them through their 
discursive interactions (Van Apeldoorn, 2004). The political economic difference consists in 
the emphasis on the fact that we must talk about capitalist social life where social power and 
production relations are basis of socioeconomic institutions in the variegated landscapes of 
global capitalism (Bruff, 2011; Macartney and Shields, 2011). This perspective allows us to 
incorporate the spatiotemporal repositioning among the various levels and units of analysis 
as much as to grasp uneven interrelationships between the TRPD´s material and ideological 
dimensions through the means of qualitative methodological strategy. 
We thus avoid the formal juxtaposing of the TRPD articulation on the three– EU 
supranational, Visegrád national, and Visegrád subnational – scales as units of analysis to be 
“separate vehicles of common or contrasting patterns of variation“ (McMichael, 2000: 671). 
Rather, the single-case oriented multi-scalar approach follows the substantivist “inquiry, 
where process-instances are comparable because they are historically connected and 
mutually conditioning“ and units are compared „in relation to one another and in relation to 
the whole formed through their inter-relationship“ (McMichael, 2000: 671). The incorporated 
comparison opens up thus to conceive the three scalar entry points as interrelated and 
analyses the historically cumulative processes of the Cohesion Policy´s transformation across 
its 1960s origins, late 1980s turning point, the eastern enlargement and until the post-crisis 
2010s. This sort of multi-scalar substantivism tries to make sense of “unity in diversity without 
reifying either” as the units of analysis become “specified in time and place” rather than 
“outside time and space relations” (McMichael, 1990: 395). From that viewpoint, the in-depth 
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single case study of Czechia in and of Cohesion Policy is observed from a polymorphous 
perspective on Visegrád capitalism in the EU´s variegated integration. 
Instead of treating the units of analysis as self-enclosed, I sympathetically move from the 
neo-institutionalist varieties of capitalism (VoC) (Hall and Soskice, 2001) paradigm on the 
comparative institutional advantages to the heterodox variegated capitalism (Peck and 
Theodore, 2007; Sum and Jessop, 2013) perspective. The heterodox perspective is cognizant 
of transnational power relations (Bohle and Greskovits, 2009) and socioeconomic inequalities 
(Ebenau, 2012). This allows to research the Czech case in Cohesion Policy as inherent to the 
spatiotemporarily emergent TRPD within the semantic (ideological), socio-institutional 
(institutional), and infrastructural (material) levels of development fix. The Czech single-case 
and comparative approach brings the in-depth qualitative analysis of the central case into the 
discussion to make concrete translation of the development fix into dependent 
developmental states (material, institutions, and ideological) in the Visegrád variety of 
capitalism. Under these conditions, the single-case standpoint allows both for theoretical 
generalization and then to test the theoretical propositions regarding the TRPD in CEE. The 
comparison enables then the compositional exploration of the single case as an integral part 
of global or at least European spatiotemporal variation in outcomes but makes also sense of 
causal regularities which the contextualization of the single case makes observable. 
As for concrete methods, I use a mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches. They are 
concerned with the reading of primary documents (i.e. reports, strategies, legal regulation) 
produced in the domain of Cohesion Policy and the interpretation of economic data on its 
redistributive character from the 1960s/1988 up to the mid-2010s. For the qualitative content 
analysis, I am using the interpretative reading of these documents at all the three scales 
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Montgomerie, 2017). These documents are produced by the 
Commission, the Visegrád national governments, and the Visegrád regional and municipal 
governments. Each empirical chapter starts with identifying these types of documents and 
their position in the inter-textual and inter-scalar hierarchies of the TRPD. As for the three 
(inter)scalar entry points, the timeframes of identified documents change, although they are 
researched through their varied interrelationship within the TRPD. On the EU scale, the 
content analysis covers strategic documents which have been published by the Commission 
between the 1960s/1980s to the mid-2010s. On the Visegrád scale, the national and 
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subnational strategic documents are then compared in the timeframe of 2004 and mid-2010s. 
Within these same timeframes, I search for economic data inside and outside of the Cohesion 
Policy as a supportive means of the content analysis to illustrate the material context of the 
institutional and ideological dimensions of the TRPD. 
The reason for selecting the in-depth study of Czech case in Cohesion Policy is clear. First, 
Czechia forms a Visegrád middle ground in economic integration but facilities a more 
Eurosceptic political context. Along with Slovakia, Czechia represents the most radical turn 
from nationalist to integrationist states projects in the late 1990s (Drahokoupil, 2009a). In the 
mid-2010s crisis, these projects remained politically more resilient than the ones in Hungary 
and Poland which turned to political and economic nationalism (Toplišek, 2019). Unlike 
Slovakia, Czechia restrained from entering the EMU membership along with Poland and 
Hungary (Pechova, 2012). Moreover, it recorded relatively higher co-incidence of harder and 
open Euroscepticism at both levels of party-based politics and overall society than the rest of 
Visegrád societies (Kopecký and Mude, 2002; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004). This long-term 
combination of middle-ground socioeconomic integration and more hostile socio-political 
context allows us to test the role of Cohesion Policy in making the EU a hegemonic order. 
Second, it is the best ground for testing the EU funds as economic concessions in the 
dilemmas of (pre-accession) dependence, (post-accession) embeddedness and (post-)crisis 
resilience. As evidenced in many instances below (see Tables 1.1 and 2), Czechia´s public 
investment and general economic convergence has been less reliant on structural funding in 
all these periods (EC, 2010a: 249; 2014a: xvi; 2017: xxii). As illustrated too (see Table 3.4, 
Graph 5.2, Plate 4.2), Czech socioeconomic indicators allowed to observe its development 
position as “moderately developed” in contrast to the “less developed” Visegrád rest (EC, 
2010a: x, 2; 2014a: viii, 15; 2017: viii, 16). Slovakia converged on this status over time, while 
Poland and Hungary remained in the latter category. The Czech case allows thus to test the 
dependency thesis in the less dependent and more embedded Visegrád case with respect to 
the cohesion assistance as economic concessions. 
The Czech case is thus an empirical mirror of the Cohesion Policy as TRPD. Through the 
approach of incorporated comparison, the three-scalar empirical comparison allows then for 
a generalizing theorization of the Cohesion Policy and recognizing the empirical particularities 
of the central case in these broader general tendencies. The TRPD as an interlinking variable 
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can be thus conceptualized as development fix, dependent developmental state, and rescaled 
dependency on the three scales through a conceptual discovery which is then substantiated 
through the empirical research. The organization of this two-way inquiry in explained below. 
1.4. Outline of the Thesis 
The structure of this thesis reflects the structure of its argument. It consists of a 
methodological-conceptual introduction, theoretical chapter and two following empirical 
parts including two chapters each. The theoretical chapter accounts for the conceptual 
discovery, while the empirical parts for the empirical substation of the TRPD. In sum, this 
analysis covers the transformation of Cohesion Policy and Visegrád states before and after 
the eastern enlargement and during the global economic crisis. 
The theoretical part I – introduction chapter 1, theoretical chapter 2, and also the 
concluding chapter 7 – identifies the existing knowledge gaps, operationalizes the 
comparative framework and incubates the theory-driven conceptual discovery. The 
interlinking concept is the TRPD. In relation to the interlinking concept, this part presents 
three navigating concepts. The concept of development fix examines the Cohesion Policy´s 
multifaceted enabling role in the transnational (re)regulation of power asymmetries and 
socioeconomic inequalities in Europe´s core-peripheral relations. The concept of dependent 
developmental state inquiries into the role of Cohesion Policy in shaping state strategies 
within the Visegrád-type accumulation regime. Third, the concept of rescaled dependency 
relates to the policy´s role in mobilizing subnational economic self-governance. The chapter 
2 provides especially open-ended questions for the next two parts which reflects the 
dilemmatic nature of regulating uneven development in European capitalist heterogeneity 
and how its abstract equalization-differentiation logic unravelled concretely across the three 
scales (see Box 1.1). 
In the empirical part II – chapters 3 and 4 – historizes the development fix as inherent to 
the transformation of Cohesion Policy since its 1960s origins to the mid-2010s. It grapples 
then with two interrelated questions: How has the Cohesion Policy shaped core-peripheral 
relations in the EU´s enlarged transnational capitalism and vice versa over time? What 
developmental purpose has been evolving in the Cohesion Policy´s development strategies 
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and how have they become tendentially hegemonic in solving the question of uneven and 
(inter)dependent development in Europe? In chapter 3, I explore thus the formation of 
cohesion governance and how it institutionalized core-peripheral redistribution into a 
cohesion consensus. I focus on the Commission´s agency in producing this asymmetric 
consensus through the dilemma between core solidarity and peripheral effectiveness. 
Accordingly, the cohesion governance has historically privileged the effectiveness discourse 
which responsibilizes the peripheral states for effects of cohesion governance as a post-
Fordist type of development governance. 
 
 
In the chapter 4, I study then the Commission-led transformation of its developmental 
purpose. The chapter identifies the formation of neoliberal developmentalism as a post-
Fordist strategy oriented at regulating uneven and (inter)dependent development in Europe. 
Looking into the developmental purpose of Cohesion Policy, I show how neoliberal 
developmentalism emerged from the dilemmatic interplay between the discourses of 
cohesion and competitiveness. Accordingly, the dilemma has been resolved in the discursive 
primacy of competitiveness. Thus, I argue that the TRPD is de facto a post-Fordist 
development strategy which reconfigures the development fix to regularize discourses of 
effective (institutional) performance and (socioeconomic) competitiveness in peripheries and 









national – peripheral 
dependent 
developmental state 
national consumption integrationist investment 
regional – peripheral 
rescaled dependency 
sociospatial justice competitive regionalism  
Source: Own preparation 
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under the conditions of lowering core solidarity. This is documented as a global trend 
preceding but simultaneously intensifying with the eastern enlargement. 
The empirical part III - chapters 5 and 6 – solves two questions as well: What sort of state 
transnationalization-cum-transformation has the Cohesion Policy enabled? Has it led to any 
variety of developmental arrangements and purpose inside Visegrád state projects and their 
catch-up strategies? If the Cohesion Policy as the EU´s de facto regional and urban policy 
promoted multi-level governance, what has been rescaled downwards within these state 
projects and through these catch-up strategies? The chapter 5 is thus dealing with the post-
2004 dependent development projects in Visegrád states, while having Czechia as a central 
case study. Here, I expand the existing research on Visegrád state projects. I explore how the 
effectiveness discourse has been operationalized into cohesion bureaucracies which form a 
nodal agency between transnational integration and national embeddedness of these 
development projects. Analyzing this socio-institutional fixing, I research how the 
effectiveness-driven transnationalization opens the national dilemma of consumption and 
investment with respect to cohesion transfers. The result is the contradictory tendency of the 
dependent developmental states: The cohesion investment is either invested under the 
Commission´s disciplinary supervision into the enhancement of FDI-based competitiveness or 
captured by the political and economic elites of Visegrád states through grand corruption 
schemes. More particularly, I explore how the visions of R&D and innovation and corruption-
free good governance, which increasingly underpin the neoliberal developmentalism on the 
supranational level, form the new catch-up promise.  
In the last chapters 6, it is documented how the Visegrád developmental states rescale the 
dependency management to local elites. This management translates the dilemmas on upper 
scales into the last dilemma between sociospatial justice of equalized inter-regional 
redistribution and competitive city-regionalism. Using Brno and the South Moravian Region, 
which is one of the Visegrád leading second-tier city-regions, as its central case, the chapter 
surveys how the Cohesion Policy enabled this rescaled dependency. I explore how it enabled 
the formation of a locally-led hegemonic project of competitive city-regionalism which 
incorporates the local growth coalition and transforms it into local developmental coalition. 
The analysis of Brno´s innovation-oriented local project gives a pretext to analyse the 
investment process of large-scale urban flagship projects in Brno. In this chapter, I focus thus 
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on the analysis of these innovation infrastructures, especially the case of Central European 
Institute of Technology (CEITEC). Reconstructing the investment process behind this project, 
I explore the micro-agential practices of local mobilization in the concrete infrastructural 
fixing. This completes the previous analysis of macro-structural processes inherent to the 




2. Theorizing Cohesion Policy: Transnational Regulation of 
Peripheral Development 
This chapter theorizes the Cohesion Policy as a TRPD by synthetizing the mutually 
overlapping yet disconnected literatures, while filling the identified theoretical gaps with a 
conceptual discovery. It departs from the critical engagement with the EU studies scholarship. 
The EU studies debate represents the main source of knowledge-production on the Cohesion 
Policy. Competing over the explanations of the inter-institutional relations in Cohesion Policy, 
EU studies scholars only implicitly situate their research into power struggles over the 
regulation of Europe´s capitalist heterogeneity. They neither analyse the institutional 
embeddedness of Cohesion Policy in the power asymmetries and socioeconomic inequalities, 
nor the purpose underpinning their regularization. Much of it is due to the multiple 
reductionist tendencies inherent to the mainstream EU studies research which take roots in 
the discipline’s neo-institutionalist origins and problem-solving bias (Ryner and Carfuny, 
2016). The contemporary research tends to further narrow the theoretical viewpoint away 
from politics to the issues of public policy (Piattoni and Polverari, 2016). My critical 
engagement does not however throw the baby out with the neo-institutionalist bathwater as 
I sympathetically explain its merit when theorizing the Cohesion Policy as a TRPD. 
Against this background, this chapter aims to provide theoretical guidance on the question 
opened in the introduction chapter and simultaneously facilitate the theoretical framework 
for the empirical chapters. This is done with respect to the multi -scalar dilemmas elaborated 
therein (see Box 1.1). The mainstream EU studies research substitutes the absent critical 
political economy perspective on Cohesion Policy. It also safeguards the critical perspective 
from the trap of overly pessimist reading of contemporary capitalist relations in Europe 
(Šitera, 2015, 2017; Bruff and Ebenau 2017). Producing such a perspective, I engage the EU 
studies literatures on Cohesion Policy with the critical materialist conjunction of heterodox 
varieties of political economy on European integration and CEE (Nölke, 2011; Sheppard, 2011; 
Shields, Bruff and Macartney, 2011; Ebenau et al., 2015). The conceptualization of TRPD is 
the result of this engagement. 
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The chapter proceeds as follows: First, it departs from the sympathetic critique of the EU 
studies scholarship with respect to the (liberal) intergovernmentalist and (multi-level) 
governance approaches. Informed by the critique, it introduces then the conceptualization of 
development fix through the regulationist and VoC-inspired discussion of its semantic, socio-
institutional and infrastructural dimensions. Third, I interconnect the discussion with the CC 
and EU studies literatures on CEE to theorize the dependent developmental states. Last, I 
finish the literatures on the multi-level governance and post-socialist urban transformation 
in CEE with respect to the rescaled dependency. 
2.1. Beyond the EU Studies Scholarship on the Cohesion Policy  
The EU studies scholarship on the Cohesion Policy is locked in the binary discussion 
between intergovernmentalist and supranationally-oriented governance scholars. A solution 
to this debate has been the middle standpoint of multi-level governance approaches (Kohler-
Koch and Rittberger, 2006). However, this standpoint only reproduces the scholarship’s 
institutionalist reductionisms with respect to the EU as a regulatory laboratory of new 
governance methods. The alternative stream of constructivist/discursive institutionalist 
approaches (Hay and Rosamond, 2002; Schmidt and Thatcher, 2014) or even critical European 
Studies ignore the Cohesion Policy altogether. Although the EU studies field fails to embed 
the Cohesion Policy into the transnational power relations and neglected its developmental 
purpose, it provides still a helpful starting viewpoint on the TRPD. We can however use it only 
when recasting the EU studies in a more critical manner. 
The theoretical narrowness stems from the scholarship´s ontological origins in the four 
new institutionalisms. These dominate the political and social sciences research including the 
CC mainstream literatures (Hall et al., 1996; Pollack, 2008; Schmidt, 2010). Despite of its 
reductionist bias, the institutionalism establishes a bridge between the EU Studies on 
Cohesion Policy and the political economy. The rational-choice institutionalism and its 
concepts, which originated in neoclassical economics, dominate still the analysis of Cohesion 
Policy. They are also central to the synthesis of other three historical, sociological, and 
constructivist institutionalisms. The synthesis builds on the transactionist paradigm. The 
paradigm perceives European integration as driven by either inter-state bargaining or 
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accumulative and complex interactions of institutionally individualized agents in the 
emergent multi-level governance. The former one views central governments as rational 
actors which use cost-benefit analysis to calculate and negotiate their own national 
preferences in the European Council and the Council of the EU. The later sees the 
governments as sharing power with other supranational institutional actors such as the 
Commission and subnational actors in the lower tiers of governance so that the costs and 
benefits are redistribute across the multi-level polity. Both reduce the research into a 
problem-solving observation of functional positions and efficient performances in the narrow 
realm of inter-institutional relations. 
The EU studies approaches nevertheless provide important inputs on inter-state relations 
and their regional ordering for the TRPD theorization. Intergovernmentalists understand the 
unceasing role of state managers in structuring the European integration through inter-state 
bargaining and within the relative autonomy of their national institutional realms. In contrast, 
governance approaches intermediate the daily agenda-setting power of multi-level 
bureaucracies under the Commission´s leadership. Recasting the EU studies approaches 
through a political economy perspective requires, however, to analytically embed both in 
global capitalist relations. Thereby, the interpretation of Cohesion Policy must go beyond the 
handling of politics and economy as external to each other and individualistic reading of the 
agenda as an insulate institutional form of Cohesion Policy. 
2.1.1. Recasting (Liberal) Intergovernmentalist Approaches 
Due to their methodological nationalism, intergovernmentalists are less cognizant of how 
the Cohesion Policy enacts state transformations. However, the liberal strand of this state-
centrist perspective is useful for its threefold inquiry into the “asymmetric interdependence” 
(Moravcsik, 1993) which underlines the inter-state consensus in the distributional conflict 
over the Cohesion Policy. First, it views the core-periphery transfers in the Cohesion Policy as 
indispensable for such a consensus. Second, it emphasizes that the bargaining terms of this 
redistributive consensus are asymmetric and depend rather on state preferences of core than 
peripheral governments, whereas the Commission supervises the compliance with the core-
peripheral deal. Last, it explains the institutional diversity of Cohesion Policy across states as 
a result of the sovereign autonomy of central governments against the Commission. 
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However, this state-centric and narrowly rationalist perspective prevents the 
intergovernmentalists to take the full implications of their analysis with respect to the 
asymmetric consensus as documented below. 
Shifting the explanations of cohesion transfers from impactless “pork-barrel politics” 
(Wallace, 1977) to functional “side-payments” (Moravcsik, 1991), intergovernmentalists 
understand them as economic concessions to peripheral states. This explains the asymmetry 
of core-peripheral relations between net-recipient and net-paying states (see Table 1.1). The 
cohesion transfers are understood as co-opting means to offset peripheral state managers 
and populations for otherwise core-dominated and market-making integration process. The 
eastern enlargement exemplifies this argument (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003; 
Vachudova, 2005). The rationalist bias explains these transfers initially as “trade-off” or 
“compensation bargain” for the South European periphery and then “extended bargain” for 
CEE periphery (Allen, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2010). However, the literature does not go beyond 
interpreting the cohesion transfers as an agreed lump-sum concession which only functionally 
underpins the inter-state consensus. Neither does it attempt to conceptualize how these 
politically negotiated transfers entangle with Europe´s other circuits of capital to fully 
appreciate the argument about the peripheral integration. Nor is there any appreciation of 
their developmental purpose beyond the functional consensus. 
Intergovernmentalists acknowledge the asymmetric power relations between net-paying 
and -receiving states, which facilitates binary but still a historical pattern of core-peripheral 
bargaining. They observe how the core paymasters strive to minimize the volume of cohesion 
transfers, while simultaneously calling for their stricter oversight under the “value for money” 
heading (Anderson, 1990; Pollack, 1995). The peripheral state managers tend simultaneously 
to maximize the volume due to the bargaining rationale but also as a concession to the 
ongoing market-enabling integration. Beside this, the state-centric lenses contribute little in 
explaining the differentiated impact of these inter-state asymmetries on power relations 
between peripheral states and the Commission. With respect to the value-for-money 
discourse, which I research in the next chapter 3, there has been accordingly no impact on 
net-recipient states. Using the rationalist principal-agent approach, the states are understood 
in unison as being principals in the Cohesion Policy during both inter-state negotiations and 
national implementations (Blom-Hansen, 2005). This reading offers a limited but helpful 
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appreciation of power asymmetries. Negotiating the consensus, the bargaining is skewed to 
core preferences which officially require the Commission bureaucrats to privilege a stricter 
oversight of cohesion investment in peripheries. Perceiving the Commission as a simple agent 
of these (inter)governmental principals downplays however the resulting power asymmetries 
during the implementation period between the Commission the peripheral states.  
National governments are then viewed as “extended gatekeeper” in relations to the 
Commission bureaucrat´s execution of the negotiated consensus (Bache, 1999). National 
governments operate subsequently at all stages and levels of implementation which 
assumedly counters the argument about the Cohesion Policy´s role in empowering 
subnational regions and the Commission at once (Sutcliffe, 2000). The scope of the 
gatekeeping explains then the national institutional diversity of cohesion agenda across the 
individual states. Pointing out the ongoing resilience of state managers within the national 
government is important as they remain central nodes interconnecting the EU´s multilevel 
governance even in peripheral states. To treat them as insulate institutional actors, however, 
perpetrates the dichotomist view on the functional contest over subnational, national and 
supranational sovereignties which otherwise exist in socioeconomic vacuum. The variation is 
then individualized as a (sub)national failure to reach the supposedly neutral cohesion and 
clearcut goals such as the sociospatial justice inherent to the emancipation of subnational 
regions and proportional allocation of the funding to those most underdeveloped (De Rynck 
and McAleavey, 2001; Stoffel and Dellmuth, 2012; Bloom and Petrova, 2013). The neutrality 
is explained as being compromised by the deliberate policy (non-)compliance, political 
distortion or institutional incapacity of peripheral (sub-)national actors. However, I claim that 
taking uncritically the institutional rules for granted omits how the national variation is driven 
not only by institutional relations but the contradictory dilemmas of the Cohesion Policy´s 
developmental purpose. 
Exemplifying the relative persistence of state autonomy in the TRPD, 
intergovernmentalists cannot however reach beyond the world of states. Their state-centric 
analysis fails to take consequently its own suggestion about the cohesion transfers as 
economic concessions institutionalized in an asymmetric cohesion consensus of the core-
dominated international regime. The institutionalist reduction of states into insulate and 
transhistorically unchanging units is neither helpful. Intergovernmentalists hardly notice how 
25 
 
the transnational inequalities in the economic interdependence condition the asymmetric 
political position of peripheral states in relation to the Commission. In the chapter 3, I show 
how the cohesion consensus skewed these relations through the effectiveness discourse of 
EU added value – as an extension of value-for-money discourse – to regularize the core-
peripheral asymmetry. As then evidenced in chapter 4, along with the competitiveness 
discourse, it also shifted the responsibilities for solving socioeconomic inequalities to the 
peripheral catch-up. 
2.1.2. Recasting (Multi-level) Governance Approaches 
A more pluralist account of the TRPD is provided by the governance approaches which 
analyse the institutional forms of Cohesion Policy in the emergent multi-level regional order. 
Governance scholars are interested in the variation of new forms, modes or networks of 
institutional actors across the Cohesion Policy´s supranational, national, and subnational 
levels of governance (Marks, 1996; Ferry and McMaster, 2013). They highlight the 
Commission´s “conditional leadership” (Wozniak Boyle, 2006) and acknowledge its 
asymmetric relations with peripheral states when explaining the varied emergence of 
subnational governance inside the cohesion agenda. There is also an inquiry into the policy 
content of the agenda, although the scholarship narrows it into problem-solving explanations 
of making the compliance and surveillance more efficient. This views the Europeanization as 
only a coupling of policy rules and norms and (post-)accession conditionalities in CEE 
(Schimmelfering and Sedelmeier, 2004; Börzel and Sedelmeier, 2017). Although taken more 
complexly, the transfers of cohesion investment are then researched by asking whether the 
policy norms enable more effective financial and rule compliance (Bachtler and Mendez, 
2013; Mendez and Bachtler, 2017). The governance approaches identify and simultaneously 
naturalize a loosely connected institutional skeleton decision-making hierarchies in the 
Cohesion Policy, while hardly engaging with the surrounding socioeconomic flesh. 
Governance scholars privilege the Commission as agenda-setter for the inter-state 
bargaining and, in disagreement with intergovernmentalist, explore it as a principal during 
the implementation periods in peripheral states (Bachtler and Mendez, 2007). They also 
uncover the Commission’s central position when powerfully shaping the national variation in 
the plural policy networks of cohesion bureaucracies. Among others, the partnership 
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principle is identified at central technology of governance in this (see Table 3.1 and 3.2). The 
principle underpins the nodal agency between the vertical hierarchies of bureaucratic 
networks organized by the Commission and horizontal hierarchies od domestic governance 
networks within member states (Thielemann, 2002; Dąbrowski, Bachtler and Bafoil, 2014). 
The Commission was identified as a heterogenous agent with internal division between 
neoliberals and supporters of regulated capitalism with respect to the Cohesion Policy 
(Hooghe, 1998). This conflict includes the cleavages among its various Directorate-Generals 
(DG) such as the DG REGIO, as a de facto ministry of Cohesion Policy, and those representing 
competition policy agendas (Wishlade, 1998). Yet, the analysis treats the Commission as 
locked in the supranational governance level rather than operating in and through the 
transnational network of cohesion governance and organizing its embeddedness in broader 
socioeconomic relations. 
Europeanization is then researched as a policy content of cohesion governance with its 
performance-oriented concerns of effectiveness and efficiency. Much of it studies the 
potential of effective compliance with supranational policy rules and norms by national and 
supranational actors. When social constructivism is employed, it measures the level of 
Europeanization as a degree to which the cohesion bureaucracies in peripheral states 
efficiently socialize with the compliance norms (Scherpereel, 2010; Bachtler et al., 2014). 
Parallelly, the scholarship makes sense of the methods of new economic governance in the 
Cohesion Policy (Mendez, 2011, 2013). Hereby, governance scholars describe and explain the 
institutional evolution of compliance and surveillance systems. This includes new 
conditionalities, strategic reporting practices, and management principles which 
operationalize hierarchies in the Commission-led networks of cohesion bureaucracies 
(Mairate, 2006; Bachtler and Gorzelak, 2007; Bachtler and Mendez, 2011; Bachtler and Ferry, 
2013). However, the scholarship’s performance bias on policy content studies the Cohesion 
Policy shallowly and tends to normalize rather than problematize the hierarchies which this 
policy content regularizes. 
This relates to the normalization of transnational inequalities when inquiring into the 
agenda´s official purpose of reaching socioeconomic “cohesion” and “convergence” or 
institutional “empowerment” of subnational regions (Smyrl, 1997; Bailey and De Propris, 
2002). Governance researchers observe the impact of Cohesion Policy on the formation of 
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subnational regions in the pre- and post-accession CEE (Brusis, 2002; Bruszt, 2008; Ferry and 
Mcmaster 2005). The Europeanization of subnational regions is however understood as only 
an institutional problem of varied compliance with or resistance to transferred norms, 
conditionalities, and principles such as the partnership. Institutional incapacities or shallow 
(non-)compliance drive the variation (Dąbrowski, 2011, 2012, 2014). The question of 
empowering the subnational actors reifies then the individualized logic of inter-institutional 
balancing among self-enclosed (sub)national units in socioeconomic vacuum. The question of 
inequalities appears when measuring the performance of Cohesion Policy in mobilizing inter-
regional convergence through effective absorption of cohesion investment and implementing 
the strategic planning on subnational level (Tatar, 2011; Dąbrowski and Piskorek, 2018). Its 
failure is attributed to the (sub)national funding misallocation, institutional incapacity or 
varied undermining of supranational policy norms oriented at convergence (Rodríguez-Pose 
and Fratesi, 2004; Simona, 2007; Surubaru, 2017). Once again, there is no critical inquiry into 
the purpose of the terms such as cohesion, convergence or empowerment. The failure to 
reach (sub)national convergence is then individualized as an institutional failure of peripheral 
states and regions. 
Governance approach takes thus the heterogeneity problem in the TRPD more seriously. 
It allows explaining the state transformation as inherent to the formation of EU as a multi-
level order. It also exemplifies the Commission´s position of an institutional entrepreneur 
which intermediates inter-state bargaining, while building multi-level networks of cohesion 
bureaucracies to play the decision-making principal during the implementation process. 
However, their inquiry into the content of cohesion governance only normalizes the master 
policy discourses of EU “added value” (Mairate, 2006), performance, and overall compliance. 
This either neglects or normalizes power asymmetries and socioeconomic inequalities. 
In contrast, the chapter 3 denaturalizes the effectiveness discourse as a power discourse 
which privileges the Commission’s decision-making and agenda-setting in peripheral states 
and regions through the governance technologies such as the partnership (see Table 3.1 and 
3.2). Furthermore, it also engages with the changing meaning of cohesion and convergence 
discourses when analyzing them in the inter-relationship with the competitiveness discourse 
in the production of Cohesion Policy´s developmental purpose. 
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2.2. Cohesion Policy in Europe´s Capitalist Order 
The concept of development fix deepens the EU studies scholarship inquiry. It allows us to 
embed the institutional form of TRPD into the scholarship´s elephant in the room: the 
regulation of Europe´s uneven and (inter)dependent development. I do this by bringing in the 
CC literatures on the European core-peripheral relations. In this sense, the development fix 
denotes the transnational-organized efforts to replaces the crisis-ridden tendencies in these 
relations by regulating the peripheral development. As explained in the chapter 1, I take 
advantage of the regulationist view on the EU as a post-Fordist mode of multi-level regulation 
which transnationally reorders the continental capitalist heterogeneity. This reordering is 
inherent to the equalization-differentiation dilemma which translates into the concrete 
overlaps between solidarity-effectiveness and cohesion-competitiveness dilemmas on the EU 
scale (see Box 1.1). My aim is to address the role of the Cohesion Policy in negotiating the 
power asymmetries over the resolving these dilemmas of Europe´s core-peripheral relations. 
Connecting to the EU studies literatures, the development fix makes thus further sense of the 
inter-state consensus and its multi-level governance within the TRPD as a hegemonic strategy 
to make the EU coherent on its peripheries and in the context of global circuits of capital. 
The empirical substantiation of the development fix is facilitated in the chapters 3 and 4. 
Here, I provide the theoretical-conceptual particularities which all refer to the discussion of 
spatiotemporal fix (Harvey, 1981, 2003; Jessop 2006, 2013). As sketched in the Table 2.1, the 
development fix is contingently reconstituted through the mutually conditioned production 
of (i) infrastructural, (ii) socio-institutional, and (iii) semantic fixing. As the development fix is 
always unstable, all its three material, institutional and ideological levels are continuously 
changing but also analysed on all the three scales of European integration. This way, TRPD 
can be analysed as constituting primarily a socio-institutional form which governs Europe´s 
heterogeneity dilemma by pattering the peripheral regimes in sync with the core regimes of 
accumulation as it shapes the peripheral development strategies in the EU´s multi-level mode 
of regulation. The socio-institutional fixing is mutually constituted at the intermediate level 
with semantic and infrastructural fixing. By infrastructural fixing, I denote the cohesion 
investment transfers which as development aid flows are simultaneously fixed through the 
TRPD into peripheral infrastructural conditions of their physical and human resources. The 
semantic fixing refers then to the selective privileging of  hegemonic visions in the 
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development purpose which are further institutionally regularized into the strategies of 
developmental (institutional and infrastructural) change in the TRPD. 
In other words, I provide framework for grasping the variegated change in spatial and 
strategic selectivity (Brenner, 2004; Jessop, 2008a, 2008; Lagendijk, 2007) of Cohesion Policy 
from its 1960s origins to the mid-2010s. I am less interested in the problem-solving inquiry 
into performance but critically review it through the neo-Gramscian regulationist perspective 
on transnational socioeconomic inequalities and power asymmetries (Bieler and Morton, 
2001; Carfuny and Ryner, 2003; Van Apeldoorn et al., 2009; Nousios et al., 2012). However, I 
equally make case for studying the TRPD as an enabling development arrangement of 
consensual peripheral co-optation which is oriented at periodical reconstitution of EU´s 
market-enabling structured coherence. 
2.2.1. Infrastructural Fixing 
The infrastructural fixing is best understood by geographical political economists. This way, 
the development fix manifests itself most literarily through the real investment process which 
embeds the cohesion flows “in and on the land for a relatively long period of time“ (Harvey, 
2004: 115). As the Table 2.1 suggests, we can study the cohesion transfers as a public 
investment in “(European and global) circuits of capital” which are organized through 
particular state-rescaling strategies into human and physical infrastructures (Brenner, 2004: 
16, 259-206; 2019: 46-86). As I illustrate in the part I, the infrastructural fixing embeds the 
core-peripheral inequalities in the Single Market and the EMU when filling the infrastructural 
peripheral gap to also enable their participation in the EU´s comprehensive Lisbon Agenda 
and Europe 2020 strategies. The state-rescaling paradigm allows us to understand the 
cohesion-competitiveness dilemma which I research in the chapter 4. Accordingly, the post-
Fordist development strategies solve the dilemma by orienting the investment on the 
redistributive equalization of immobile capital so that the differentiating operability of mobile 
capital can be simultaneously promoted. The Cohesion Policy underpinned this EU´s state-
rescaling dilemma of fixing Europe´s infrastructural gaps and socioeconomic inequalities 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































For Harvey, the infrastructural fix aims at establishing conditions for the 
“complementarity” of global circuits of capital (Harvey, 1982: 407-408). The infrastructural 
fixing is underpinned mainly by the (i) fixed capital along with (ii) the technological innovation, 
on the one hand and (iii) the consumption patterns along with (iv) social expenditures on the 
other. The “fixed capital” (Harvey, 1982: 204-38, 264-5) forms a built environment that 
enables ongoing accumulation. It consists of large-scale flagship projects such as transport, 
communication, and innovation infrastructures. The types of these infrastructural conditions 
have differed between the Fordist and post-Fordist ones but their productivist orientation is 
similar as explored below. Although primarily immobile, the fixed capital moreover circulates 
indirectly as its value becomes integrated into the mobile capital (investment, goods, services, 
labour) with the spatially expanding accumulation cycle of production, distribution, exchange 
and consumption. These infrastructures facilitate a double function as some of them – 
highways or airports – constitute fixed inputs in the “consumption fund” (Harvey, 1982: 229-
231; 256-5). Besides these physical infrastructures, other – social, human, and environmental 
infrastructures – became part of build environment with respect to the conditions oriented 
at the (re)production of healthy, skilled, and appeased labour (Brenner, 2019: 130-1). The 
cohesion transfers can be analysed as filling this infrastructural gap and embedding thus the 
peripheral development in the EU. 
The role of state in the infrastructural fixing was further explained by Jessop (2002) and 
Brenner (1999, 2003). In capitalism, infrastructural conditions are secured through state-
organized public investment into the built environment. Besides different national variations 
of state involvement in economy, there were two historical manifestations of its 
infrastructural fixing in the Western core. First, the Fordist strategies were characteristic of 
“spatial Keynesianism” (Brenner, 2004: 114-171, 181-188). Spatial Keynesianism was realized 
on national scale and preferred equalizing strategies which embedded Europe´s market-
reordering in national regimes of accumulation, while the capital remained bound to national 
projects. Second, the post-Fordist logic of state-rescaling foregrounds differentiation in 
development of Europe´s multi-scalar landscapes as an investment goal for spatial 
redistribution of fixed capital. The post-Fordist strategies incentivize state managers to 
privilege core regions as places of strategic infrastructural investment to make them fully 
competitive in the transnationalizing accumulation process. Therefore, all city-regional 
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“growth coalitions” are simultaneously mobilized to form strategies of “urban 
entrepreneurialism” to promote own regions in the capital circuits through upgrading their 
large-scale physical and social infrastructures (Harvey, 1989; Jessop et al.; Brenner and 
Theodore, 2002; Brenner, 2019). West European states and the EU are a prototype of this 
multi-scalar regime change. The state-rescaling was identified in other non-Western and 
originally non-Fordist contexts such as the post-socialist Europe and (post-)development East 
Asia (Drahokoupil, 2007; Park, 2013). This state-rescaling perspective helps us to understand 
the link between the changing spatial selectivity of infrastructural fixing in the Cohesion Policy 
and the peripheral states. 
Thus, the infrastructural fixing constitutes literal and primarily material underpinning of 
the core-peripheral relations in the TRPD. However, it cannot be separated from the socio-
institutional and semantic fixing which organise its transformation from cohesion investment 
transfers into the actual infrastructural development. The state-rescaling perspective makes 
a case for studying such rescaling practices which are inherent to the Cohesion Policy (Harvey, 
1996; Brenner, 2009). As Jensen and Richardson (2003) show, the EU used infrastructural 
planning to discursively project itself as a competitiveness-oriented spatial order of an 
accelerated polycentric mobility. As I show in chapter 4, the observation of core-peripheral 
infrastructural gaps has been used by the Commission to legitimize the institutionalization of 
Cohesion Policy into the TRPD in the end. 
2.2.2. Socio-Institutional Fixing 
The analysis of socio-institutional fixing brings together the regulationist perspective (Peck 
and Tickell, 1994; Jessop, 2001) with the EU governance as well as the VoC scholars (Crouch 
and Streeck, 1997; Höpner and Schäfer, 2008). This loose exchange addresses how the TRPD 
as an institutional form tendentially establishes the structured coherence of crisis-ridden 
“heterogeneity” in the EU (Becker, 2014). We must however go beyond the VoC framework 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001) and its broader CC critique about methodological nationalism, 
institutionalist determinism, microeconomic bias, absent role of state, and its overt 
orientation on the Western core among others. This critical inquiry highlights then the more 
nuanced version of the institutionalist CC perspective´s main conceptual underpinning: 
institutional complementarity (May and Nölke, 2015: 88-89). In the chapter 3, I show how the 
33 
 
Commission became a leading institutional entrepreneur which organized the inter-state 
cohesion consensus to synchronize the multi-scalar complementarities between the 
peripheral socioeconomic institutions and the emergent multi-level mode of regulation. This 
was then oriented at resolving the (core) solidarity-(peripheral) effectiveness dilemma 
inherent to the heterogeneity problem. Trying to resolve it, I document how the Commission 
legitimized the coordination of such complementarities and coherence-seeking “nodal 
agency” (Chibber, 2002: 958-960) which embedded these complementarities in the  multi-
level networks of cohesion governance as a strategy to transnationalize the peripheral states.   
The concept of institutional complementarity (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003; 
Crouch et al., 2005) explains how socioeconomic institutions form coherent institutional 
orders both nationally and under transnational integration (Nölke, 2011). The CC scholars 
identify multiple central institutions within capitalist accumulation. The corporate (and 
public) governance, financial system (and public investment), industrial relations (and welfare 
state), and (education and private-public) transfer of innovation are the most important as 
exemplified later in the Tables 2.2 and 5.1. To form a coherent national variety of capitalism, 
these institutions must become complementary and organized through the nodal agency of 
bureaucracies in the state apparatus. The individual characteristics of national 
complementarities allow also identifying different forms of integration into global economy 
(Nölke et al., 2015). In the VoC-inspired research, the recognition of state role in organizing 
these complementarities came only gradually and replaced a firm-centric view in which this 
complementary is primarily and productively arranged by the capital (Schmidt, 2009). In CEE, 
the VoC-inspired research highlighted the role of “state capacity” and developmental activity 
in coordinating these complementarities (Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011; Drahokoupil and 
Myant, 2015). These accounts also highlighted the Europeanization as asymmetrically shaping 
this state capacity through reduced autonomy of state action in comparison to Western 
Europe (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007a, 2007b, 2009). Except of some institutionalist accounts 
for CEE (Bruszt and Vukov, 2017; Medve-Bálint and Sčepanović, 2019), the discussion has not 
yet differentiated the role of Cohesion Policy in shaping state capacity in European 
peripheries. 
This perspective allows us to understand what has been governed in Cohesion Policy. 
We can thus link more clearly the research on the EU governance with the CC scholarship on 
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(trans)national complementarities of socioeconomic institutions in the EU. It is possible to 
explain then how the persistent lack of complementarities and nodal agencies makes the EU 
ridden with crisis contradictions in the solidarity-effectiveness dilemma of core-peripheral 
relations inherent to its inter-national and multi-level ordering inside the Single Market and 
the EMU (Nölke, 2016; Streeck and Elsässer, 2016). The combined reading of both literatures 
offers a view on how the Commission-led transnational network of cohesion bureaucracies, 
as I show in chapter 3, governs the heterogeneity contradictions. 
In this perspective, the post-1980s integration was explicitly researched as a dilemma 
between positive and negative integration. Accordingly, the technocratic bureaucracies 
preferred negative integration to solve this heterogeneity dilemma which promotes market-
making reconfiguration of national institutions as barriers to the Single Market and the EMU 
(Höpner and Schäfer, 2010, 2012). Negative integration asymmetrically privileges these 
supranational market institutions at the expense of the socially embedded national models. 
The positive integration into a “European social model” has been simultaneously hindered by 
the growing capitalist diversity, especially with respect to the peripheries, and the political 
incapacity on the supranational level to commit their socially-oriented European convergence 
before and equally after the latest global crisis (Offe, 2001; Scharpf, 2012). This explains the 
scholarship´s pessimist reading of the Cohesion Policy given its impotence to successfully 
regulate core-peripheral relations (Streeck and Elsässer, 2016). Despite this pessimism, the 
literature allows us still to inquire into how the cohesion governance reorders the institutional 
complementarities to embed the peripheral complementarities into and enable thus this 
market-making integration. 
The socio-institutional fixing constitutes then not only the intermediate level of 
development fix. Analyzing the institutional form of Cohesion Policy provides an opportunity 
for the intermediation of EU governance and CC literatures. We can analyse how the TRPD 
not only reorders the peripheral institutional complementarities but links them with the 
complementarity of capital circuits in the EU. Unlike the original VoC approach, the nuanced 
view goes beyond the economistic reading and embeds the cohesion governance in social 
and political interactions and contexts (Streeck, 2012) to think of how particular core national 
models are prioritized as patterns of EU integration. We can also inquire into the 
developmental purpose of this institutional form and discuss the contradiction between its 
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market-correcting and -marking rationalities (Behrens and Smyrl, 1999). At the intersection 
of CC and neo-Gramscian regulationist analysis, the Cohesion Policy was randomly identified 
as inherent to the German “Ordnungspolitik” wherein the state is “neither laissez faire nor 
étatiste, but rather as an ´enabling state´” (Streeck, 1997: 241; Van Apeldoorn, 2002: 163-65, 
180-184). The chapter 3 inquiries into how the TRPD contingently formed into such an 
enabling institutional fixing, which hybridized both the market-making and dirigiste features, 
to explain how this overlapped with the semantic fixing in the chapter 4.  
2.2.3. Semantic Fixing  
The neo-Gramscian approach is suitable for inquiring into the developmental purpose of 
Cohesion Policy but also its production through semantic fixing (Van Apeldoorn, 2002; Bruff, 
2008). The viewpoint allows for a reflexive standpoint between the analysis of the circuits of 
capital and the common-sense analysis of hegemonic (regional or state) projects. 
Neo-Gramscians foreground the transnational inequalities and power relations and the 
strategies of their regularization across the EU´s multi-level mode of regulation. They 
recognize the post-Fordist global transformation in the 1980s and the gradual disruption of 
its hegemony in the global and then eurozone crisis of 2010s (Van Apeldoorn and Overbeek, 
2012). Their critique of institutionalism makes them share ground with the critical 
ideationalist accounts when, in particular, analyzing the comprehensive rise and historical 
configurations of the “competitiveness” discourse (Rosamond, 2002, 2012; Van Apeldoorn, 
2002; Sum and Jessop, 2013). The combination of dependency and neo-Gramscian varieties 
of regulationist approach (Agnew, 2001; Becker and Jäger, 2012; Becker et al., 2016) adds a 
spatial awareness of how the hegemonic visions of competitiveness have been selectively 
privileged over other alternatives such as cohesion in the regulation of Europe´s core-
peripheral relations. In chapter 4, I do thus the genealogy of cohesion-competitiveness 
dilemma and how it merged into the strategic purpose of neoliberal developmentalism.  
Neo-Gramscians analyse the discourse of competitiveness as primarily formed through the 
hegemony of neoliberal transnational project in the EU. Van Apeldoorn (2002) identifies it as a 
result of transnational social struggle with and a later co-option of two alternative class projects 
in the 1980s. Accordingly, the social forces behind the two alternatives – Social-Democratic and 
Euro-mercantilist projects – were integrated through the negotiated consensus. The cohesion 
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consensus entailed a promise of “Social” and selectively protectionist Europe which, under the 
Commission led by Jacques Delors, aimed at a third-way embedding of the competitiveness 
visions. This transnational consensus was however further neoliberalized through the 
Commission-led “asymmetric integration” in the EU´s “multidimensional” and “new economic” 
governance since the 2000s (Holman, 2004b; Van Apeldoorn and Hager, 2008). The asymmetric 
integration was just another articulation of negative integration described by other CC scholars 
which however recognized it as a class-based strategy rather than an institutional dilemma. 
Following the Southern peripheral expansion in the 1980s, the EU´s eastward expansion to CEE 
was a logical consequence of this asymmetric neoliberal project (Holman, 1998, 2004a). What 
is more, the transnational co-option of CEE state-society formations into the project under the 
heading of competitiveness only deepened the asymmetric neoliberalization (Bohle, 2006; 
Shields, 2011). As latecomers to the cohesion consensus, CEE states received less social 
embedding in this already matured neoliberal project. 
The transnational projects were equally variegated historical cumulation of national 
ideologies and accumulation imperatives (Macartney and Shields, 2011; Jessop, 2014b). The 
ideological change was thus not only historical between Fordism and post-Fordism. It was 
also a crystallization of French Euro-mercantilist dirigisme, British globalist neoliberalism, and 
German hybrid of ordoliberalism which, along with other less dominant national models, 
merged into the EU governance (Jessop, 2019). This variegated governance was skewed to 
the imperatives of “German space economy” (Jessop, 2014b) oriented at forming the EU into 
an open and export-oriented order. This space covered the Benelux in the West, Switzerland 
and Northern Italy in the South and crossed Austria to reach Visegrád economies, while 
closing the circle around the Baltics and Northern Europe. Regarding Visegrád economies, the 
correlation of FDI and cohesion flows is clearly visible in the Table 1.1. In the chapter 4, I show 
how the TRPD transformed from tendential supranational dirigisme to this Ordnungspolitik-
type agenda in connection with the EMU, Single Market, and EU Trade Policy. Ordoliberalism 
sets market-enabling intervention which besides establishing basic infrastructural and 
institutional framework to market economy favours Vitalpolitik as a social policy oriented at 
maximizing the competitiveness of the population´s human capital (Bonefeld, 2012). 
Although defining the so-called Sozialmarktwitschaft, its social adjective was only 
materialized in Germany´s social market economy through historical social contestation and 
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negotiation (Young, 2014). Ordoliberalism tends otherwise to constitutionalize austerity in 
Germany and the EU. What is more, the ordoliberal concept of Standortpolitik stood at the 
root of state-rescaling strategies in the EU (Brenner, 2003a, 2004: 16). 
“Neoliberal developmentalism” has been identified at the core of contemporary global 
governance (Sum and Jessop, 2013: 296-323). It was also observed as the core of the EU “multi-
level metagovernance” (Jessop, 2002: 2016-46; Jessop, 2008b). Haahr and Walters (2005: 139) 
identify the Commission as producing this hybrid of ordoliberal and neoliberal 
governmentalization which uses the “matrices of benchmarking and performativity“ to fix 
Europe´s uneven development into a knowable and thus governable socioeconomic space. For 
the EU, the neoliberal developmentalism could be also described as “embedded neoliberalism” 
which both configures the competitiveness discourses as the major hegemonic vision of the 
EU´s position in global markets (Van Apeldoorn, 2002: 159-189). As one of competing 
“hegemonic visions” (Sum and Jessop, 2013: 201-3, 248-58; Jessop, 2016: 84-88) produced in 
transnational governance networks, neoliberal developmentalism fixes European 
socioeconomic inequalities within extensive production of semantic devices (e.g. maps, indices, 
tables, graphs, rankings). Such comprehensive visions tend to render the EU a coherence- or 
cohesion-seeking order. They also fill the purpose of major transnational regional projects so 
that the regulation to give the developmental purpose to the institutional complementarities 
of core-peripheral relations within the globalizing circulations of capital in the EU. 
Given the Cohesion Policy incubated originally in the Social Europe project, I identify how 
the hegemonic visions of neoliberal developmentalism represent its ideological articulation 
as the TRPD in the EU´s post-Fordist project. In this sense, the semantic fixing is thus an 
institutionalized practice oriented at the (re)production of developmental purpose in the 
development fix. With respect to the institutional fixing, the analysis of semantic fixing allows 
us to decipher the content of TRPD at the centre of EU´s inter-state cohesion consensus. We 
can thus bring the analysis of global circuits of economic capital and developmental purpose 
of the EU as a variegated political project together. With respect to the infrastructural fixing, 
we can then understand the knowledge production on Europe´s uneven and (inter)dependent 
development and how it becomes tendentially skewed towards one development 
imperatives over others in and through the TRPD. In other words, it is possible to inquire how 
the historically changing hegemonic visions shape the content of Cohesion Policy.  
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2.3. Dependent Developmental State in Visegrád Capitalism 
The concept of dependent developmental state complements the research on Visegrád 
dependent market economies or embedded neoliberalism (Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009; 
Bohle, 2009; see Graphs 1.1 and 2.1). It can explore the complementarity of FDI and cohesion 
investment inflows with respect to the EU´s development fix. I intend to study the cohesion 
investment transfers as neither a new source of dependency in isolation, nor solely material 
transfers which infrastructurally and institutionally underpin the Visegrád regime(s) of 
accumulation. First, this is illustrated in the Graphs 1.1 and 2.1. Second, the chapter 1 
documents how this was done already elsewhere. While considering these levels of Visegrád 
development (see Table 1.2), I rather study the TRPD´s impact on the transformation of 
Visegrád state projects and the developmental purpose of their catch-up strategies 
(Drahokoupil, 2007, 2009a, 2009b). Broadening the FDI bias, I extend it with the focus on the 
role of EU funding on the Visegrád post-socialist integration and (post-)enlargement catch-up 
strategies until the mid-2010s. I show how these integrationist strategies became articulated 
with respect to the cohesion consensus and the neoliberal developmentalism, which were 
primarily produced on the EU scale as analysed in the chapters 3 and 4. Then, it is possible to 
analyse how the development fix translates into not only developmental but also rescaled 
states in the Visegrád countries.  
Following Drahokoupil, I use the Poulantzasian approach to evidence how this is due to 
the transnationalization of Visegrád state. Poulantzas saw uneven and (inter)dependent 
development in Europe as dialectically driven by external international forces as much as 
internal national forces. In this logic, given the dependence on EU funds, TRPD is borne out 
of asymmetric transnationalization of Visegrád states which is simultaneously being 
re-embedded in the “concrete specificity” (Poulantzas, 1974a/1978: 78) of Visegrád state-
society relations. Poulantzas (1974b: 173; emphasis added) sums up this variegated 
integration in the following pattern: 
“This [continuing] dominance of the state corresponds to the considerable increase in 
the economic functions of the state that are absolutely indispensable to the extended 
reproduction of large capital. But this deals with only a part of the problem and in 
particular does not explain why these economic interventions continue to have, and this 
is the essential aspect, the national states as their supports. [….] Now, there is no doubt 
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that the forms of co-ordination of the economic politics of the different states are 
currently proving necessary (various international institutions, the EEC). But these 
institutional forms do not in fact constitute apparatuses either supplanting the national 
states or superimposed on them. [….] It is therefore impossible to separate the different 
interventions, and their aspects, of the state, in envisaging the possibility of effective 
transfer of the 'economic functions' to the supra-national or superstate apparatuses, with 
the national state maintaining only a repressive or ideological role. [….] In fact, by 
straining in that direction, one loses sight of the real tendencies, namely, the interiorized 
transformations of the national state itself with a view to assuming responsibility for the 
internationalization of public functions with respect to capital. [….] In fact these 
international institutional forms are not, moreover, 'superadded' to these national states 
but they are precisely the expression of their interiorized transformations. These 
transformations are not concerned solely with the economic interrelations of the 
national state but also with the repressive and ideological aspects of the state by means 
of which these interventions are realized.“ 
Rather than viewing it as superadded, the part II studies thus how the governmentalizing 
tendency in the TRPD tendentially ignites interiorized transformations of Visegrád state 
projects. In other words, the transnationalization proceeds as governmentalization. The 
developmental states can be thus conceived as sedimented modes of regulation which 
resemble a “form-determined condensation of the changing balance of political forces” 
(Jessop, 1990: 149) in the concrete Visegrád context. The state constitutes institutionalized 
form of social power relations which periodically differ in privileging one regimes of 
accumulation over others as a result of past social struggles. Any form of state becomes 
hegemonic only when it successfully condensates into comprehensive national-popular 
“state project” (Jessop, 1990: 161) which gives cohesion to the ascending elite “power bloc” 
(Jessop, 1990: 42). Once institutionalized, hegemonic state projects simultaneously legitimize 
and constrain the use of “state power” within the contentious cycle of negotiation, selection, 
articulation, and regularization of particular hegemonic visions of socioeconomic 
development as national interest (Jessop, 2008a). Hegemony is reached through the 
balancing of various forms of coercion and consent, while the latter is being preferred and 
the former looming behind (Gramsci, 1971: 169–70). Against this background, the part II 
studies how the TRPD facilitated cohesion transfers as economic concessions to Visegrád 
elites and populations, while conditioning them with the Commission-led negotiation, 
selection, articulation, and regularization of neoliberal developmentalism in Visegrád states. 
In the part II, I show how the TRPD constituted two embedding dilemmas between the 
strategic capacity and relative autonomy of Visegrád states (Jessop, 1990, 2008a; Drahokoupil, 
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2009a). I analyse how the cohesion governance was internalized in Visegrád states through the 
multi-level formation of cohesion bureaucracies in their state apparatuses. I also show how 
these bureaucracies were operationalized to follow the hierarchies of cohesion governance but 
became simultaneously embedded in Visegrád state apparatuses. We can thus observe how 
the governmentalization of Visegrád dependency translated the supranational dilemmas of 
solidarity-effectiveness and cohesion-competitiveness. That is how it translated them into the 
national dilemmas between consumption and investment on the state level and the 
subnational dilemmas between sociospatial justice and competitive city-regionalism on the 
city-regional level. Both these issues are discussed in the chapters 5 and 6. 
2.3.1. Asymmetric Transnationalization of Peripheral State 
The classical understanding of developmental state expects a relatively autonomous 
sector of nationally embedded development bureaucracies. These include a network of 
ministry departments and investment or planning agencies within state apparatuses oriented 
at (re)industrialization efforts (Evans, 1995). This state-centric account expects bureaucratic 
apparatus which preserves a relative autonomy from both national and international forces. 
Such development bureaucracies remain moreover contingent on success in organizing their 
“nodal agency” inside such developmental states (Chibber, 2002: 958-960). The post-Fordist 
global arrangements rendered these nationally autonomous solutions unavailable (Glassman, 
1999). Rather, the developmental arrangements in CEE have been shaped by the 
transnationalization of state and its compliant transformation in sync with the EU market-
enabling integration (Bruszt and Vukov, 2017). Following the chapter 3, the chapter 5 
documents thus the national institutional commonalities and variation of TRDP-based 
transnationalization in Visegrád states. In particular, it investigates the governmentalizing 
tendencies of cohesion governance which hierarchically reduces the Visegrád state relative 
autonomy to increase its strategic capacity as a way to resolve the consumption-investment 
dilemma in favour of effective investment for competitiveness (see Table 2.2). 
The TRPD can be understood as a historical product of asymmetric transnationalization 
which was identified already since the 1980s. Its first wave was organized by international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In the 1990s, these IFIs promoted a fast neoliberal 
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restructuralization along the Washington Consensus which set an institutional framework for 
the triple programme of privatization, macroeconomic stabilization, and overall liberalization. 
For the post-socialist CEE, this recognized the FDI as a neoliberal form of Marshall Plan 
(Gowan, 1995). Although inducing the brownfield FDI through privatization this way had not 
materialized (Jensen, 2006), the Washington-type transformation disrupted the state 
autonomy from above and below to the detriment of development capacity of CEE states 
(Böröcz, 2002; Bandejl, 2017). Visegrád economies retained such capacities without however 
utilizing them for a state-led upgrade (Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011). Neo-Gramscian 
scholars (Shields, 2004, 2011, 2012) exemplified this transnationalization as an asymmetric 
combination of coercion and consensus. It enforced the state restructuralization through 
external “conditionalities” in exchange for financial support (Stone, 2002), while 
subordinately co-opting CEE state managers into Western transnational governance 
structures. Despite of their varying interpretations, this asymmetry was observed by other 
scholars (Jacoby, 2001; Smith, 2002). Besides the conditionality strategy, they also identified 
the governmentalizing “technologies of transition” (Pickles and Smith, 2005) which both 
institutionally transformed and semantically fixed the CEE transitions in global governance. 
The EU accession agenda was inherent to this transnationalization as illustrated in the 
Copenhagen Criteria of 1993. A wide array of researchers highlighted the conditionality 
approach in the accession process (Schimmelfering and Sedelmeier, 2004; Grabbe, 2005; 
Vachudova, 2005). Unlike its first phase of plain neoliberalization, the later stages of 
accessions shifted to a more developmentalist direction oriented at building state capacity, 
while requiring more comprehensive forms of state transnationalization. This followed the 
Accession Partnerships of 1998 and was also reflected in the changing developmental 
purpose of the pre-accession (structural) fund Phare (Grabbe, 2005; Bruszt and McDermott, 
2012). In the chapter 3, I show how the accession and cohesion agendas merged to promote 
the ordoliberalizing strategies of development in Europe´s peripheries. Although remaining 
within the confines of institutionalist and policy-oriented inquiries, the research identified 
high asymmetry between Commission bureaucrats and CEE state managers. Acting on behalf 
of member states, the Commission not only manufactured the accession conditions but it 
used Phare to finance their fulfilment, while publishing evaluation reports which 
benchmarked the performance of CEE states in this respect. The combination of 
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Commission´s asymmetric position, Phare funds, and the semantic technologies of evaluation 
remained oriented at FDI as development remedy (Vliegenthart and Horn, 2007). This 
tendency mirrored the same transformation in the cohesion agenda with respect to the EU´s 
internal peripheries. 
This asymmetric transnationalization shaped the balance of forces in CEE power blocs. The 
immediate power bloc was heterogenous (Eyal, Szelenyi and Townsley, 1998) including 
various contenders in the re-emerging class struggle over becoming new political and 
economic elite. For Drahokoupil (2009a) and Hanley et al. (2002), the bloc became 
differentiated between nationalist and globalist political forces. Jacoby (2010) and Medve-
Bálint (2014) highlighted the role of Commission in privileging the integrationist FDI-
orientation among CEE elites. The “comprador” managers (Drahokoupil, 2008; Vliegenthart, 
2010) and the resultant “foreign capital-state nexus” (Pavlínek, 2016), a nexus of corporate 
and state managers servicing the interests of transnational capital, could shape the balance 
in favour of the FDI-oriented state strategies. It was simultaneously capable to enforce FDI-
based policies in CEE and lobby for making them compliant with the enlargement rules in the 
Commission (Bohle and Husz, 2005). Following the global crisis, it was however possible to 
observe the uneven rebalancing of power with respect to nationalist forces and national 
capital (Scheiring, 2019; Toplišek, 2019). Even during the enlargement, CEE state managers 
were able to bend the accession conditionalities as documented by Hughes et al. (2005) on 
the case of multi-level regional policies. Likewise, the EU funding tended to increase the 
propensity to the “high-level corruption” in CEE (Fazekas and King, 2018). However, the FDI-
based orientation remained high despite of the nationalist turn (Bohle and Greskovits, 2018). 
This turn was visible in Poland and Hungary rather than Czechia and Slovakia. Against this 
background, the chapter 5 explains these contradictory shifts as inherent to the TRPD-based 
transnationalization as interiorized transformation embedded primarily in the cleavage 
between nationalist and globalist forces. 
Therefore, the governmentalization through cohesion governance was primarily oriented 
at reconfiguring these power blocs into developmental coalitions inside the Visegrád state 
apparatuses (see Table 5.2). This was through redesigning these apparatuses from afar by 
integrating the new category of cohesion bureaucracy inside them, while promoting its nodal 
agency through the technologies of cohesion governance. First, I use the Poulantzasian 
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understanding of bureaucracy as a distinct “social category” (Poulantzas, 1968/1975: 332-
360, 1978: 154-60) which gains operational cohesion through the production of socially 
autonomous organizational hierarchies, practices, and rationalities. Rationalizing own 
position as neutral force acting on behalf of societal general interest, bureaucracy gives thus 
coherence to state projects and the relational power asymmetries therein. Second, I 
recognize the nodal position of cohesion bureaucracies as embedded in the national 
administrations but also transnationally integrated as CEE nationals in the higher 
supranational ranks which include the Commission. A successful core-peripheral hegemony 
co-opts best talents from peripheries (Cox, 1983). Bureaucracy is, as the Poulantzasian logic 
advises, however far from a homogenous force and is rather riven with socially relevant 
internal cleavages and relational conflicts in the narrower power bloc and wider state-society 
relations. The transnationalization of Visegrád state is thus always rescaled across the varying 
national degrees of scalar embeddedness and transnational integration (Panitch, 1994). 
In the chapter 5, I analyse how the governmentalization of Visegrád dependency through 
cohesion governance socio-institutionally fixed the dependent developmental state projects. 
In particular, I show how cohesion governance tendentially articulated the dilemma between 
national consumption of cohesion funding inflows and their effective investment to be 
secured by the technologies of cohesion governance. More specifically, the chapter shows 
how the coherency-seeking effectiveness visions prioritized the relative autonomy of 
Visegrád states from above so that the upgrade of their strategic capacity could be secured. 
Through this contradictory governmentalizing rationality, as evidenced on the Czech case, 
Cohesion Policy has become a part of political and social power politics in Visegrád states. 
2.3.2. Embedding Neoliberalism in Dependent Development 
 Through governmentalizing its dependency, TRPD semantically fixed the “relative 
backwardness” of CEE (Gerschenkron, 1962; Janos, 2000) so that it selectively privileged 
integrationist visions of Visegrád catch-up strategies of development over others. In chapter 
5, I further show how the material dependence allowed the Commission to promote visions 
of neoliberal developmentalism in relation to the FDI-based regime of dependent embedded 
neoliberalism as recognized elsewhere (Bohle and Greskovits, 2012, 2019). I also document 
how the cohesion transfers and FDI-based development were made complementary to 
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normalize the less developed position of Visegrád states in Europe´s uneven and (inter-
)dependent development. I also show how they were discursively articulated as a 
development assistance to be invested effectively given the cohesion-competitiveness 
dilemma inherent to the neoliberal developmentalism. As sketched in the Table 2.2 and later 
empirically elaborated in the Table 5.1, much of this consisted in reconfiguring the role of 
state (Drahokoupil and Myant, 2015) in coordinating (trans)national complementarities 
(Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009) which intermediate the relations between Visegrád state, 
(trans)national capital, and local labouring populations. As the Graph 2.1 documents, this 
reconfiguration was conditioned by the high shares of cohesion transfers in the public 
investment on all Visegrád levels of governance. In Visegrád states, the articulation of these 
(trans)national complementarities embedded them more firmly as integrated periphery in 
the German-led export-oriented space economy (Jessop, 2014b; Krpelec and Hodulák, 2018). 
However, the TRPD was primarily a co-optive endeavour despite of its coercive features. As 
the blueprint of neoliberal developmentalism was determined by the Commission, it still 
demanded Visegrád state managers to rearticulate it – under ongoing consultations and 
negotiations - into national developmental strategies. 
Graph 2.1 Share of Cohesion Investment in the National Public Investment (%) 
 
Source: Own preparation; Eurostat and EU Financial Reports and Revenues and Expenditures database (data on the cohesion investment 
















 The dilemma of consumption and investment was historically inherent to the dependent 
development in Visegrád economies as (semi)peripheries of Europe´s continental order(s) 
(Ther, 2014). Its relative economic backwardness vis-a-vis the West European core changed 
its form but remained historically persistent through the uneven exchange of capital across 
the East-West divide (Janos, 2000). The late socialist dependence on and consumption of 
foreign debt provided by Western creditors – banks and states – evidenced this and shaped 
the asymmetric power relations in the initial phase of postsocialist transitions (Böröcz, 1992). 
The degree of this indebtedness also differentiated the initial globalist opening of highly 
indebted Hungary and Poland to the FDI and the low-indebted Czech and Slovak strategies of 
national capitalism (Myant, 2003; Fisher et al., 2007). As King and Sznajder (2006) exemplify 
on the Polish case, even later reversal of the neoliberal restructuring by the state-led 
industrial strategies resulted in the FDI-based dependence. Either way, according to 
Drahokoupil (2009a), the material dependence and the transnational structures enforced the 
reversal of initial divergence among Visegrád state strategies in favour of convergence on 
similar FDI-oriented strategies since the late 1990s. A decade later in the late 2010s, this 
material dependence, according to Bohle and Greskovits (2018), prevented the attempted 
nationalist reversal of these FDI-based strategies as well. 
 In the chapter 5, I evidence the role of cohesion transfers in embedding this dependent 
development. This role oscillates between their conflicting visions as economic concessions, 
which legitimize the discourse of cohesion, and the effective investment, which underpin the 
catch-up discourse of competitiveness. As economic concessions, cohesion transfers 
embedded the exhaustive features of FDI-based strategies. As shown in the Table 2.2, since 
the late 1990s, the Visegrád state managers produced a similar sets of investment incentives 
to attract transnational corporations (TNCs) in complex manufacturing sectors. These 
involved advantages such as long tax holidays and various tax exemptions, land grants for 
greenfield complexes, highway links and additional infrastructures, as well as refinancing of 
workforce training and education (Drahokoupil, 2009a; Bohle, 2009; Pavlínek, 2016). Besides 
these direct incentives, the non-direct ones included radical tax cuts for business and 
simplification of tax codes, loosened labour regulations and other adaptations of physical and 
social infrastructures (O’Dwyer and Kovalčík, 2007). Second, rather than a development 
catch-up by the mid-2010s, these strategies only reproduced the international integration of 
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Visegrád economies as providers of skilled but cheap labour along with less innovative but 
technologically adaptive subcontracting sectors of mostly small and middle-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) (Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009). Third, FDI inflows flattened during the global 
economic crisis, while the profits in FDI-based export-oriented industries and banking sectors 
started to outflow in the form of dividends back to their home markets rather than being 
reinvested (Galgóczi et al., 2015). These exhaustive features deepened thus the 
infrastructural gap which could be then partially compensated by and embedded through the 
consumption of cohesion transfers. 
 Across the main institutions (see Table 2.2), the cohesion transfers could be explained as 
complementary investment not only in the long-term embeddedness but also (post-)crisis 
resilience of Visegrád market economies (Myant et al., 2013). Such economic models could 
be characterized as a combination of export-oriented manufacturing, relative fiscal austerity, 
and welfare for middle classes to produce relatively equal societies. Visegrád states were 
accordingly able to produce business-friendly environment combined with a sustainable 
infrastructural development and skilled labour, which kept the TNCs in the region. At the 
same time, they lagged in the innovation and educational infrastructures, which was allegedly 
reflected in their low innovation potential (Drahokoupil and Myant, 2015). The cohesion 
transfers equally formed a de facto transnationally organized industrial policy for SMEs 
(Medve-Bálint and Sčepanović, 2019). According to Medve-Bálint (2018), the cohesion 
spending remained however misallocated as they were spent on physical infrastructures 
rather than innovation projects involving the Research & Development (R&D) and the 
upgrade of human capital. Although recognizing the lack of Visegrád innovativeness as a 
material reality in the next chapters, I rather explore how it is being discursively articulated 
in the Cohesion Policy to individualize Visegrád economies´ failing catch-up as a regularization 
practice of making sense of the region´s semiperipheral integration. 
 Against this background, the chapter 5 exemplifies how the cohesion investment inflows 
are semantically fixed as a developmental assistance which becomes conditional on the 
Visegrád state managers´ ability to articulate the infrastructural gaps with respect to the FDI-
based catch-up. The resultant developmental purpose is produced within the TRPD, while the 
cohesion governance tendentially regularizes it inside the Visegrád states. It is articulated in 
the asymmetric relation between the Commission´s hierarchical guidance and peripheral 
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manager´s self-assessment of their societies´ relative socioeconomic backwardness against 
the benchmark of EU objectives and targets. Against these objectives, the self-assessment 
opens for two courses of action. First, it negotiates and thus regularizes the relative 
backwardness as inherent to the endogenous trajectories of Visegrád states. Second, it allows 
for negotiating the national configurations of neoliberal developmentalism within the 
determined developmental frameworks. Oriented at enhancing state capacity to organize 
developmental catch-up, the developmental purpose remains externally determined, albeit 
nationally embedded. 
  
Table 2.2 Dependent Developmental State – Ideal Type 
Institutions - 
Infrastructures 
Dependent Market Economies Dependent Developmental State 
Coordination 
Mechanism/Capacity 
Hierarchies in TNCs 




Control by headquarters of TNCs 
Proxy multi-level control by the 
European Commission 
Investment Finance FDI and foreign-owned banks 




Appeasement of skilled labour, 
company-based agreements 
Activating employment and welfare 
policies including social inclusion and 
healthcare 
Education and Training No provisions beyond basic education 
Adapting education to investor demand 
and intra-firm training 
Innovation Intra-firm transfer within TNCs 
Creation of public-private innovation 
clusters 
Business Development Investment incentives for TNCs 
SME bias and upgrade from dual 
economy 
Physical Sustainability 
Exploitation of infrastructural 
conditions (also as a part of incentive 
packages) 
Improving transport and environmental 
infrastructures 
Transnational Integration 
Full export orientation towards global 
product markets 
Catch-up with higher positions in global 
value chains 
Source: Own preparation; Inspired by and adapted from Drahokoupil and Myant, 2015: 160; Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009: 
680; Nölke et al., 2015: 546, Nölke et al., 2019: 195. 
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 2.3.3. Rescaled Dependency in the Visegrád City-Regional Development 
Given that the Cohesion Policy is the EU´s regional and urban policy, the dependent 
developmental states take the form of rescaled states (Brenner, 2004; Drahokoupil, 2009a). 
The governance accounts assume that the rescaling process of European enlargement 
involved institutional transformation of regional governance (Bruszt, 2008). Given the 
technology of multi-level partnership, the institutional capacities were said to shape the 
variation of this governance in individual regions (Dąbrowski, 2014; Dąbrowski, Bachtler and 
Bafoil, 2014). In the chapter 6, I take the advantage of previous parts to go beyond this 
institutionalist view, which neglects the socioeconomic polarization (Lang et al., 2015; Lang 
and Görmar, 2019), by asking about the issue of rescaled dependency. I relate the rescaled 
dependency to the spatial selectivity of cohesion governance in Visegrád states. By the 
rescaled dependency, I mean thus a process whereby not only management but also 
responsibility for socioeconomic development is delegated to lower scales of governance, 
while remaining constrained by the catch-up strategies articulated at upper scales. Here, the 
TRPD arrives at the last rearticulation of the dilemmas inherent to Europe´s core-peripheral 
relations (see Box 1.1): the dilemma between sociospatial justice and competitive city-
regionalism. Inquiring into the Europeanized promotion of strategic spatial planning 
(Dąbrowski and Piskorek, 2018), I am thus interested in its developmental purpose (Lang and 
Török, 2017) to decipher how it semantically fixed the Visegrád inter-regional “uneven 
transformations” (Smith and Timár, 2012). 
Against this background, the TRPD connects the state rescaling theory and urban research 
on the so-called postsocialist city (Golubchikov et al., 2014) and regions more broadly (Lang 
et al., 2015). The research on postsocialist city asks about the ways CEE city-regions have been 
integrated into the political and economic landscapes of globalizing capitalism (Wiest, 2012). 
With the exceptional research on Cohesion Policy (Lang and Görmar, 2019), the state-
rescaling impact of Cohesion Policy in the full political-economic perspective has been so far 
neglected in efforts to broaden the inquiry into these urban transformations (Grubauer, 
2012). Accordingly, with the advantage of this political economic perspective, we can critically 
and contextually inquire into the “ideology” (Golubchikov, 2018) of the rescaled dependency 
in Visegrád city-regions. 
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Recontextualizing thus the state-space discussion, especially its neo-Gramscian pathway 
(Jessop, 1997; Jessop et al., 1998; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999), I use its concepts to explore 
the downscaled dilemma between sociospatial justice and competitive city-regionalism 
(Harvey, 1989, 1996; Brenner, 2019: 206-32; Jones et al., 2019). I illustrate in the chapter 6 
that, despite its promise of such a justice, the Cohesion Policy retained its neoliberal 
orientation on the competitiveness (Lang and Török, 2017). Therefore, I trace how the 
downscaling of Visegrád dependency aimed at establishing comprehensive “(local/regional) 
accumulation strategies and state strategies/project” (Jessop, 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 
1999), while focusing on the Visegrád second-tier city-regions outside of the capitals. Through 
these projects, the local or regional state managers articulate their catch-up strategies of 
overcoming own backwardness through “inter-local competition”(Peck and Tickle, 2002). As 
explained above, this competition has been particularly over the FDI among other forms of 
mobile capital. Such projects are then semantically as well as infrastructurally fixed especially 
through “large-scale urban development projects” (Swyngedouw, Moulaert and Rodriguez, 
2002). 
Enabled and simultaneously conditioned by cohesion investment inflows, neoliberal 
developmentalism rearticulates the sociospatial justice as productivist investment into the 
visions and infrastructures of competitive city-regionalism. Given the dependent public 
budgets (see Graph 2.1) and thematic prioritization of filling the institutional-infrastructural 
gaps (see Table 2.2), the chapters 3, 5 and 6 explore how particular catch-up visions 
differentiate between the old (Fordist) priorities as misallocated consumption and the new 
(post-Fordist) priories as catch-up investment. The old ones are those including “large-scale 
transportation infrastructures such as highways, canals, ports, tunnels, bridges, railroads, 
airports, and public transport systems; the management of key public utilities and energy 
resources such as gasoline, electricity, and nuclear power as well as water, sewage, and waste 
disposal systems; the expansion of public housing, schools, universities, and other research 
facilities; the maintenance of communications networks such as postal, telephone, and 
telecommunications systems“ (Brenner, 2004: 124). Meanwhile, the post-Fordist “soft-
neoliberal techno-utopias of ´smart,´ ´sustainable, ´ or ´ecological´ urbanism“ prioritized 
„growth-oriented, market-disciplinary strategies of urban development, postwelfare state 
institutions“ that were infrastructurally underpinned by or as „financial centers, industrial 
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districts, technopoles, enterprise zones, science and technology parks, innovation hubs“ to 
selectively turn the city-regions into „putatively distinctive, innovative, and competitive 
locational products on the world market“ (Brenner, 2019: 147, 315). 
Although increasingly based on the smart, sustainable and ecological visions (McCann and 
Ortega-Argilés, 2015), the justice side has been transformed into a social embedding which 
mobilized city-regional elites for the market-oriented strategies of inter-regional competition 
over the FDI among other flows across the EU. This only regularized the practices of 
hierarchizing logic between less developed periphery and developed core (Leick and Lang, 
2018), that between the FDI-oriented leading and those lagging city-regions without the FDI 
(Brown et al., 2007). In effect, the cohesion investment was competed over and won by the 
leading ones (Medve-Bálint, 2017). Here, the chapter 6 documents how the rescaled 
dependency has been also underpinned by the technologies of cohesion governance. They 
reconfigure the Visegrád city-regional elite power blocs into growth “machines” to establish 
them as local developmental coalitions (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Brenner, 2004: 295-296). 
These coalitions include actors such as regional authorities, local municipalities, universities, 
local development agencies, non-governmental organizations or private consultancy 
agencies, as well as business associations, and trade unions. 
2.4. A Transnational Regulation of Peripheral Development 
The TRPD is thus a conceptual toll which allows to merge the often-separated discussions 
on European integration and Cohesion Policy into a heterodox and transdisciplinary 
perspective, on the one hand, and mediate it with the empirical reality on the other. It departs 
from the EU studies literatures, which dealt with the Cohesion Policy, and engages them with 
the CC literatures on CEE and EU integrations. By doing so, it brings in the emphasis on the 
regulation of Europe´s uneven and (inter)dependent capitalist development. Admittedly and 
by its nature, this theorization of the Cohesion Policy as TRPD is not all-explaining. It has its 
contextual, yet open limits: I develop firstly it in interconnection between the theoretical 
discussions and historization of Cohesion Policy on the supranational scale of EU integration. 
Then, I focus empirically on the scales of Visegrád states and their city-regions as a case of 
the EU´s eastward expansion and the CEE´s westward (semi)peripheral integration. 
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To recap the questions suggested in the introduction chapter 1, this theorization facilitates 
open-ended inquiry rather than narrow answers for empirical chapters. On the EU scale: How 
has the Cohesion Policy shaped the core-peripheral relations in the EU´s enlarged capitalist 
order and vice versa over time? What hegemonic purpose has been evolving in the Cohesion 
Policy´s development strategies and how have they become tendentially hegemonic in 
solving the question of uneven and (inter-)dependent development in Europe? On the 
Visegrád scale of dependent developmental states: What sort of state transnationalization-
cum-transformation has the Cohesion Policy enabled? Has it led to any variety of 
developmental arrangements and purpose inside Visegrád state projects and their catch-up 
strategies? If the Cohesion Policy as the EU´s de facto regional and urban policy promoted 
multi-level governance, what has been rescaled downwards within these state projects and 
through these catch-up strategies?  
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3. Cohesion Consensus: Negotiating the Asymmetric Inter-
Dependency in Europe 
In this chapter, I trace the institutional form of TRPD since its origins in the mid-1960s up 
to the mid-2010s. I investigate the process of socio-institutional fixing. The transformation 
involved several path-dependent but also shaping conjunctures through period reforms of 
1974, 1979, 1984, 1988, 1994, 1999, 2006, and 2013. Three of them – 1974, 1988, and 2006 
– constituted landmarks. The 1974 reform institutionalized the Regional Policy, the 1988 
reform turned it into the Cohesion Policy. The 2006 reform adapted it to the enlarged EU. 
Against this background, this chapter inquiries into the institutionalist purpose of this 
constitutionalizing process as a historically contingent regularization of hierarchies in the 
multi-level cohesion governance. Embedding the reform process in the global (post-)Fordist 
transformation, I recognize it as a tendential turn from a dirigiste supranationalization to 
ordnungspolitik-type multi-level governmentalization. Both types of this TRPD promoted 
different historical forms of asymmetric regulation of core-peripheral (cohesion) consensus 
inherent to European integration. 
Using the content analysis of the official legislative documents published within the 
Cohesion Policy, I focus on the Commission´s conditional leadership in negotiating this 
cohesion consensus. Contrasting these two historical forms allows us to observe the changing 
configurations of regulating the core-peripheral relations within the European integration. 
The chapter documents this when tracing the discursive origins and rearticulation of the 
hegemonic dilemma between the core solidarity and peripheral effectiveness. Regarding this 
institutional consensus, I explore how the Commission used the two discourses in two 
periodic processes of (i) inter-state bargaining over the volume and shape of cohesion 
transfers and (ii) institutional implementation of their formal governance. This allows us to 
document the governmentalizing tendency as historically sedimented along the selective 
prioritization of the effectiveness visions under the latest heading of the EU added value. 
Supporting the content analysis with economic data, I document how the prioritization of 
peripheral effectiveness over core solidarity reflected the growing austerity in the 5- and later 
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7-year long EU budgets, the so-called Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). The trend was 
an “expansion” through the doubling of cohesion transfers in 1988, as the cohesion consensus 
was institutionalized, which was followed by the “dilution” by 1999 and further relative 
“retrenchment” ever since the 2000s (Bachtler and Mendez, 2013: 81-109). This tendential 
infrastructural erosion of the cohesion consensus is sketched in the Graph 3.1 on the share 
of the MFFs and the cohesion funding payments in the EU GNI that are contrasted with the 
total payments (EU, 2007l; 2014g; 2019a). Hence, the packages Delors I of 1988-1993 and the 
Delors II of 1993-1999, the first articulated MFFs, raised the average ceiling of appropriated 
budgetary commitments to the 1,22 % of EU GNI. The announced doubling allowed then for 
the average budgetary share of cohesion investment on the level of 21,7 % by 1993 and 33,3 
% by 1999. Three 7-year MFFs followed in 2000-2006, 2007-2013, and 2014-2020. Although 
the average ceiling was lowered to 1,09 % share of EU GNI in the first period, while it slightly 
increased 1,12 % in the second one only to be reduced to the 1,03 % share in the 2014-2020 
period. Although the share of cohesion funding grew to the average level of 36 % in the first 
period and remained there for the second period, it was reduced to 32,6 % for 2014-2020. 
Therefore, I document the discursive regularization of these trends of initial budgetary 
expansion which has been however contradictorily reversed in the context of post-Fordist 
institutional deepening and post-enlargement peripheral enlargement of the EU. 
The chapter is structured as follows: First, it traces the 1974 institutional origins of 
cohesion consensus which developed during the 1980s Southern enlargement and the 
initiation of the Single Market and the EMU between the 1987 Single European Act and the 
Europe 1992 strategy. Second, it exemplifies the 1988 reform as a comprehensive strategy 
enacting the Commission-led supranationalization which coincided with the expanding 
solidarity of North-Western core. It also explores how this multi-level supranationalization 
gave way to the neoliberal governmentalization under the Agenda 2000. Third, it shows how 
the Agenda 2000 shifted the cohesion consensus from the core solidarity to the effectiveness-
driven responsibilization of the old Southern and new Eastern peripheries. Since the 2006 
reform, the Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020 strategies made the turn comprehensive under 
the global crisis. Last, the chapter concludes with the surveying how the governmentalization 
impacted on the everyday hierarchies inside the cohesion bureaucracies. 
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3.1. Intermediating the Cohesion Consensus 
The cohesion consensus had been under negotiation since the mid-1960s. Failing to 
articulate it into a comprehensive institutional form, the Commission´s intermediating role 
fixed its comprehensive configuration only in 1988. The articulation was inherent to a twofold 
process. Originating in the relatively coherent club of six core economies, the integration 
process expanded into Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Denmark in 1973 and Southern 
peripheries of Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. This territorial expansion was 
accompanied with the market-oriented deepening which stalled by the mid-1970s but was 
relaunched in the mid-1980s. The Fordist nationally-oriented fixation prevented the 
supranational institutional maturation of Cohesion Policy. However, the 1970s economic and 
political crisis of Fordism established discursive conditions to institutionalize it in the 1988 
reform as a part of the Single European Act (EC, 1987a, 1987b). In other words, the cohesion 
Graph 3.1 Cohesion Investment in the EU budget: Total Payments and Percentage of EU/Community GNI 
 
*% of cohesion investment is also the adjusted share of the total EU budget. 
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consensus was comprehensively institutionalized only as an early post-Fordist arrangement 
which highlighted the “European solidarity” as indispensable for “encouraging greater 
competitiveness and more convergence between Member States“ with respect to the Single 
Market and the EMU (EC, 1987a: 13). The Fordist origins can be however traced in the 
Commission´s Thomson Report (1973a: 7, emphasis added) which spelled out the growing 
heterogeneity problem under the market-making integration through the first articulation of 
the solidarity-effectiveness dilemma:  
No Community could maintain itself nor have a meaning for the peoples which belong to it so long 
as same have very different standards of living and have cause to doubt the common will of all to 
help each Member to better the conditions of its people. [….] For it is clear that rapid progress 
towards Economic and Monetary Union would be arrested if national economies had not 
undergone the transformations needed to avoid excessive divergencies between the economies of 
Member States. [….] No Member State can be expected to support the economic and monetary 
disciplines of Economic and Monetary union without Community solidarity involved in the effective 
use of such instruments; equally Member States must be prepared to accept the disciplines of 
Economic and Monetary union as a condition of this Community support. 
George Thomson was the third Commissioner for Regional Policy. In 1973, he started the 
line of Commissioners which made the Cohesion Policy constitutive to the double peripheral 
and social dimension of the integration relaunch (Apeldoorn, 2002). Thomson was preceded 
by Hans von der Groeben (1967-1970) and Albert Broschete (1970-1973) which represented 
Germany and Luxembourg respectively. The two first Commissioners supervised the 
establishment of regional policy as an appendage to their more important portfolios of, firstly, 
Single Market and, secondly, competition. Especially Von der Groeben, who supervised the 
formation of Directorate-General for Regional Policy (DG Regio) in 1968, was not only a 
founding father of the Single Market. He was also affiliated with the ordoliberal circles which 
established the Social Market Economy in Germany. In contrast to these two, the following 
Commissioners represented a combination of socialist parties, peripheral states or states with 
large peripheral areas. Thomson (1973-1977) was a Scottish member of Labour Party, Antonio 
Giolliti (1977-1985) was a member of Italian Socialist Party, and Grigoris Varfis (1985-1989) 
was a member of Greek socialist PASOK. All the three played major roles in intermediating 
the cohesion consensus as a basic condition of core-peripheral compromise on European 
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integration which was later foregrounded by Jacques Delors, himself a French Socialist, as the 
President of the Commission (1985-1995) during the integration relaunch. 
According to Wozniak Boyle (2006), these Commissioners intermediated the inter-state 
consensus so that it, however, resembled the DG Regio´s technocratic visions. By the 1988 
reform, the intermediation had already skewed the solidarity-effectiveness dilemma in favour 
of effectiveness discourse. The 1983 communication On Ways of Increasing the Effectiveness 
of the Community Structural Funds was a turning point (Commission, 1983c). Foregrounding 
“the twin requirements, inextricably bound together, of Community solidarity and 
effectiveness”, Commission bureaucrats (1983c: 11) strived to overcome the stalemate of 
1979 and 1984 reforms. The communication offered the framework of „financial solidarity“ 
which entailed the “doubling“ of cohesion transfers for “multiannual” programming periods 
(Commission, 1983c: 7, 10, 14-15). The core solidarity was to be conditioned by “enhancing 
effectiveness” to be guaranteed by the Commission´s enhanced coordination powers over 
peripheral states. However, the framework became accepted only when it linked “European 
solidarity” with the “greater competitiveness [of Single Market] and more convergence 
[towards the EMU] between Member States” in the late 1980s (EC, 1987a: 13). Here, “most 
prosperous” states compensated the “less prosperous” ones (EC, 1987a: 7, 12, 19-20). Failing 
when articulated as a core assistance to periphery in the “present economic crisis“ (EC, 1981a: 
1) of Fordism, solidarity discourse succeeded later as a compensation for the “painful” 
restructuralization during the integration relaunch. The Commission´s supranational 
dirigisme guaranteed to switch the cohesion transfers from „compensatory devices“, 
„offsetting mechanism“ or merely „budget transfers“ (EC, 1987a: 7, 13, 20) to effective 
investment into peripheral integration. Although fixed only in the late 1980s, the two Fordist 
decades remained crucial to make this a consensual underlining of the post-Fordist EU. 
3.1.1. From Institutional Void to Fixing 
The socio-institutional fixing privileged the effectiveness concerns of establishing 
“complementarity”, “coherence”, and “coordination” of the supranational and national 
regional policies as the major purpose of Cohesion Policy (EC, 1965: 6; 1969: 36; EC, 1973a: 
12-13). This strategy allowed the Commission (1973b: 1-2) to establish the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) in 1974 which initially aimed only to “complement” national and 
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regional policies. However, the ERDF underpinned the core-peripheral consensus not only 
institutionally but infrastructurally. Only in the 1980s, the Commission succeeded in pushing 
these complementarity-oriented reforms of the ERDF into the establishment of Cohesion 
Policy as a “comprehensive policy” (EC, 1965: 22; 1973b: 3). This became necessary with the 
Southern expansion and the increasing peripheral demands on financial compensation in 
exchange for the external coordination of their development. Following the ERDF in the 
1970s, the 1980s Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMP) allowed the Commission to 
fix the Cohesion Policy as both co-optive and hierarchically coordinated instrument of 
peripheral integration. 
 The ERDF was instrumentalized as an “important test of Community solidarity“ (EC, 1973a: 
14). It complemented other existing instruments such as the European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) within the Common Agricultural Policy, the European Social 
Fund (ESF), and the loan-based European Investment Bank (EIB). Legitimizing them as a sign 
of solidarity, the Commission strived to turn these instruments into a comprehensive 
developmental policy, while emphasizing the effectiveness imperative of coherent 
integration. Thus, the proposal on its 1979 reform highlighted the need for their 
“complementarity” (EC, 1977a: 9). Only this way, it was accordingly possible to establish a 
“systematic link between Community policies and regional problems“ where integrated 
“guidelines”, proposed by the Commission and “fixed by the Council” later, complied with the 
effective intervention. Dissatisfied with the reform process, Giolliti´s DG Regio voluntarily 
tested the shared guidelines on the Integrated Development Operations which, under the 
“combined use“ of all instruments, aimed at „fuller and more effective“ impact (EC, 1979a: 
1). The Commission (1981a: 61) used the integrated approach of „joint financing“ to 
positioning itself from „bookkeeping and checking conformity“ to the powers of „devising 
policy, promotion, planning and providing technical assistance“. 
The integrated approach expanded the Commission´s multi-level tendencies to “effective 
cooperation between the regional, national and Community authorities“ (EC, 1965: 18). The 
effectiveness visions regularized its leadership which moved from expecting to “add its own 
effort” to later argumentation about closely “coordinated joint action” so that it could 
privilege the long-term “integrated development operations” in the 1980s (EC, 1973b: 2; 
1977a: 14; 1981a: 7). Although the method changed, the purpose remained oriented at 
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adapting the “institutional framework of economy“ in peripheries in order to synchronize the 
“new requirements of economic structures” (EC, 1969: 52). Focusing on the mobilization of 
peripheral “indigenous [development] potential” (EC, 1981a: 5, 1981b: 60), this still expected 
to change the „psychological aspects“ and ignite an „active cooperation of the people in the 
area“ for enforcing their „initiative and sense of responsibility“ (EC, 1965: 29). Such multi-
level strategies were promoted as deliberative “consultations” which included the 
partnership of “Community, the Member States, the social partners and the regional and local 
representatives“ (1977a: 14). The effectiveness discourse legitimized their hierarchical 
institutionalization at once. 
The hierarchies were negotiated in the core-peripheral bargaining, while incubating many 
future technologies of cohesion governance (see Table 3.1). Demanding the doubled 
resources, the effectiveness visions responded to the North-Western core states´ arguments 
about “ever-tighter budgetary constraints“ following the Fordist crisis, while appeasing them 
with the emphasis on financial “discipline” (EC, 1981b: 59; 1983c: 14). In this sense, the 
Commission (1983c: 10) offered itself as the guarantor of this discipline because it was “not 
prepared to accept that the negotiations deal solely with the financial redistribution“ without 
any sense of “coherent programme of reform“. Such a programme was proposed in the 1983 
communication on effectiveness which reframed it as necessarily leading to the “value 
added” effects (1983c: 6). The added value of cohesion funding could be then guaranteed 
only through “conditionality” approach which included “ex ante technical, economic and 
financial assessment and ex post monitoring of the results of operations“ in peripheral states 
(EC, 1983c: 13). Finding effectively the “complementary character between Fund aid 
measures and those of Member States” (EC, 1981a: 5) was consequently up to the 
Commission´s hands-on management of peripheral development.  
The core-peripheral negotiation about financing the cohesion consensus became inherent 
to the negotiations over common budget resolved only in the mid-1980s. It was the 
Commission (1979b) and the peripheral states – rather than core state managers - which 
brought the “budget and convergence questions” together, albeit with differing logics. Much 
of it, however, formally differentiated the net-paying core and net-recipient periphery. The 
establishment of ERDF was enforced only through the threats of Ireland and Italy, due to its 
peripheral area of Mezzogiorno, to boycott the inter-governmental summits in the 1970s. 
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Later, the issue of “convergence of [national] economic policies” (EC, 1973a: 16; 1977a: 6, 16-
17) was tightly attached to the demands for reform and budgetary increase of ERDF. Much of 
the peripheral strategy was practiced by Southern state managers in the 1980s. The 
convergence question was also skilfully used by the UK, which had own north-western 
peripheries, during the budgetary negotiations to reach the maximal return of its payments. 
For the Commission (1973a: 16; 1977a: 6, 16-17), the logic of solidarity appeals, aiming at net-
paying core of north-western Europe and West Germany in particular, denied the game of 
United Kingdom-type “juste retours” between net-paying and -recipient positions. Rather, 
the Commission bureaucrats articulated the net-payments as a core contribution to the 
shared regional order which politically integrated the socioeconomic peripheries.  
The IMP became the testing ground of this asymmetric, yet consensual integration. The 
anticipation of Greek, Portuguese and Spanish accessions opened the Southern peripheral 
question at full. The Commission (1981b: 59) used this to promote its integrated approach as 
merging the “[effective] coordination and [financial] solidarity” with respect to the 
convergence question. Following the Greek accession, the new socialist Government of 
Greece (1982: 90) under the PASOK leader Andreas Papandreu opened this question when 
requiring financial compensation given that the existing structures tended to “suit the central 
and developed economies”. The Commission (1981c: 1; 1983a: 4) concurred that 
Mediterranean regions “benefited less” from the market-making integration and suffered 
“more acutely” from the Fordist crisis, which required robust „adjustment efforts“ to 
establish “interdependence between the[ir] ´catching-up policies´ [….] and other Community 
policies“. At the end, the IMP encompassed the Southern regions of Italy, France, and “whole 
of Greece” (1986: 6) after being introduced following the Greek threat to bloc Portuguese 
and Spanish accessions. Compensating these regions, the Commission used the IMP to define 
“overall strategy and retrospective control” and receive a “wide margin of manoeuvre” in 
their coordination (EC, 1986: 9). Appealing to “joint efforts” and “dialogue”, the IMP were to 
enable the “programme partners [….] themselves be forced” to address “problems of [their] 
modernization” with respect to the “realization of big European projects” (EC, 1986: 10).  
Following the ERDF, the IMP turned the Cohesion Policy into a testing framework which 
foregrounded the concertation of development intervention on peripheral areas. By the 
mid-1980s, the Commission failed to fix the Cohesion Policy in both respects of socio-
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institutional and infrastructural resources. However, the two decades of discursive struggles 
over the 1974, 1979, and 1984 reforms represented a powerful incubation period for the 
pattern of solidarity-effectiveness dilemma. The increase in core solidarity was matched with 
the market-making integration. Moreover, the core solidarity became ever more conditioned 
by the effectiveness visions which privileged the Commission´s leadership in fixing peripheral 
development. Given that peripheral state managers and the peripheral or socialist 
Commissioners shaped this intermediation of cohesion consensus, the 1988 reform became 
thus a social-democratic and peripheral agenda in the overall post-Fordist shift. 
3.1.2. Partnership: From Regional to Cohesion Policy 
The 1988 reform doubled the cohesion resources in the first multiannual EU budget, the 
5-year financial perspective known as the Delors I, and established the Cohesion Policy. For 
Delors Commission, the Cohesion Policy formed a chance for supranational dirigisme which 
allowed it to facilitate an industrial policy consistent with the visions of Euro-Mercantilist and 
Social Europe. It tended to establish the cohesion consensus on both scales of transnational 
– social democratic, Euro-mercantilist, and neoliberal – projects and inter-governmental 
relations. In both respects, core states and neoliberal forces were demanded “adequate 
financial resources” (1987b: 7) which legitimized the peripheral co-option and social 
embedding of the Single Market and, later, the EMU in the conditions of liberalizing world 
trade (EC, 1985, 1987a, 1987b). In this logic, the Commission established the multi-level 
cohesion governance to fix the socio-institutional form of Cohesion Policy. It stood on the five 
more or less articulated technologies of governance which tended to “complement each 
other and form a whole“ (EC, 1989: 13; see Table 3.1): partnership, programming, 
concertation, additionality, simplification. 
Out of the five technologies, the partnership was the key one. It bound the other principles 
together and adhered to the coherence-seeking nodal agency of cohesion governance. It 
represented “close” and “genuine” deliberation and structured the coordination hierarchies 
as a “guarantee of effectiveness” at once (EC, 1987b: 14; 1989: 15, 43, 63, 78, 91). Adhering 
to the multi-level governance, it was to operate “at all levels” and “each stage” of the 
integrated “multiannual operational programmes” (EC, 1987b: 22, 1990a: 9). The Commission 
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Table 3.1 Technologies of Cohesion Governance 
Technology Reform Original Purpose Reformed Purpose (if any) 
partnership 1988 
„[C]lose consultation between the Commission, the 
Member States concerned and the competent authorities 
designated by the latter at national, regional, local or other 
level, with each party acting as a partner in pursuit of a 
common goal”. Accordingly, this covered “the preparation, 
financing, monitoring and assessment of operations“. This 
was to especially happen in the Monitoring Committees 
(MC) during the implementation periods. 
In 2007, it was “further widened” from regional, social and 
economic partners to include “environmental partners, non-
governmental organisations and organisations responsible for 
promoting equality” during „negotiations“ and “at every 
programming stage (setting up, follow-up and evaluation)“. In 
2014, „highlighting the importance of the partnership and 
multi-level governance“, the Commission could enact “a 
European code of conduct on partnership through the 
adoption of a delegated act“. 
concentration 1988 
“Concentration on these priority objectives requires a 
continuing effort to coordinate not only the financial 
instruments but also the back-up policies they serve.“ This 
„opens the way to a global approach which should make it 
easier to achieve the priority objectives and to administer 
more effectively the substantial growth in the financial 
resources“. 
 Turn from the territorial concentration in Objectives to the 
“thematic concentration” by the 2014 reform. Here, the “new 
rules on thematic concentration set out minimum level of 
resources which should be spent on some specific areas of 
intervention and a minimum allocation“ with respect to the 
Europe 2020 strategy and within new hierarchization among 
less developed, transition, and developed regions. 
programming 1988 
Turn from “project-based to programme-based approach” 
to give the investment planning “necessary depth and 
width, while at the same time allowing greater flexibility“, 
so that the combination of „some degree of 
decentralization of the management“ through partnership 
and its „predictability“ is arranged for „improved 
assessment“ and „better administration“. 
Especially since 2007, the “strategic approach” has been 
foregrounded. This upscaled the definition of content to the 
supranational level including the Lisbon Strategy and Europe 
2020 and their fixing in CStF and CSG above all.  
additionality 1988 
“While the additionality arrangements will be appraised on 
a case-by-case basis when the Community support 
frameworks are drawn up, a monitoring system needs to be 
set up as of now to assess the extent to which the 
Community effort is matched at national level“. 
In 2007, underpinning the added-value discourse: It had to be 
verified only in less developed “convergence objective“ regions 
due to proportionality. A „financial corrective mechanism in 
the event of this principle not being respected“ was added 
here. Then, the financing had to „target the European Union 
priorities in terms of the promotion of competitiveness and 
employment creation“ - Lisbon Strategy. 
decentralization 2000 
Establishment of Managing Authority (MA) with detailed 
tasks of managing “collection and transmission of financial 
and statistical data”, „annual implementation report“, 
conformity with Community policies“, „mid-term 
evaluation“, „implementation of any Commission 
recommendations for changes in monitoring or 
management procedures“. Facilitating MCs with tasks such 
as „approval of proposals for changes“ of OPs, „approval of 
the criteria for selecting the operations to be funded“, 
„monitoring and evaluation“ or specifying „monitoring 
indicators“ and approving „annual implementation report“. 
In 2007, three sorts of separate bodies originating in 2000 
reform were restructured within member states: Certifying 
(formerly Paying) Authority, Auditing (formerly Control) 
Authority and Intermediate Bodies (often state agencies acting 
on behalf of MA) within the management, implementation, 
and control responsibilities were assigned bigger 
responsibilities. Certifying Authority then “draws up and sends 
to the Commission a certified inventory concerning 
expenditure and requests for payment”. It assures “compliance 
of expenditure” returns “Community credits in the case of 
irregularities”. Auditing Authority “is an operationally 
independent body“ which „takes charge of the audits“, 
“writes up the annual control reports and offers an opinion 
on the audits carried out“. 
proportionality 2007 
„Modulating the obligations attributed to the member 
states, contingent on the total amount of expenditure on 
an OP“, where core states with lower funding have (i) „the 
choice of indicators used to measure up a programme, the 
obligations in terms of evaluation, management and 
reports“ and (ii), in „control and monitoring“, such states 
have „less obligations“ where, e.g., their „auditing authority 
is not obliged to present an auditing strategy to the 
Commission“. 
In 2014, it has been absorbed by the partnership and 





Appeared in 1988 reform but was later backgrounded: 
“assured in the first place through uniformity of the 
procedures under which assistance is provided by the three 
structural Funds although each of these retains certain 
features specific to it”. 
Foregrounded in 2014 as „harmonisation of rules“ between the 
funds „with regard to rules on eligibility and durability“; 
„increased proportionality“ with regard to „reporting, 
evaluation, management and control“; „legal certainty through 
clearer rules“; Facilitation of „more efficient delivery and 
lighter reporting“ when focusing „in particular on core 
common indicators that facilitate data gathering and reporting 
on achievements at EU level“ and transfer to a „results-based 
management“. 
Source: EC, 1989: 14-5, 21-2; 2000: 23-6, 28-31, 133; 2007: 35; 2015: 15, 19, 24, 201, 219. 
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interpreted thus the partnership as inherent to the whole cycle of “preparation, financing, 
monitoring and assessment of operations“ (EC, 1987b: 27). For the “maximum synergy”, the 
Commission had to “be a great deal more involved and to maintain a higher profile than in 
the past in the [peripheral] regions and social groups” (EC, 1987b: 15; 1989: 16). Besides the 
“official partnership”, the “broadly based partnership” extended the scope of cohesion 
governance from state managers to also “various economic and social partners (chambers of 
commerce, industry and agriculture, trade unions, employers, etc.)“ (EC, 1989: 15). 
The partnerships were operationalized in the Community Support Frameworks (CSuFs). 
Firstly, this included Operational Programmes (OP) and Monitoring Committees (MC) (see 
Table 3.1 and 3.3). These frameworks were based on expecting the peripheral managers to 
self-assess own backward development which were then negotiated with the Commission. 
Accordingly, their negotiation followed the submission of multi-annual – national and 
regional – development plans. These plans had to involve the self-assessment of own 
socioeconomic problems, offer own proposal of development strategy and priorities, as well 
as estimates of necessary aid. Following these preparation and negotiation stages, MCs were 
then established to form “the machinery for monitoring and assessing“ of operationalized 
partnerships (EC, 1989: 22) in the CSuFs-based OP. Therefore, the institutionalization of the 
cohesion bureaucracy remained a mix of co-option and disciplining. It allowed for „many 
forms and expected decentralization“ within national and local conditions, while leaving the 
CSuFs “amended each year” if needed (EC, 1989: 15, 22). However, it simultaneously required 
the peripheral elites to submit “jointly agreed reporting procedures“, establish national 
compliance with “public procurement financed from the structural Funds” as well as actively 
pursue “publicity” to make “potential beneficiaries” and “general public” aware of the 
development assistance (EC, 1989: 85). 
All the other governance technologies strategically cultivated the partnership-based nodal 
agency under the heading of effectiveness, coherence, and transparency (EC, 1989: 16). First, 
the programming integrated the project- to program-based operations. This way, the 
negotiated purpose in CSuFs gained higher comprehensiveness within the MFF-based 
programming periods. Second, the concentration aimed at spatially concentrating the 
resources only on five specific objectives and organized thus the basic development 
hierarchies between the regions (EC, 1990a: 9, see Table 3.2): “Most of the resources 
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available“ were territorially oriented at the Objective 1 which involved peripheral regions 
„lagging seriously behind“. The Objective 2 covered the „selected areas hard-hit by industrial 
decline”, while the Objective 5b focused on those “requiring a special effort in rural 
development”. Furthermore, regions with „long-term unemployed (Objective 3)”, “young 
people entering the labour market (Objective 4)”, and “modernizing agriculture (Objective 
5a)“ were included. Third, the additionality expected the cohesion investment to bring added 
value rather than substitute national investment, whereby “equivalent increase” of cohesion 
funding was expected to be “matched at national level” (EC, 1989: 21). This blended the 
supranational and national transfers, while subordinating the developmental purpose of 
national to supranational ones. Last, the simplification was not recognized initially as a formal 
rule. However, it emerged later through the initial logic which aimed to “simplify procedures” 
in order to reduce the “complexity” and establish “uniformity” of procedures for the sake of 
higher “effectiveness” and prevention of “opportunities for fraud” (EC, 1989: 22). 
The governance technologies of partnership, programming, concertation, additionality, 
and simplification underpinned the formation of a comprehensive institutional form in the 
cohesion agenda. Underpinning the emergent multi-level governance, Delors Commission 
conceptualized it as a first step to consolidate a transnational network of cohesion 
bureaucracies under its supranational dirigisme. Its purpose was a supranationally-led 
industrial policy which was to, firstly, secure the peripheral integration and, secondly, 
reconcile the ascendant leadership of the neoliberal project with its social-democratic and 
Euro-mercantilist counterparts (Van Apeldoorn, 2002). In the first round, the Cohesion Policy 
was associated primarily with the Single Market, while the Delors Commission expected its 
further EMU-oriented budgetary and institutional expansion under its technocratic 
leadership.  
3.2. Solidarity of North-Western Payers 
In the 1990s, the expansion of core-peripheral consensus reached its limits as a dirigiste 
and embedding of the emergent neoliberal project. Evoking the “solid [cohesion] consensus”, 
the Commission bound its extension as a condition to the realization of “new ambitions” on 
the way to the EU (EC, 1990: 3; 1992a: 15). Against the background of the 1992 Maastricht 
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Treaty, the core solidarity was further extended in exchange for the peripheral co-option and 
in favour of the Commission´s dirigisme in the 1993 reform. The expectations of new 
doubling, however, collapsed into its dilution under the emergent neoliberal 
governmentalization to be fixed in the 1999 reform. Either way, the cohesion consensus 
locked the peripheral states in the extending system of “multilateral surveillance” 
orchestrated within the EMU preparations (EC, 1992b: 46; 1992c: 3, 24). Although the 
establishment of the EU was associated with the solidarity of North-Western core, “assuring 
[this] financial solidarity“ gradually shifted to be the task of peripheral effectiveness against 
the background of increasing budget restraint in the EU and with the prospect of eastern 
enlargement (EC, 1997: 21). In 1992, the promise of second doubling in the Delors II 
perspective aimed already at co-opting the peripheral states and regions into the new 
ambitions of neoliberal developmentalism (EC, 1992b: 29):  
The strengthening and readjustment of structures in regions whose development is lagging behind is 
made all the more urgent by the creation of the internal market, the increased competition which this 
implies between businesses and regions and the need for a substantial and rapid reduction of economic 
disparities between the Member States in order to achieve economic and monetary union. […] If the 
Community is to adapt to a world where economic conditions are constantly changing, assistance must 
take account of the pressing need to improve the Community's competitiveness, with the social 
consequences that this implies. In addition, support for the liberalization of world trade in the context 
of GATT and for the progress of the countries of central and eastern Europe towards a market economy 
must take account of the Community's overall effort to achieve cohesion. 
The governmentalizing turn was clear between the Europe 1992 and Agenda 2000 
strategies. The Europe 1992 followed the emerged pattern which bound core solidarity with 
peripheral consensual subordination to supranational hierarchies of ongoing market-enabling 
integration. The market-enabling integration was complemented with budgetary doubling 
under the 5-year Delors II perspective. The doubling was possible due to the peripheral threat, 
this time led by Spanish socialist government under Felipe Gonzáles, to bloc the Maastricht 
Treaty. Delors Commission was instrumental in delivering the consensus to be sealed during 
the Edinburgh Council (EC, 1993c). The 1993 reform only reinforced the dirigisme, while 
simultaneously embedding the EMU preparations with a new fund – the CF. The 1990 German 
reunification and the anticipation of 1996 enlargement with core-type Austria, Sweden, and 
Finland made this possible. From then, the 1997 communication Agenda 2000 introduced a 
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turn whereby the core solidarity remained restrained in favour of peripheral effectiveness. 
The Commission (1997: 37) revaluated its “executive and management functions and a 
change in its administrative culture“ on the eve of 1999 reform. The original doubling of 
Delors II was diluted as the 5-year perspective was extended to a 7-year framework. As 
illustrated below and in the chapter 4, under this budget restraint, the Single Market, EMU 
preparations and liberalized EU Trade Policy became regularized as a necessity of the EU´s 
global competitiveness. As well, the eastern enlargement no longer constituted the 
imperative to increase core solidarity but rather enforce the new and old peripheries to the 
effective use of the existing one.  
In stark contrast to the previous decades, the neoliberalizing turn was supervised by the 
Commissioners for Regional Policy who represented a mix of core and conservative forces. 
The 1992 doubling and 1993 reform were implemented by Bruce Millan (1989-1995), a 
Scottish Labour politician, in Delors Commission. In contrast, the 1999 reform was organized 
by Monika Wulf-Mathies (1995-1999), a West German Social Democrat, against the 
background of East German integration. Although social democrats, both Millan and Wulf-
Mathies were nominated by the Conservative and Christian-Democratic governments of their 
respective member states. Implementing the 1999 reform, Michel Barnier (1999-2004) 
confirmed this trend as a French centre-right politician. 
3.2.1. Europe 1992: Limits of Supranational Dirigisme 
The early 1990s set the limits to the Commission´s supranational leadership. By that time, 
the cohesion governance matured into a comprehensive form which integrated the solidarity-
effectiveness dilemma with the dilemma of “competitiveness and cohesion“ (EC, 1992a: 2; 
see chapter 4). In the Europe 1992 strategy, the Commission (1992a: 2) rationalized the core 
solidarity when highlighting the “major contradiction here“ between the EMU rules of 
nominal convergence, including the „budgetary rigour“, and the need of real convergence of 
social standards through the „march towards greater cohesion“ on the Single Market. The 
Cohesion Policy had to thus embed this financialization-cum-marketization to reconcile the 
„aims of [social] cohesion, [nominal] convergence and [economic] growth“ (EC, 1992a: 8). Its 
purpose aimed thus at reconciling two imperatives of „economic expansion and monetary 
66 
 
stability“ to reconfigure the cohesion governance into an “effective policy of structural 
assistance“ oriented at building peripheral „competitive advantages“ (EC, 1992a: 8). 
Europe 1992 extended the cohesion consensus. It aimed to compensate the peripheries 
but equally realign the cohesion governance with the new screening methods of nominal 
convergence and performance with the EMU´s financializing convergence rules. The CF, 
which replaced the IMPs, was established to compensate the Southern periphery. Moreover, 
the doubled funding in the post-Maastricht EU aimed to “demonstrate its solidarity“ with the 
emergent Eastern periphery of the Eastern Germany and then CEE in the pre-accession 
“Phare operations“ (EC, 1992a: 17, 21). The eligibility of Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Greece 
for the CF became thus „conditional on the introduction of a programme to meet the 
convergence conditions, particularly on budget deficits, and subject to Community 
monitoring in the context of multilateral surveillance“ during the EMU preparations (EC, 
1992c: 26). The surveillance was said to prevent the “risk” whereby the “convergence of 
economic policies” conflicted with the “goal of cohesion” (EC, 1992c: 13). In other words, the 
surveillance as inherent to the supranational dirigisme guaranteed that the cohesion 
transfers were effectively allocated to “productive resources and improvements on the 
supply side rather than the establishment of a system of redistribution“ (EC, 1992c: 14). 
The supranational dirigisme was articulated with respect to the partnership, programming, 
and additionality in the 1993 reform (1992b, 1993c, 1996b). First, it emphasized the 
“extension of partnership“ which had to include „economic and social partners” (EC, 1993a: 
19-20). The preparation of nation-wide development plans to “some extent restricted“ the 
participation of regional authorities which were „more fully involved“ only during the CSuF 
negotiations (EC, 1992b: 23). Only the MCs on regional level enabled the „three-way 
partnership“ between the Commission, national governments, and regional governments. 
This concerned also social partners whose participation was “unsatisfactory“ during the 
national operationalization of Cohesion Policy (EC, 1992b: 23). Second, the programming 
failed “to adopt a ´strategic approach´” (EC, 1992b: 24). The reform required the strategic 
self-assessment which required the national articulation of development „objectives, 
quantified“ (EC, 1993a: 22; see Table 3.3). For the more developed states and their regions 
outside of Objective 1, this approach was streamlined into Single Programming Document 
(SPD). The SPDs merged the “development plan and the applications for assistance relating 
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to it“ to require only “a single decision” from the Commission vis-à-vis the thorough 
negotiations over CSuFs with less developed states (EC, 1993a: 22). Third, the additionality 
suffered from an insufficient “verification” and “availability of information” to check whether 
the cohesion transfers were complemented with “comparable expenditure” on national level 
and allocated according to the rules” (EC, 1992b: 26). Deepening of these technologies was a 
prelude to the governmentalizing turn. 
Fourth, the concertation rescaled the doubled finance upwards and further to the 
peripheral coverage as sketched in the Table 3.2. Making them more supranationally-led and 
peripherally-oriented, the cohesion transfers concentrated ever more on peripheral areas, 
while being partially retained for the Commission´s (1992b) “Community initiatives”. Then, 
the Commission advocated a “stronger concentration of structural Fund operations on 
Objective 1” on around 70 % of total allocation which included “the new German Länder” 
since 1994 (EC, 1992c: 24). With respect to the CF, the peripheries were differentiated 
between “two types of country“, that is the eligible Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal and 
non-eligible „other Objective 1 regions“ (EC, 1996: 16). The new Objective 6 on least densely 
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populated area was added to integrate the territorially peripheral northernmost regions of 
newly accessed Sweden and Finland in 1996 (EC, 1996: 15). Regarding the initiatives, they 
accumulated “between 5 and 10 % of total resources committed“ which aimed at further 
„complementing“ the national CSuFs and SPDs, as well as other supranational policies (EC, 
1993b: 11; 1998b: 7). These 13 initiatives facilitated its coordination powers through 
promoting “cross-border, transnational and inter-regional cooperation and networks” which 
aimed at disseminating the policy transfer and technical assistance within the cohesion 
governance (1993b: 14; 1994: 7; 1998b). The supranational dirigisme went thus hand in hand 
with the peripheralizing focus of Cohesion Policy. 
 
3.2.2. Agenda 2000: Governmentalizing Turn 
The Agenda 2000 governmentalized the tendential dirigiste supranationalization when 
turning it into the ordnungspolitik-type governance. The governmentalizing tendencies were 
always inherent to the cohesion governance. Already in 1992, with an aim at “improving the 
effectiveness”, the Commission (1992b: 40-41) considered to “participate less in the detailed 
implementation in order to step up its activities in the definition of strategies and policies, 
assessment, monitoring and control“. The turn signalled progressing neoliberal leaderships 
inside the Commission and the whole post-Fordist regional project itself. The turn emerged 
simultaneously with the anticipation of eastern enlargement which was no longer fixed with 
the Commission´s readiness as well as core states´ willingness to extend the solidarity. It 
equally coincided with the member states´ resistance against the Commission´s 
supranationalizing tendencies. In connection with the formerly dominant technologies, the 
1999 reform proposal shaped their purpose when foregrounding the formerly less important 
ones of “simplification”, “flexibility”, “decentralization”, and “subsidiarity” (EC, 1998a). 
However, rather than any retreat of its “institutional and political responsibility as guarantor 
of the Community”, the Commission (1998a: 10) aimed to change the purpose and forms of 
its asymmetric leadership to execute a proxy command and control power. 
The simplification logic aimed at reshaping the “clear division of responsibilities“ among 
various levels and stages of “deeper and broader partnership” (EC, 1998a: 9). Reconfiguring 
them aimed at unmaking the “complicated, slow and cumbersome“ as well as „over-
bureaucratic“ tendencies of the dirigiste model (EC, 1998a: 10). In reality, the Commission 
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reshaped the asymmetries so that it could define the strategic framework of the initial 
programming stage and keep control over the assessment of the peripheral performance in 
the last stage. The “partners benefiting” from the cohesion assistance assumed thus a 
“greater responsibility” for the intermediate phase of implementation which responsibilized 
the state managers as “guarantors for monitoring, management, evaluation and control“ (EC, 
1998a: 11, 20). Therefore, the decentralization shifted the implementation responsibility to 
member states as a form of deepened partnership, while broadening it with “economic and 
social partners“ as well as “other relevant organizations” such as non-governmental 
organizations and other interest groups (EC, 2000: 26). The deepening involved clear 
distribution of tasks inside the MC of every OP and the state bureaucracies for the “correct 
implementation“ in general (EC, 1998a: 11). 
From the proposal, the decentralization made it into the final regulation as the newly 
recognized governance technology (EC, 1998a, 2000). Through it, the downscaled 
responsibilization through flexible decentralization brought back the proposition of 
governance through conditionality from the early 1980s (EC, 1983: 13). As Table 3.2 shows, 
the shape of MCs was reshuffled, while the new function of Managing Authority (MA) had to 
be established in member states. Through the Managing Authorities, the states and regions 
have overtaken responsibility for the proliferating duties in the management of cohesion 
governance. The Commission legitimized this as a guarantee that the processes to “cement 
solidarity within the Union are as effective as possible and monitored at all levels“ (EC, 1998a: 
12). The surveillance strengthened “the links between programme monitoring, financial 
management and controls“, while extending the effectiveness vision with the emphasis on 
“principles of sound financial management“ (EC, 1998a: 28). With this logic, the “monitoring 
and evaluation systems“ of national governance and performance were to be complemented 
with “management and inspection systems“ (EC, 1998a: 28). The supranational intervention 
was thus replaced with the “greater integration of” ex ante, mid-term, and ex post 
“evaluations” to verify the additionality of cohesion investment under the heading of 
institutional “efficiency” (1998a: 27; 2000: 26-31). 
Downscaling the implementation responsibilities, the power over strategic programming 
was upscaled. Although the lose supranational guidelines existed before, the Commission 
gave stricter emphasis on the consolidated “Community guidelines” (EC, 1998a: 8; 1999a; 
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2003c). This required the peripheral state managers to articulate their CSuFs/SPD against 
these guidelines so that there was their tighter complementarity with the final OPs. As 
evidenced in detail by the chapter 4, the Commission was already developing guidance on the 
complementarities between selected national and supranational socioeconomic institutions 
and policies with respect to the neoliberal developmentalism over the 1990s. These aimed at 
privileging investment which involved: research and development, labour markets 
restructuralization, sustainable development, and transport (EC, 1993d, 1994b, 1995, 1999b). 
These sectoral complementarities materialized in the formation of comprehensive guidelines 
on “integrated strategies“ of socioeconomic development which brought together peripheral 
and EU development objectives (EC, 1999a: 3; 2001b; 2003c). The simplification of the 
strategic planning legitimized thus the increase of the Commission´s power over privileging 
particular developmental purpose in the cohesion investment. 
The asymmetry grew also in the core-peripheral consensus. As the EMU entered in force 
and the eastern enlargement neared, the core solidarity was no longer extended. Thus, the 
“tight[er] budgetary framework“ (1997: 11) expected the Commission´s leadership as well as 
the peripheral state managers to find “cost-effectiveness“ (EC, 1997: 25, 1998b: 5). Although 
the eastern enlargement made the EU solidarity „more important than ever“, this solidarity 
had to be „undertaken with safeguards for the achievements of 40 years of European 
integration“ (EC, 1997: 21, 96). The effectiveness-oriented efforts were thus oriented to 
„maintain financial solidarity“ in volume and scope (1998a: 5), while the cohesion 
redistribution had to remain oriented at both regions of “the present 15 Member States and 
to those of the future Member States“ (EC, 1997: 21, 63, 113; 1998a: 5). Much of the turn 
was equally reflected in the concertation of financial resources (EC, 2000: 18). The immediate 
effect was the simplified concentration of objectives from 6 to 3, as well as reduction of 
supranational initiatives (see Table 3.2). The Objective 1 on less-developed regions and the 
Objective 2 on conversion of structurally suffering ones remained preserved, absorbing 
around 70 % in the former case and around 11,5 % of total funding in the latter one. The 
Objective 3 refocused on labour market issues with about 12.3 %. Much illustrative was the 
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3.3. Added Value of South-Eastern Recipients 
The discourse of EU added value regularized the neoliberal governmentalization into a 
comprehensive form. The turn resonated with the core states´ call for the “value for money” 
which were upheld especially by the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, Netherlands, France, 
and other net-payers since at least the 1990s (Pollack, 1995; Wozniak Boyle, 2006: 141-3, 155, 
268; see Table 1.1). The Commission´s (EC, 1997: 17, 19, 37; 1998: 11, 39) tendency to 
privilege the Cohesion Policy´s “real”, “clear”, “significant” or “greater added value at 
Community level“ was evident already at the eve of the 1999 reform. However, only the 2006 
reform fixed and the 2014 reform deepened this governmentalizing tendency. As 
documented by the Graph 3., this tendency was characterized by the rapid emergence of 
particular visions of command and control in the regulation. There were four important 
contexts in the span of two programming periods of 2000-2006 and 2007-2013. As I show in 
the next chapter 4, the added value was double-edged as it privileged effectiveness in the 
institutional governance and linked it with competitiveness in socioeconomic performance. 
This synthesis structured neoliberal developmentalism. Its ordnungspolitik-type features 
became also evident as the cohesion governance´s added value became ever more 
articulated with respect to its enabling effect on the peripheral integration in the EMU and 
Single Market governance within a globalizing world economy. First, this was bound to 
enabling peripheral participation in the decade-long development agendas of Lisbon Strategy 
of 2000s and the Europe 2020 during the 2010s. Second, this was articulated against the 
waves of eastern enlargement from the large-scale one in 2004 and the small-scale ones in 
2007 and 2013. Third, the global economic crisis or, in other words, post-Fordist crisis of late 
2000s and the consequent eurozone crisis of mid-2010 played prominently in the latest 
transformation of Cohesion Policy. 
The ordnungspolitik-type neoliberalization became clearer as the Cohesion Policy was 
attached to the overall aim of Lisbon Treaty of 2009, which replaced the Maastricht Treaty, 
to constitutionalize the EU as a “highly competitive social market economy” (Article 3). It also 
extended the role of Cohesion Policy from enabling “economic and social cohesion”, as 
constitutionalized in the Single European Act of 1987, to “economic, social and territorial 
cohesion” in Lisbon Treaty (Articles 174 and 178). In defence against the core´s demands for 
even deeper retrenchment of post-2007 budget and the cohesion share thereof (see Graph 
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3.3), the Commission (2004b: 14-15) foregrounded this “added value of cohesion policy“. This 
expected “a Europe of solidarity and partnership” where “[g]rowth must be underpinned by 
solidarity“ and „[c]ompetitiveness and cohesion reinforce each“ other but must equally avoid 
„excessive and unjustified fiscal burdens“ on core states (EC, 2004b: 4-5, 37). Amid the 
economic crisis, the proposal for post-2014 budget reasserted the message in which cohesion 
transfers represented an „important expression of solidarity” which benefited “all parts of 
the EU, rich and poor, big and small” and facilitated “scarce” resources and “more needed 
than ever” growth-oriented investment (EC, 2011b: 11). While the proposal for the post-2007 
budget linked the cohesion to Lisbon Strategy, the post-2014 one guaranteed “effectiveness 
of cohesion spending by tying cohesion policy more systematically to the Europe 2020 
objectives” (EC, 2011b: 11). 
There was a mix of core and peripheral Commissioners for Regional Policy which included 
new CEE nationals. The main contours of 2006 and 2014 reforms were however influenced 
more by core and centre-right Commissioners. Barnier supervised the proposal for 2006 
reform, while the Austrian Christian-Democrat Johannes Hahn (2010-2014) supervised and 
negotiated the 2014 reform. During the post-accession restructuring of the Commission, 
Péter Balázs (2004), who was a Hungarian Social Democrat, joined Barnier as a twinned 
Commissioner. A former Polish Social Democrat, Danuta Hübner (2004-2009) became the first 
long-term Commissioner from CEE, while being replaced with a Polish technocrat Paweł 
Samecki (2009-2010) as she became a Christian-Democratic member of the European 
Parliament. Following Hahn´s reforms, Romanian Social Democrat Corina Crețu assumed the 
task of implementation and preparation of the post-2021 reform. 
3.3.1. Lisbonization in Global Crisis: Strategic Turn 
The emergence of added-value discourse was inherent to what became termed as the 
strategic turn. As the Graph 3.2 shows, the strategic turn was further fixed increasingly 
proliferating grammar of command and control of this type. Through the 2006 reform, it 
rearticulated the old paradigm of increasing “complementarity, coherence, coordination, 
conformity and additionality“ (EC, 2007b: 27). This strategic turn aimed at allowing the 
Commission to steer the peripheral investment to the Lisbon strategic “objective[s]” or 
“target[s]” through the “reprogramming of the Structural Funds“ (EC, 2003c: 5-6; 10-11). The 
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turn assumed that the peripheral problems did not derive only from the real economy but 
also within the lack of “institutional and administrative capacity” (EC, 2003b: 5). Always 
implicit in the effectiveness discourse, the added value made this explicit as the neoliberal 
governmentalization interlinked the questions of socioeconomic competitiveness and 
institutional performance of national governance. With both respects, the Commission 
proposed the further skewing of asymmetries in the cohesion governance at the expense of 
peripheral states with the new “framework of shared management” (EC, 2004c: 9). This way, 
peripheral states became responsibilized through the technologies of “simplification and 
decentralization” as well as “differentiation and proportionality”, while being enforced to 
“more rigorous systems for monitoring, control and evaluation“ (EC, 2003d: 1; 2004c: 8). 
A key in this turn, the hierarchy of strategic programming was further upscaled as 
evidenced in the Table 3.3. The new Community Strategic Guidelines (CSG) formed a strict 
supranational framework for the articulation of National Strategic Reference Frameworks 
(NSRF) and the delineation of OP within them (EC, 2007b: 28-30). In contrast to the more 
nationally embedded CSuFs-based OP, CSG further reinforced the primacy of supranational 
objectives. The Commission negotiated the CSG with the Council and gained then the right of 
final approval of OP in the NSRF. The governments had to then submit regular “strategic 
reports” on the progress in realizing the NSRF (EC, 2010c, 2013b). The added value of 
Cohesion Policy was thus legitimized by its CSG-based complementarity with the 2005 “re-
launch of the Lisbon Strategy“ and its enabling in peripheral states and regions (EC, 2005b: 6, 
13). The NSRF negotiations equally provided an “added value” as they deepened the multi-
level “dialogue” and reinforced “good governance, ownership and institutional capacity” in 
peripheries (EC, 2008c: 2, 8, 11-12). Moreover, a concept of earmarking emerged during these 
negotiations in which new member states were voluntarily expected to “earmark“ a portion 
of cohesion transfers to Lisbon objectives (EC, 2007b: 3, 2008c: 4, 2010c: 6-8). 
Given the relative retrenchment of core solidarity, the cohesion resources were “genuinely 
concentrated” through the transformation of former Objectives 1-3 to the three objectives 
of Convergence, Phasing In-Out, and Regional Competitiveness and Employment regions (EC, 
2005b: 11; 2007c: 10-24). Additionally, the European Territorial Cooperation replaced the 
former Community initiatives. The transformation regularized the concentration of resources 
in old and new peripheries despite the “statistical effect” (EC, 2004b: 15; 2004c: 4, 5, 12). Due 
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to the statistical effect, old peripheral areas were rendered ineligible for cohesion funding as 
they became relatively richer than the new ones (see the chapter 4). The Graph 3.5 shows 
the result of reorientation of cohesion funding to the new Eastern periphery. The reduce the 
effect, the Commission came with two solutions. The newly introduced “capping” allocated 
funds at the maximal level of 4 % of member state GDP in the Convergence regions (EC, 
2004b: 28; 2004c: 12) to retain funds for older peripheries. The Convergence regions received 
81,5 %, while the Regional Competitiveness and Employment regions received 16 % of total 
funding. Between these two, the phasing out and in regions were introduced to cover those 
regions affected by the statistical effect on both sides. Following the further decrease in share 
of supranational initiatives, the 2,5 % of the funding was absorbed by the European Territorial 
Cooperation. Foregrounding less developed regions as ever more “top priority“ (EC, 2004c: 
4), the statistical effect reduced the funding for those old ones in absolute terms, while the 
capping reduced it for the new ones in relative ones. 
The added value was de facto rearticulation of the additionality technology along the lines 
of neoliberal developmentalism in the NSRFs (see Table 3.1). Both the Lisbon Strategy and 
the later “global financial crisis and the current economic slowdown“ formed opportunity to 
demonstrate it (EC, 2008b: 2). Using the strategic planning to bring “greatest impact and 
added value“ of Lisbon Strategy was another way how to prioritize and make the neoliberal 
developmentalism comprehensive in the blend of national private and public investment (EC, 
2005b: 7). The “Lisbon-related objectives“ were fixed at the rate of 65 % for Convergence and 
82 % for Regional Competitiveness and Employment regions (EC, 2007b: 4). In the global 
crisis, the cohesion transfers were showcased as adding to the “major fiscal stimulus 
combining national and Community actions“ in the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) 
between 2008 and 2009 (EC, 2008b: 9). Making “over 50 %” of total public investment in 
peripheral member states, the strategic approach facilitated its smoother “availability” in the 
context of “severe cash-flow difficulties“ in national budgets (EC, 2008: 3; 2009b: 3-4, 12, 20, 
25). However, this fiscal stimulus aimed still at keeping the “´earmarked´ Lisbon investment 
priorities“ so that they could „contribute to quicker recovery and address long-term 
challenges“ later on (EC, 2008b: 12). In other words, the strategic earmarking secured that 
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the transfers remained sustainably invested during the economic crisis to legitimize the 
resilient forms of Lisbon-based peripheral integration. 
Indeed, the 2006 reform rearticulated most of the technologies of cohesion governance, 
while adding the proportionality technology. With respect to the decentralized partnership, 
new performance system was institutionalized. This further responsibilized the national 
Authority and Monitoring Committees, while further differentiating new functions of Auditing 
Authority (AA) and Certifying Authority (CA). The partnership became more inclusive as it had 
to include “different types of partners (including NGOs, universities or regional development 
agencies as well as social partners)“ (EC, 2008c: 8-9). However, its deepening subordinated 
these partners to a more rigorous system of monitoring, control, and evaluation. This way, 
the “verification, through partnership, of the principle of additionality“ had to be secured by 
the means of “evaluation before, during and after the end of the [operational] programmes“ 
and a general “annual dialogue” (EC, 2004c: 11).  
The proportionality technology only differentiated the degree of responsibilization 
between the developed and less developed states. Accordingly, the stricter audit-based 
evaluation system was only introduced in the less developed convergence regions given the 
higher “extent of the financial resources allocated to them“ (EC, 2007: 41). This regularized 
the reform as a tool to strengthen “institutional capacities and governance [in peripheral 
regions and states] where they are considered to be weak“ (EC, 2005b: 10). Thus, the transfer 
of “unique delivery system for cohesion programmes” promoted new forms of governance 
but aimed equally to guarantee that the „ownership of the Lisbon agenda has been further 
extended to the regional and local level and to a broader spectrum of stakeholders“ (EC, 
2008c: 9). Besides this coercive system, the national “performance reserve”, which originated 
in previous reform, was foregrounded. It allowed to reallocate transfers up to the 3 % of total 
national allocation “to the most effective programmes“ so that the OP competed among each 
other in fulfilling the objectives set. (EC, 2007b: 34). To improve the partnership performance 
forwarded the logic of Commission´s surveillance, control, and command, while peripheral 
states became ever more subject to the new legislative grammar of being controlled, 







3.3.2. Europe 2020 in the Eurozone Crisis: Conditionality Turn 
The transmission of global economic crisis into the eurozone debt one enforced the 
subordination of Cohesion Policy to the EU neoliberal governance in the mid-2010s. The 
eurozone crisis amplified the EU governance as an “ordoliberal iron cage” due to its 
prioritization of fiscal austerity which aimed at the nominal convergence to the monetary 
stability in the EMU at the expense of real convergence through economic growth on the 
Single Market (Ryner and Carfuny, 2016). The debt crisis subordinated the core solidarity to 
the peripheral orientation on “[funding] effectiveness and [governance] efficiency“ in the 
conditions of lowering EU and national budgets (EC, 2015: 2, 49, 54 ,74, 98). This touched the 
2014-2020 MFF especially (see Graph 3.3) . First, the effectiveness visions linked the cohesion 
governance closer to the austerity governance enshrined in the Stability and Growth Pact 
which was an arrangement built-in into the EMU but made more comprehensive during the 
crisis. As well, the links with the Europe 2020 strategy were made even more direct. Second, 
the emphasis on peripheral institutional “capacity” or “performance” to comply with the 
strategic objectives (EC, 2011c: 4-5) hardened the monitoring, control and evaluation 
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evasions. The introduction of ex-ante conditionalities, especially the macroeconomic ones, 
was illustrative in this. 
The expectations of the strategic turn and the urgency of economic crisis made the 
Commission to further upscale the strategic programming. The 2014 reform replaced the 
“non-binding” CSG with the new “legal” Common Strategic Framework (CStF) which became 
directly integrated in the regulation (EC, 2011c: 5; 2015: 16; see Table 3.3). The CStF formed 
thus a legal basis for negotiating new Partnership Agreements (PA) that replaced the NSRFs. 
The PAs could be then reprogrammed through “country-specific recommendations“ in the 
European Semester which annually updated the Europe 2020 objectives (EC, 2015: 22-23). 
The Europe 2020 heralded the further deepening of “strategic programming process“ (EC, 
2011c: 7). Both the hardening tendencies in the 2014 reform and Europe 2020 resulted from 
the failure of Lisbon Agenda and the Commission´s striving to further streamline the 
effectiveness orientation. Therefore, the regulation-based CStF were to prevent “delays” as 
it happened during the NSFR negotiations and make the “strategic reporting exercise” 
comprehensive in the implementation period (EC, 2010c: 4, 11-13). The reason was the 
unsatisfactory reporting practices in the 2009 and 2013 national strategic reports which only 
loosely reported on fulfilling the “Lisbon earmarking” and the “contribution to 
competitiveness and job creation” within the Europe 2020 (2011c: 6-9; 2013b: 5). 
Within the shared management, the performance-oriented upscaling of programming was 
inherent to the ever-tightening tendency to responsibilize the lower scales especially through 
hierarchical innovation of two technologies (see Table 3.1): partnership and final 
foregrounding of simplification. Facilitating “clear added value in enhancing the effectiveness 
of the implementation“, a delegated act on the European Code of Conduct on Partnership 
(EC, 2014c) formalized the partnership technology. More “representative” partners were 
thus legally obliged for MCs and “throughout the whole cycle“, while “the performance and 
effectiveness of the partnership during the programming period” became subjected to the 
“assessment“ as well (EC, 2014c: 5). This only furthered the established strategy of 
simultaneous inclusion of various private and non-governmental actors into the cohesion 
networks and their disciplining. Referencing to the experience with the newly introduced 
reporting, the Commission was less satisfied with “strong mechanisms for tracking the flow 
of money and absorption” which however remained weak in “setting, monitoring and 
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evaluating objectives“ (EC, 2013b: 12). Rather, the simplification was highlighted to 
streamline the “more results oriented policy“ where „better programming“ had to establish 
clear links between the funding and „a convincing narrative, supported by quantified 
information on progress in achieving objectives“ (EC, 2010c: 11; 2013b: 12). Although 
oriented at lowering the administrative burdens, the simplification equally expected upscaled 
harmonization of diverse national procedures on lower scales.  
Moreover, the ex-ante evaluation was now turned into ex-ante conditionalities. The most 
prominent was the macroeconomic conditionality which linked the Cohesion Policy to the 
Stability and Growth Pact. Under the heading of “sound economic governance” (EC, 2015: 17-
22), the cohesion transfers became conditioned by the EMU convergence criteria which were 
now connected with country-specific recommendations in the European Semester. The ex-
ante conditionalities identified minimal conditions for the approval of PA. These conditions 
were based on “Fund-specific rules” but had to be negotiated through the cycle of national 
“self-assessment”, “Commission assessment”, and the “resolution of disagreements” (EC, 
2014d: 4-5). Later, the implementation “reporting” to the Commission could result in the 
option of “suspension of interim payments” in a case of non-compliance (EC, 2015: 22). Thus, 
the conditionality turn was another way of linking the peripheral socioeconomic institutions 
with the austerity and competitiveness imperatives inherent to Europe 2020 and the Stability 
and Growth Pact. Besides this coercive measure, the role of performance reserve as an 
incentivizing instrument grew too as it was now set at 5 and 7 % to motivate the OPs to 
compete over setting and reaching “clear, realistic and measurable milestones and targets“ 
(EC, 2015: 22-23). 
The conditionality turn happened in the conditions of reduced EU budgeting, while 
lowering the capping from 4 to 2,35 % to retain concentration on peripheral regions of core 
states. This time, the former mix of thematic and territorial objectives turned them into 
territorial ones of “less developed” (formerly convergence), “transition” (formerly phase in 
and out), and “more developed” (formerly regional competitiveness and employment) 
regions (EC, 2011c: 10-12; 2015: 29-40). The less developed ones covered those regions below 
75 %, those transition ones represented ones between 75 % and 90 %, and those more 
developed ones involved regions with 90 % of the average EU GDP. The less developed ones, 
located mostly in CEE and Southern Europe, received 52,45 %; transition regions, those 
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located mostly in Southern and North-Western Europe, were allocated 10,24 %; while the 
more developed regions mostly in North-Western Europe received 15,67 % (EC, 2015: 110). 
In all regions, the thematic development objectives were strictly realigned with Europe 2020 
in the conditions of widespread fiscal austerity. 
3.4. Cohesion Bureaucracy 
The effectiveness vision underpinned the multilevel cohesion governance. It regularized 
the asymmetric hierarchies of the nodal agency in the variegated networks of cohesion 
bureaucracy. As shown by the Graph 3.2, the effectiveness grammar secured the multilevel 
hierarchies so that the transnationalization of peripheral states was tendentially regularized 
as a coherent management of the provided transfers. The Commission´s power was thus 
structural when shaping the nodes of cohesion networks in the lower scales of peripheral 
states and regions. The 2006 and 2014 reforms made this more evident. The associated 
technologies of cohesion governance aimed thus at a dual effect. On the one hand, they 
insulated the cohesion bureaucracies in peripheral states through this asymmetric 
transnationalization. On the other, the partnership aimed at embedding the cohesion 
networks into peripheral state-society complexes, while disciplining them at the same time. 
On the everyday implementation level, the TRPD became thus regularized through the 
production of indicative guidelines, guides, COCOF (Committee of the Coordination of Funds) 
notes, common draft templates on national reports and other strategic documents, 
information papers, and working papers with respect to the legal rules.  
Since the 2006 reform, the imperative of shared management invited moreover to 
“strengthen the Commission's supervisory role“ in the implementation responsibilities of 
member states within its Action Plan on shared management (2008d). Despite the relative 
retrenching of cohesion transfers, “the central place of solidarity“ in Cohesion Policy had to 
be accordingly secured through „effective and efficient internal control system“ during the 
implementation of investment process. The shared management was legitimized by the 
repeated reports of the European Court of Auditors on the „high level of errors in 
expenditure“, „ineffective or moderately effective“ management and control (EC, 2008d: 3). 
It only intensified the emphasis on the coordination through the practices of auditing, 
reporting, and financial surveillance (EC, 2009d).  
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3.4.1. Operationalizing Cohesion Governance 
The operationalization was fixed through OPs. The OP remained historically a backbone of 
the cohesion governance operationalization, although in different forms with respect to lose 
supranational guidelines, CSG, and CStF (see Table 3.3). First, as demonstrated by the Tables 
2.2 and 5.1, OP fixed the cohesion transfers into state strategies across their sectoral 
complementarities with peripheral socioeconomic institutions in the form of „infrastructure, 
human capital, research and development and productive investment” (EC, 2006b: 7, 21; 
2008h). This strategic complementarity was embedded in the negotiation of CSuFs/SPDs, 
NRSFs, and PAs. 
Within the OPs, cohesion bureaucracies arranged this complementarity through 
variegated forms of nodal agency within the vertical partnership between the Commission 
and state apparatuses. A range of functional roles emerged through MA, CA, AA, and MCs. 
The MA – one of national ministries or development agencies – and the OP – integrated in 
one specialized or multiple sectoral ministries – were the most important as coordinative 
bodies for partnership with the Commission. Through the MCs, which consisted of MA 
representatives, other specialized bureaucracies and socioeconomic partners – the OP was 
interconnected within horizonal partnerships. CA and AA – often Ministries of Finance – were 
then responsible for the financial control to the Commission. Interpreting the regulations and 
guidance, the Commission could nevertheless steer the everyday practices of this 
operationalization through its effectiveness discourse. 
Therefore, the evaluation procedures behind the NSFR negotiations combined an 
emphasis on deliberation with effectiveness-oriented identification of added value. The 
Commission (2006b: 1, 5-6) made the ex-ante evaluations an “iterative and interactive 
process“ which produced a „Community Added Value“ when regularizing the governance 
hierarchies through the “exchange of experience and networking at a transnational, national 
or regional level”. Prepared by “independent” experts, this process set a strategic 
“coherence” between CSuFs, NSFRs, and OP (EC, 2006b: 10, 18). This was initially based on a 
“socioeconomic analysis” which required self-assessment in the “identification of the 
disparities, gaps and potential for development“ in the realms of human and physical capital 
in selected OPs (EC, 2006b: 7, 21). The main aim was to identify the additionality of cohesion 
investment and set methods of its “verification” through “written consultations and bilateral 
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meetings“ during the methodological and content negotiations over the NSFRs and individual 
OPs (EC, 2009d: 4). The negotiations over the NSFRs formed thus a broader strategy which 
organized the OPs as the centre of the cohesion governance in individual states through the 
combination of iteration, guidance, and enforcement of rules. 
The NSFR negotiations and the implementation allowed thus to prioritize particular 
strategic content of cohesion bureaucracies in individual state-society complexes through 
selecting development indicators and methodological guidance for their identification and 
realization. For example, the Commission published guidance on the innovation strategies in 
“national and regional Operational Programmes“, while criticizing their missing “links to 
national initiatives” and generally “little information“ and „few details“ on their 
implementation through partnership (EC, 2006d: 7). The negotiations constituted thus an 
invitation for the Commission´s methodological guidance. The concepts, such as the 
“earmarking", asked for the methodological guidance on their “calculation” within the “new 
generation of operational programmes“ oriented at the innovation-driven „growth and jobs“ 
of the Lisbon Agenda (EC, 2007c: 1-3). The guidance set everyday frameworks for activities of 
cohesion bureaucracies which centred on initial setting and monitoring of indicators and the 
later articulation and visualization of their effects into the categories of “Relevance, 
Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impacts, Community Added Value, Sustainability” (EC, 2010e: 4). 
This operationalization allowed thus to regularize the asymmetric complementarities 
between the supranational and national content of national and regional partnerships. 
In result, the operationalized networks of cohesion bureaucracies involved developmental 
coalitions as the chapter 5 explores on Visegrád power blocs (see also Table 5.2). The 
operationalization involved a co-optive inclusiveness of multi-level and public-private 
partnerships which simultaneously regularized the management hierarchies and practices. 
Through the investment process, this differentiated “Managing Authorities, Intermediate 
Bodies [mostly governmental, ministerial or regional agencies but also private consultancies 
acting on behalf of the MA] and Beneficiaries“ and attributed them with responsibilities (EC, 
2008f: 5). Ordered by the Commission (2014e), a study on OP-based cohesion bureaucracies 
revealed the variability of management bureaucracies ranging from various forms of 
employment and temporal contracts. This ranged from public bureaucracies within OP which 
outsourced or delegated services to separated or mixed public or private intermediate bodies 
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(IB) and beneficiaries. From evaluation to auditing, the management was outsourced to 
independent consultancy sector, although the overall responsibility for “sound financial 
management” remained with the MA (EC, 2008f: 5-6, 12; 2008g). This public-private 
partnerships involved also MCs in the manner of monitoring and adjusting performance 
indicators and financial engineering (EC, 2006b, 2008f, 2009d). Such partnerships required 
regional actors and cities, SME associations, and other actors like universities (EC, 2006c; 
2007h; 2008a; 2010d; 2012a). Once inside the network, the “technical assistance” was 
provided to enhance the capacity of the cohesion bureaucracies with respect to their 
development agency (EC, 2007e, 2007d, 2011d). 
3.4.2. (Self-)Evaluating Own Performance 
The co-optive features regularized the governmentalizing tendency to “on-going 
evaluation” (EC, 2007i: 4-13). The on-going evaluation was nothing but another rearticulation 
of ex-ante, interim, and ex-post evaluations. The governmentalization turned the cohesion 
governance into nothing else than compliance system of auditing, reporting, and evaluating 
of peripheral performance against the benchmark of supranational indicators. Besides the 
Commission, and the DG Regio in general and the DG Empl (Employment, Social Affairs, and 
Inclusion) in particular issues, European Court of Auditors and the Commission´s OLAF (Office 
de Lutte Anti-Fraude) became involved. On lower scales, the compliance system 
responsibilized MAs, CA, and AA, IB, beneficiaries to follow a general “audit strategy” (EC, 
2007k). Centred in the state apparatus, the administrative demands of on-going evaluation 
necessitated its partial “outsourcing” to the consultancy industry of “other auditors” and 
“independent evaluation companies or consortia“ on all levels of cohesion governance (EC, 
2009g: 2, 8; EC, 2016: 3). Therefore, the cohesion bureaucracies were also turned into public-
private compliance networks where the development was reduced to technocratic exercise 
of everyday surveillance. 
The question of “financial engineering” and its “transparency” regularized this surveillance 
of investment process within the “compliance assessment“ (EC, 2007j). The methodological 
notes made the national authorities “strongly recommended“ to follow the „key 
requirements” of assessment procedures (EC, 2008h: 1). Through auditing, the Commission 
could thus supervise the “management and control system“ which was to „ensure value for 
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money, proper management of the programmes and consistency with Community policies“ 
in OP (EC, 2009j: 6; EC, 2008h). Not only detecting potential fraud, the auditing provided a 
chance to correct the future procedures and everyday practices of cohesion bureaucracies by 
detecting and correcting “errors” in the national levels of cohesion governance (EC, 2011g). 
The transparency through audit became this way another form of proxy control and 
command for the Commission. 
The auditing of financial compliance was linked to the reporting at the end. The ongoing 
evaluation was fixed to Lisbon and Europe 2020 objectives to initially generate quantifiable 
„measurement of an objective to be met, a resource mobilised, an effect obtained, a gauge 
of quality or a context variable“ (EC, 2006f: 5). The cohesion bureaucracies were then reduced 
to a chain of “suppliers of information on indicators“ which were systematized by managing 
authorities and used then by the “users of information” ranging from MCs, external 
evaluators, and the Commission (EC, 2006f: 21). The quantified “core” indicators formed 
“evaluation plans” which could be monitored and later serving for strategic “reporting” in the 
on-going evaluation process (EC, 2007i: 12-17; 2009e; 2009f). Not only did the Commission 
instruct on the indicative content and structure of national strategic reports on the progress 
and achievements (EC, 2009i, 2012b). It also developed a system of reporting to track the 
“outcome indicators” and their summarization in “outcome targets” (EC, 2011f). 
The ongoing evaluation had two other reasonings in the Commission´s technocratic visions 
besides the regularization of multi-level hierarchies inside the cohesion networks. Ex ante, 
this “new logic” was expected to support public debate for a “fair and reasoned choice of 
policy objectives“ which exerted „an ex-ante disciplinary pressure on policy makers“ as it 
raised „questions on whether policy is effective“ with respect to indicators and targets 
established (EC, 2011f: 7). Ex post, the Commission (EC, 2016: 43-45) justified it as a strategic 
necessity to identify the “EU added value” with regard to “relevance, effectiveness and 
coherence” of Cohesion Policy after the eastern “enlargement” and during the “deep global 




3.5. Development Fix – Institutions and Transfers 
This chapter historicizes the (trans)formation of the cohesion consensus as inherent to the 
core-peripheral compromise in the EU integration. From this historicizing viewpoint, CEE 
states entered the consensus only when the infrastructural fixing turned from its financial 
expansion to retrenchment under the growing fiscal austerity. There were three reasons 
involved. First, the core solidarity became hard to levy as the post-Fordist frameworks of 
Single Market, EMU, and the open EU Trade Policy became institutionalized by the late 1990s. 
Second, the cohesion consensus became neoliberalized as the neoliberal transnational 
project prevailed over its Euro-Mercantilist and Social Democratic alternatives over time. 
Much of this tendency paralleled the neoliberalization of social consensuses in the core and 
peripheral states alike. Third, while the Southern state managers and peripheral or Social 
Democratic forces in the Commission negotiated this post-Fordist consensus as a de facto co-
optive strategy for internal peripheries, there was no longer a will to expand it for the newly 
arriving external peripheries of CEE states on the same scale. 
Therefore, the CEE state-society complexes entered the consensus only once the dilemma 
between core solidarity and peripheral effectiveness was already skewed to the added-value 
visions. This heralded the governmentalizing turn to the institutional form of ordnungspolitik-
type development policy. Through its strategic and conditionality turns, the Commission 
tended to upscale the decision-making powers over the developmental purpose of Cohesion 
Policy, while downscaling responsibilities for its implementation through fixed control and 
performance frameworks. This socio-institutional fixing deepened the surveillance system of 
monitoring, evaluation and control through expanding auditing and reporting practices. The 
Commission leadership has thus consisted in the interiorized transformation of peripheral 
states rather than superimposition through the multi-level cohesion bureaucracy. 
The TRPD-based development fix has thus tended to become more asymmetric in terms 
of infrastructural and socio-institutional fixing over time. On the level of accumulation 
regimes, it however established development framework oriented at the post-2004 market-
enabling integration of CEE states, while facilitating an anti-crisis resilience for them during 
the economic crisis. However, the cohesion governance established an institutional form 
which tended to the increasingly conditional and surveillance-based hierarchies. This variety 
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of TRPD privileged the Commission´s primacy over the definition of neoliberal 
developmentalism, while responsibilizing peripheral states and regions for its effective 




4. Neoliberal Developmentalism: Regulating Uneven and 
Dependent Development in Europe 
This chapter traces the semantic fixing of developmental purpose in the TRPD. I track its 
Fordist origins and transformation by the post-Fordist crisis of mid-2010s. To do so, I 
investigate two series of Periodic and Cohesion Reports. With six editions, the Periodic Report 
on the Social and Economic Situation and Development of the Regions of the Community was 
published by the Commission from 1980 to 1999. The edition was replaced by the Report on 
Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion since 1996. Between 2001 and 2014, additional 
series of Progress Reports was published. The difference between these series tells the 
difference between the Regional and Cohesion Policy. Periodic Reports were established by 
the 1979 reform to “form the basis for periodical comparison of regional problems“ when 
constituting „the first stage of a coordination process“ in the Cohesion Policy (EC, 1977a: 9). 
Cohesion Reports were constitutionalized in the Maastricht Treaty to evaluate “every three 
years on the progress made towards achieving economic and social cohesion“ which was to 
be „accompanied by appropriate proposals“ (Article 130b). Through these reports, the 
Commission gained primacy to fix uneven and dependent development in Europe. 
As show by this chapter, these reports regularized the developmental purpose of cohesion 
governance with respect to the cohesion-competitiveness dilemma. We can thus analyse 
them to trace the contingent articulation of neoliberal developmentalism inherent to this 
dilemma. These reports constituted a broader source of strategic planning for the CSuFs, CSG, 
and CStF. Despite of its implicit origins in the 1960s, Delors Commission openly articulated 
the cohesion-competitiveness dilemma only in the 1980s. Rather than simply contradicting 
each other, the cohesion and competitiveness discourses emerged together as documented 
in Graph 4.2 since the 1980s. They were put into relational configuration with respect to the 
transnational projects of and inter-state consensus on EU integration which I analysed in 
previous chapter 3. Thus, I study neoliberal developmentalism in order to revaluate the 
enabling role of Cohesion Policy on “embedded neoliberalism” in the EU (Van Apeldoorn, 
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2002: 159-61; Van Apeldoorn, 2008) generally and its dependent variation in the Visegrád 
state-society complexes particularly (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007a; 2018). 
The cohesion-competitiveness dilemma in semantic fixing was not isolated from the 
solidarity-effectiveness dilemma in socio-institutional and infrastructural fixing. I evidence 
how they constituted each other within the neoliberal governmentalization since the Agenda 
2000. Just as peripheral effectiveness was privileged over core solidarity, I document how 
economic competitiveness became relationally privileged over social cohesion in the EU´s 
regulation of uneven and dependent development. As the Graph 4.1 documents, this 
coincided with the eastern enlargement which, first, relocated the cohesion flows from the 
South to the East and, in effect, established two distinct peripheries in the EU. Furthermore, 
I investigate how these dilemmas merged in the added-value discourse underpinning the 
Lisbon and Europe 2020 strategies at the same time. Hardly articulated into a comprehensive 
developmental purpose during the Fordist period, this chapter explores how the regulation 
of Europe´s capitalist heterogeneity was comprehensively articulated only in post-Fordism. 
Given its transformation to an ordnungspolitik-type instrument as illustrated in the chapter 
3, I show how the cohesion governance became fixed as an enabling framework of peripheral 
development in the enlarged and deepened market-making order. 
The chapter follows the historizing approach in parallel with the chapter 3. I structure it as 
follows. First, I trace the 1960s origins of neoliberal developmentalism with respect to the 
technologies, objects and purpose of making uneven and dependent development 
observable and thus regulatable by the late 1980s. My aim is not to trace neoliberal 
developmentalism back in the 1960s but identify the origins of semantic infrastructure which 
underpinned its contingent (trans)formation later on. Second, I show its articulation during 
the Southern enlargement and especially the formation of the Single Market and EMU from 
the mid-1980s to late 1990s. This part evidences the changing emphasis on the embedding of 
core-peripheral relations from European cohesion to global competitiveness. Third, we can 
thus discuss why and how the pre- and post-accession CEE became observed as a threat as 
well as opportunity to the EU´s global competitiveness and why the infrastructural 
complementarity of cohesion investment and FDI became privileged as the post-2004 
development promise (see Graph 1.1). Last, I conclude with the post-2008 crisis and its 




4.1 Origins of Neoliberal Developmentalism 
In 1965, the first communication concerning regional policy was published. In this 
document, the Commission (1965: 3) appealed to the principles of “harmonious development 
of economic activities“, “narrowing the gap”, and reduction of „differences between the 
various regions“ with an attention to "mitigating the backwardness of the less favoured". All 
these imperatives were enshrined in the founding Rome Treaty of 1958 and replicated in the 
later treaty revisions mentioned above and below in this text. Against this background, the 
Commission called for a regional policy because the regional „disequilibria“, „imbalances“, 
“disparities” or, in other words, „gap does not seem to have narrowed much in recent years“ 
(EC, 1965: 5-6, 9). This was one way of calling for the establishment of „development policy“ 
against the background of intensified competition in the „unified economic area of the Six 
and the development of trade with non-member countries” (EC, 1965: 5). The other way was 
to produce developmental purpose of regulating Europe´s uneven and dependent 
development which would steer this supranational development policy. 
The 1965 communication set thus three courses of action. First, the statistical void had 
to be replaced with the new practices of semantic fixing. As the Commission (EC, 1965: 7) 
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made only general “forecasts”, the lacking national “regional statistics” had to be fixed 
through the supranational “means to collect and standardize statistical data”. Second, this 
allowed systematizing their „degree of backwardness“ given the “heterogeneous nature“ of 
regions in member states so that the individual „less developed" or „large peripheral regions“, 
including south-western France or South Italian Mezzogiorno, became eligible for assistance 
(EC, 1965: 7, 11-12). Third, the developmental purpose could be thus fixed against the 
„general conditions“ of peripheral backwardness which consisted of „complementary 
economic activities“ and „infrastructure facilities provided by the public authorities“ (EC, 
1965: 11-12). Therefore, “the building-up of infrastructure so that companies setting up in 
less-developed areas“ accessed equal infrastructural conditions to become „competitive in 
the Common Market or able to meet external competition“ legitimized the development 
policy (EC, 1965: 10, 18). These three actions turned into a comprehensive policy only in the 
late 1980s but underpinned the content-formation of cohesion governance. 
4.1.1. From Statistical Void to Semantic Fixing 
Making the uneven and dependent development observable through various indexes and 
indicators was the first course of action for the Commission. As the DG Regio was established, 
the Commission filled the statistical void with irregular reports which became the incubators 
of semantic fixing for the later regular reports. Therefore, the Commission´s (1969: 9) first 
comprehensive report highlighted the “limitations of the data given“ and announced thus the 
intention to improve the „machinery for keeping track of regional development“. Facilitating 
„systemic information“ was thus a precondition to organize „harmonized statistics and 
regional development plans“ together (EC, 1969: 52-53). An Analytical Survey followed which 
aimed to illustrate the lack of systematic information by identifying “quantitative criteria” to 
establish “number of indicators” (EC, 1971: 6). From listing the separate statistics in member 
states, the survey proposed to calculate these indicators to establish inter-regional 
relationships and upscale the observation of their uneven and dependent development on 
the supranational level. This made the thorough interpretation of “the notion of ´gap´” 
central to the systematization of “complete list of indicators” on socioeconomic inequalities 
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in Europe (EC, 1971: 114-115). By putting together this list, the Commission overtook the 
control over its interpretation. 
Although the 1979 reform was a minor success of socio-institutional or infrastructural 
fixing, the Commission received symbolic power over this interpretation by establishing the 
semantic fixing in Periodic Reports. These regular reports followed the irregular reporting 
such as the Thomson Report, regional development atlas, and two short brochures (EC, 
1973a, 1977b, 1980a, 1980b). All of them urged the need of semantic fixing as the “gravity of 
the present [Fordist] crisis intensified“ (EC, 1977b: 7). In this ever „more complicated and 
worrying“ context, the Commission´s (1977a: 6, 9, 12) the 1979 reform established a 
„comprehensive system of analysis and assessment of regional economies“ this way . 
Although a draft of the Periodic Reports was to be submitted for dialogue with other national 
actors in the emerging networks of cohesion bureaucracies, the content-formation remained 
solely with the Commission. Since 1996, Cohesion Reports followed the same pattern as a 
way to “lend structure to this dialogue“ between national actors and the Commission (EC, 
1996: 129). 
Gaining this symbolic power, the Commission (1980c: 118) could both learn the nature of 
uneven and dependent development and simultaneously articulate strategies of its 
regularization as well as regulation “from the vantage point of Community”. In 1980, the first 
Periodic Report (EC, 1980c: 111-121) started to make the „relative intensity of regional 
problems“ measurable through “devising composite indicators, however judiciously this may 
be done“. Referring initially to statistical „gaps in the analysis“, the reports became 
progressively concerned to calculate “all quantifiable indicators“ to make the uneven and 
dependent development observable through various semantic devices as maps, statistical 
matrices, indexes, graphs (EC, 1980c: 6, 120) as visible in the Plates 4.1 and 4.2. Especially the 
Plate 4.1. shows the most used devices but also the semantic content of their observation. 
Inherent to the Spatial Keynesianism, uneven development was initially fixed in grammar of 
demographics and labour markets, sectoral structures with emphasis on productivity, and 
incomes levels measured by GDP (see Plate 4.1).  
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4.1.2. From Less Developed Regions to Less Developed States 
Making uneven and dependent development observable was the first step to differentiate 
relational hierarchy between the variegated degrees of regional backwardness. This 
differentiation, and the accompanied knowledge-production on peripheral backwardness, 
became reinscribed from interregional relations inside the original six economies to inter-
state relations with the new rounds of peripheral enlargement. The first step fixed the regions 
as “certain limited geographical areas“, while systematizing the surveillance of “interregional 
economic dependence” on European scale (EC, 1973a: 8; 1980c: 45, 63). Initially, the regions 
were systematized into „the basis of the 100 regions“ to gradually develop into the scale of 
the statistical „Level II regions“ which became a medium category of the „Nomenclature of 
Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS)“ since the mid-1980s (EC, 1971: 7, 1973a: 2, 1980c: 3-4, 
1984: 2-3). As the Plate 4.2 documents, the Thomson Report fixed thus firstly the regional 
hierarchies when categorizing their (regional) GDP per capita as a percentage level in the 
index of “average of Community of Nine = 100”. While the indicators became more diverse, 
they remained nevertheless hierarchizing the regions through binary hierarchies: The 
peripheral regions as ´less developed´, ´backward´, ´lagging´, ´disadvantaged´, ´less 
fortunate´, ´least-favoured´, ´weaker´, ´poor´, ´underdeveloped´ or ´problem´ regions. The 
core regions became defined as ´more developed´, ´more advanced´, ´richer´ or ´stronger´. 
Fixing the backwardness of peripheral areas was thus derived from the observation of their 
relationship in the “interregional linkages” with core ones (EC, 1980c: 44). This invited to 
various but often mutually reinforcing explanations of peripheral backwardness. From the 
Fordist viewpoint, there was a hierarchy of socioeconomic stages of industrial, semi-
industrial, and agricultural regions. The territorial proximity to the industrial core decided the 
backwardness of “frontier regions” early on (EC, 1969: 14, 35). The backwardness was 
nevertheless primarily infrastructural in both “classical” and “broad” (EC, 1969: 22) senses. 
The classical sense denoted the peripheral backwardness as the absence of “transport, 
communications and telecommunications” infrastructures, while the broad sense included 
the “whole network of public amenities” ranging from the basic “to the less common services 
generally designated higher tertiary or quaternary (universities, research and training 
centres, computers, etc.)“ (EC, 1969: 23). What is more, these infrastructures involved the 
“factor of prime importance” in the “large and skilled population“ which necessitated to 
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equally invest in the „amenities of civilization“ such as healthcare, cultural and recreational 
infrastructures (EC, 1969: 24). The absence of or territorial distance from such infrastructural 
fixes could regularize the persistence of socioeconomic inequalities, while simultaneously 
guiding the developmental purpose of Cohesion Policy (EC, 1969: 25). 
Fixing the peripheral backwardness was already a double-edged dilemma of equalization 
and differentiation. The first 1969 comprehensive report regularized the persistent 
socioeconomic inequalities due to the peripheral lack of “technical and economic 
requirements governing location“ (EC, 1969: 22). Having these institutional and 
infrastructural conditions, core regions could „guide industry in the choice of location“ and 
govern thus the „strong pull on business and people“. In contrast, the first Periodic Report 
used the equalizing imperative to recognize that this competitive “location pattern of 
headquarters functions of large industrial and non-industrial corporations“ reinforced 
undesirably the uneven and dependent relations (EC, 1980c: 62-5): 
The structural characteristics of regional production systems - size of firms, ownership 
and decision making patterns and linkages within and outside the regions - also have 
an important bearing on regional development. On the one hand are to be found 
[peripheral] regions composed of small, locally based units (e.g. agricultural, service 
activities) while at the other extreme are found [peripheral] regions where large and 
often externally controlled units are found. […] Another characteristic of economic 
structure in the less favoured regions is [in other words] the subordinate role they play 
in regard to ownership and control of firms and decisions on investment [in 
headquarters located in core regions]. This dependence of peripheral regions on the 
centre has a number of undesirable consequences. First, production in the peripheral 
regions in firms controlled from outside the region is geared towards exports often 
involving application of labour saving technologies. Second, few significant intra-
regional linkages or economies of scale are achieved. 
Either way, the observation of backwardness incubated with respect to peripheral regions. 
With the enlargement to new “southern and western periphery“, it had been however 
upscaled to peripheral states: Ireland in the 1970s as well as Greece, Spain and Portugal in 
the 1980s (EC, 1984: 200-5). The large peripheral areas in old and new core member states 
remained observed but their relative backwardness diminished in contrast to peripheral 
states. As the plate 4.1 shows, the relevance of observing regions relatively diminished in 
relation to states between the Fordist and post-Fordist reports. Combining the socioeconomic 
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performance and territorial distance between core and peripheral regions, the new 
“peripherality index” mapped (see also Plate 4.2) thus the late 1970s trend as such: “All 
regions of Greece, most regions of Italy - especially the south and centre -, south-western 
France, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Scotland, parts of northern England and Wales and most of 
Denmark can be placed in the peripheral class of regions“ (EC, 1984: 135-9, 1987c: 119). The 
1980s Southern enlargement made, however, the relative shift from regional to national 
scales more evident. The Greek accession signified thus “fundamental consequences“ to be 
engraved by Spain and Portugal as the enlarged bloc tended to become “more heterogeneous 
than the current Community“ (EC, 1984: 183). Since the mid-1980s, the new periphery 
included no longer regions but „the least developed countries of the Community of Twelve 
(Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy)“ (EC, 1984: 183). 
4.1.3. An Outlook of Post-Fordist Developmentalism: European Competitiveness 
At the conjuncture of its internal deepening and external expansion, and more than a 
decade of semantic fixing, the Commission could articulate the “notion of convergence and 
cohesion” (EC, 1987c: 52) by the mid-1980s. Since the mid-1970s, the purpose of the 
“convergence of national economies“ (EC, 1980c: 2) established the main legitimization for 
the emergent core-peripheral consensus on the relaunched integration. However, the 
developmental purpose of this consensus became articulated into a comprehensive content 
only under Delors Commission in the 1988 reform which merged the socio-institutional, 
semantic, and infrastructural fixing. As the imperative of “economic and social cohesion” 
became constitutionalized in the 1987 Single European Act, the Commission articulated it in 
the dilemmatic configuration of cohesion and competitiveness in the emergent neoliberal 
developmentalism. Here, the net-paying “´stronger´” and net-recipient “´weaker´ Member 
States” could be differentiated by the Commission (EC, 1987c: v, 8) in order to strategically 
steer “the necessary catching-up and convergence process [wherein] the assisted countries 
and regions share a special responsibility“. 
By articulating the neoliberal developmentalism, Delors Commission tried only to resolve 
the conflict between equalizing and differentiating rationales pervading the Cohesion Policy 
since its origins. The first 1969 report and the Thomson Report provided a telling contrast. 
The former was written under Von der Groeben´s ordoliberal founding years of DG Regio, the 
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later under the first independent, socialist, and Keynesian Commissioner. Both reports 
accepted “sever conditions of competition between one country and another within the 
Common Market but also between Community and non-Community countries“ (EC, 1969: 
31), as well as the potential “disciplines of Economic and Monetary Union“ under discussion 
at that time (EC, 1973a: 7). Their difference was in configuring the regulation of core-
peripheral socioeconomic inequalities. The 1969 report foregrounded market-enhancing 
locational competitiveness as the “top priority”, the Thomson Report allowed for market-
correcting means to “attack and reduce the regional imbalances“ in order to enable 
peripheries to attain a “more equal competitiveness” (EC, 1969: 31; 1973a: 5-6, 18). The 
Thomson Report facilitated an equalizing purpose and made it evident for the initial Periodic 
Reports which then viewed the socioeconomic equalization as natural “terms of hard 
economics” and the question of “future development and even existence“ of the bloc in the 
aftermath of Fordist crisis (EC, 1980b: 9). Accordingly, regional inequalities wasted the idle 
factors of production, hindered the peripheral participation in economic integration, and 
severed its political legitimacy in effect. 
As for the cohesion visions, the Commission subordinated the equalizing rationale as a 
factor of equal conditions of competitiveness. Much of this trend emerged in the context of 
late Fordist crisis and early post-Fordist articulation of integration relaunch. In the “increasing 
competitiveness of world markets“, the Commission (EC, 1980c: 2-3, 58) legitimized the 
effective use of cohesion transfers to enhance „higher competitiveness of weaker regions“ as 
the best strategy to the greater inter-national convergence. The cohesion investment was to 
enable the “indigenous [growth] potential” of regions in competition over “mobile 
investment” and in a need to “attract such investment to weaker regions“ (EC, 1984: 133). 
This locational mobilization required not only to invest into the “threshold level of 
infrastructure” but channel the “´traditional´ investment aid“ into the productivity-enhancing 
„technological development in industry and tertiary [service] sectors“ (EC, 1984: 133, 201). 
As competitiveness gained qualitatively discursive primacy within the Cohesion Policy, the 
notions of convergence and cohesion remained reconfigured with respect to the Single 
Market and EMU. There were two – nominal and real – notions of convergence that 
rearticulated socioeconomic inequalities in these two structures. The real convergence 
denoted the “convergence in living standards“ which was conditioned by „above-average 
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growth rates of income generation, i.e. of employment and productivity“ in peripheral states 
(EC, 1987c: 52). The real convergence was understood as both a political condition and 
desirable consequence of the successful “completion of a large internal market“ (EC, 1987c: 
viii). However, it became already conditioned by the nominal convergence as a “prerequisite” 
and “necessary but not a sufficient condition for real convergence” (EC, 1987c: vi, 1991: 4-2). 
In the face of future EMU and the past inflationary crisis of Fordism, nominal convergence 
ordained “price stability” and balanced “public finance and balances of payments” to 
guarantee „sound, macroeconomic growth“ (EC, 1987c: vi). As real convergence in core-
peripheral relations became subordinated to the nominal convergence, the cohesion visions 
expected the structural adjustment of national structures to the market-making integration 
as a proper catch-up strategy. 
The origins of neoliberal developmentalism, in other words, navigated the 1988 reform to 
the market-enabling structural adaptation of peripheral states. As the cohesion transfers 
doubled in Delors-I perspective, neoliberal developmentalism solved the regulation of 
uneven and dependent development by privileging their investment into the 
competitiveness-enhancing complementarity which brought together “private capital flows 
supplemented by organized capital flows and transfers in the form of investment aids“. The 
developmental purpose was thus market-oriented because the „assistance available under 
Community regional policy“ responsibilized peripheral state managers to abide by the rules 
of „nominal convergence and adequate profitability“, while investing into inter-state 
and -regional competition to „attract national and foreign investors“ (EC, 1987c: x). 
Subordinating the cohesion funds and – domestic and foreign – to the private investment 
imperatives became key to neoliberal developmentalism. 
4.2 Embedding the South-Northern Development 
The ordoliberal tendencies of making Cohesion Policy a market-enabling development 
framework were deepened in the 1990s. Published under the Commissioner Wulf-Mathies, 
the first Cohesion Report (EC, 1996: chapter 1) spelled out its overall purpose to transform 
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Cohesion Reports (1996-2017) 
 
Source: own preparation in Voyant Tools; EC, 1980c, 1984, 1987c, 1991, 1994d, 1996, 1999d, 2001a, 2004a, 2007a, 2010a, 2014a, 2017. 
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As the cohesion changed form from dirigiste supranationalization to ordnungspolitik-type 
arrangement, its content changed in neoliberalizing direction. The developmental purpose 
shifted to promote “structural adjustment” of core-peripheral relations with respect to the 
internal Single Market and EMU formation and in the external context of “globalization of 
economic activity and financial services” (EC, 1991: 3-1; EC, 1996: 10). In this post-Fordist 
trajectory, the regulation of uneven and dependent development became preoccupied with 
regulating the “interregional differences in competitiveness“ as the underlining factor behind 
socioeconomic inequalities and the target of cohesion investment priorities as well.  
The asymmetries of core-peripheral consensus expected the hierarchical differentiation 
between the advanced core and the catching-up periphery as they were hierarchized though 
differing “averages”, “shares”, “rates”, “levels” (see Plate 4.1) and mapped in different shades 
of development (see Plate 4.2). This developmental difference was made between “northern“ 
and „southern“ states or, in other words, the „the North of the Union“ and „the South of the 
Union“ (EC, 1996: 30, 37, 54, 60-62; 1999: 10, 27, 85, 93, 96, 105, 149). The early 
differentiation between Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece as “EUR(4)” of “cohesion 
countries”, given their GDP below 75 % of the indexed EU average, and the developed rest of 
“EUR(8)” of “non-cohesion countries” (EC, 1991: 45; 1994: 134, 1996: 18, 76) could legitimize 
the core investment into peripheral states due to their backwardness. At the same time, it 
regularized their lagging status and normalized the peripheral states as laboratories of 
structural adjustment. The German unification and the 1995 enlargement with Austria, 
Sweden, and Finland changed little in the inter-state differentiation. On inter-regional scale, 
“the two large [less developed] Objective 1 regions in other countries (Southern Italy, Eastern 
Germany)” than the four cohesion states and “small Objective 1 regions” in other core states 
were however recognized (EC, 1996: 100;). At the same time, peripheral regions in core states 
were differentiated as objects of national rather than supranational intervention. 
The simultaneous tendency to “deepening and widening” (EC, 1994d: 14) of the EU´s post-
Fordist order shaped neoliberal developmentalism. Indeed, as the comparison of semantic 
fixing in the Period and Cohesion Reports shows in Plate 4.1., there was a growing tendency 
to observe the public expenditure and the priorities of public investment including the effects 
of cohesion investment since the mid-1990s. On the one hand, the cohesion budget was 
initially doubled as a showcase of core solidarity in the Delors II package. On the other hand, 
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the Commission could legitimize thus the Southern restructuralization as a necessity for its 
resilience in the „greater intensity of [international] competition“ on the Single Market and 
in the „changing global environment“ (EC, 1991: 63, 1994d: 50, 1999d: 33). Furthermore, this 
competition was more sever because the EMU fixed the exchange rates, which constrained 
the conventional peripheral strategies to “offset a loss in international competitiveness“ 
through devaluation of national currencies in peripheral states (EC, 1994d: 149). Now, the 
peripheral catch-up model became fixed as enhancing own competitiveness through either 
„lower costs of labour„ by introducing wage restraint mechanisms or investment into the 
productivity-enhancing „human and physical capital“ or a combination of both at best (EC, 
1991: 80-81). Given the „sustained fiscal constraint“ in the EMU, the Commission (1994d: 
148-150) promoted effective investment of cohesion transfers as a third way between 
meeting “budget targets” and “maintaining the relatively high levels of development-related 
public expenditure“ to transform peripheral states into “attractive [investment] locations“ at 
once. 
4.2.1. Neoliberalizing Development: Global Competitiveness 
Enabling the EU as a social market economy, the Commission (1996: 13) highlighted 
cohesion transfers as a compromise between differentiating “economic organisation based 
on market forces“ and equalizing „commitment to the values of internal solidarity“. Within 
this compromise, it was clear that “competitiveness is not, therefore, an end in itself but a 
means of consolidating the European model of society“ (EC, 1996: 122). In other words, 
European cohesion was to be achieved through competitiveness-oriented restructuring, 
while solving thus overlapping dilemmas of economic, social, and political legitimacy (EC, 
1996: 115-6). Against this background, the cohesion funds were oriented at embedding the 
uneven “geographical pattern of gains and losses“ (EC, 1994d: 81) of neoliberal 
restructuralization as they enabled a market-oriented framework for peripheral states. 
The aim was to regularize the EU as a globalizing space which was both aware of social 
losses in cohesion and capable to “reap the benefits” and “new opportunities for exporters 
and investors” in the Single Market and within the global economy (EC, 1991: 9, 1994d: 145, 
1996: 67). In general, this market-enabling integration was thus “favourable in terms of 
economic growth“ and had „equally favourable consequences in reducing regional disparities 
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in incomes and rates of unemployment“ (EC, 1991: 9). In particular, it facilitated higher “costs 
or risks” for peripheral states (EC, 1994d: 145). Although the exposition of their economic 
sectors and labour markets to the “greater competition” was about to “speed up the 
modernisation process“, the structural adaptation “could give rise to considerable costs in 
social terms“ (EC, 1991: 79). Moreover, EMU preparations imposed “strict nominal 
convergence criteria regarding inflation and public finances, as well as to maintain exchange 
rate stability“ which risked to „adversely affect economic and social cohesion“ in peripheral 
states (EC, 1994d: 145). For the Commission, the cohesion transfers did not serve to 
contradict the painful restructuralization but rather embed it into an adaptive framework 
which reconfigured the peripheral state-society complexes along the globalist visions. 
The more the hegemonic visions of FDI- and trade-driven globalization emerged, the more 
they became integrated into the developmental purpose of cohesion governance. 
Meanwhile, the competitiveness heading expanded textually from the corpus into titles of 
chapters (EC, 1991, 1994d), whole sections (EC, 1999d), and report as such (EC, 2004). With 
globalization, the rise of “multinational firms” or “large transnational companies” allegedly 
propelled the state and regional managers to compete over new export and investment 
opportunities (EC, 1994d: 83, 1996: 68). The Commission (1994d: 12) could thus praise FDI 
inflows from core economies as “a significant source of potential investment for the 
Community's weaker regions“. It became “generally accepted that a balanced development 
strategy which succeeds in attracting and integrating inward investment can significantly 
assist the convergence of lagging regions“ (EC, 1994d: 86). The Commission could this way 
establish complementary between the cohesion transfers and the FDI. Here, the peripheral 
competitive advantage depended on whether the cohesion transfer helped to attract and 
integrate FDI. In the very contrast to the dictum of past Fordist decades, the Commission 
regularized the FDI dependence this way (EC, 1999d: 115, emphasis added): 
A common fear, in particular, is that the investing company will have less attachment 
to the area and may at any time cut back production, and employment, as part of its 
global strategy […] Another concern, sometimes expressed, is that the presence of a 
foreign investor tends to drive up wages. Instead of recruiting people and training them, 
it is argued, multinationals tend to entice the most qualified, and already well-trained, 
workers away from local companies by offering them high rates of pay. Forced to follow 
suit, the cost competitiveness of local businesses therefore suffers. There is, however, 
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little evidence that multinationals act in this particular way - indeed, since low wages 
may well have been a motivating factor behind the move in the first place, they have 
little incentive to do so. […] A further view holds that a significant part of FDI consists of 
companies relocating their activities primarily to benefit from investment aid. If the 
relocation takes place between Member States, then there need be no net expansion 
of the capital stock in the Union as a whole. Again, however, there is no evidence that 
this is a prevalent activity and, even if it were, the capital stock is likely to be modernised 
and made more productive as a result. 
Against this background, the double-effect of cohesion transfers was acknowledged but 
simultaneously skewed to an effective investment into peripheral competitiveness. As a 
source of “European solidarity”, cohesion funds allowed “income transfers“ that prevented 
„worsening of the balance of payments“ (1996: 116). However, the “so-called Keynesian, or 
demand, effect on output and employment“ was never their „essence but a side-effect“ (EC, 
1987c: 53, 1994d: 130, 1999d: 155). Rather, they represented productive investment into the 
supply of peripheral physical and human infrastructures. Besides the traditional investment 
into “transport and energy networks, telecommunication links and environmental facilities 
(i.e. waste treatment and water supply)“, the investment purpose increasingly foregrounded 
the priority of „qualified manpower“ and „Research and Technological Development“ (EC, 
1994d: 65, 95, 148; 1996: 7; 1999d: 186). Enabling this infrastructural investment, the painful 
structural adaptation was thus envisioned to manage peripheral transition into social market 
economies along with the EU adaptation trajectories of globalization. 
4.2.2. Cohesion Four: Laboratory of Neoliberal Developmentalism 
The “Cohesion Four” (EC, 1996: 20) of Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal was fixed as a 
laboratory for identifying peripheral backwardness and testing the neoliberal trajectories of 
development catch-up. First, these economies were grouped as double treats to the EU´s 
global competitiveness. Their backwardness made them „more vulnerable to trade 
liberalisation because of weaknesses in their exporting and import-competing sectors“ as well 
as having simultaneous problems to „curb inflation“ and “reduce budget deficits“ (EC, 1994d: 
148). Grouped often with Italy due to its Mezzogiorno problem, the four peripheral states 
were equally observed as a testing ground for the peripheral catch-up due to their “double 
challenge of catching up with the present, as well as adapting to the future“ (EC, 1994d: 9, 
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88). The divergent paths of Ireland and the rest, especially Greece, fixed then the visions of 
successful and failed peripheral catch-up. 
Their backwardness was always fixed in relation to the core development trajectories. The 
Commission (1994d: 10) performed this in the following way: “Compared to the rest of the 
Community, the regions of Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal tend to have fewer roads, 
fewer motorways (and higher road accident rates), fewer and more outdated rail lines, fewer 
telephone lines, poorer access to the major energy networks and are less likely to be collected 
to waste and water supply systems“. Equally, the educational levels as well as competitive 
skills of labour were explained relationally such as “the proportion of employment in RTD 
[Research and Technological Development] in the South and in Ireland is generally around a 
half that in the more prosperous Member States“ (EC, 1996: 37). Establishing this relational 
backwardness had a twofold purpose. It regularized the expected painful structural 
adaptation as the effect of this backwardness, while foregrounding the infrastructural need 
to legitimize cohesion transfers to these states. Furthermore, the infrastructural 
backwardness legitimized the complementarity between FDI and cohesion funding as it 
supported “improvements in infrastructure and training to raise the skills of the work force, 
so making the areas concerned more attractive to foreign investors“ (EC, 1999d: 119). 
Ireland was exemplified as a catch-up model thanks to making the FDI and cohesion funds 
complementary. Although all four economies were “catching up at a rapid rate“, Ireland was 
exemplified (EC, 1999d: 29). It formed the main „exception“ given that the other three 
economies performed well „like Ireland“, underperformed „except” of Ireland, while their 
common negative trends applied „even for Ireland“ (EC, 1994d: 145, 148; 1996: 75; 1999d: 
10, 28-30, 123). Unlike the rest of three economies, Ireland used the funds to support its 
otherwise neoliberal strategy of highly globally integrated economy. This allowed it to 
become rebranded as „the major destination for both external and intra-Community foreign 
investment in relation to its size“ which specialized in the “modern productive base in 
[capital-intensive] industries such as electronics and pharmaceutics“ (EC, 1994d: 91). The Irish 
case also legitimized a catch-up strategy which offered “low wages, low corporate taxation 
and generous [investment] incentives“ but was still capable „in attracting higher quality 
investments“ (EC, 1994d: 85, 1996: 54). 
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In contrast, Greece became a “notable exception“ where the challenge of adaptation was 
“the toughest of all“ (EC, 1999d: 10, 93-4). One reason for this was because it “attracted 
relatively low levels of inward investment“ which centred moreover on tourist industry and 
hardly upgraded „skills relevant to high value-added industry“ (EC, 1994d: 91). “[S]till 
relatively underdeveloped“, Greek economy experienced thus “few signs of improvement“ as 
its unreformed structure could hardly “take advantage of the export opportunities“ instead 
of remaining in „overdependence on domestically generated demand“ (EC, 1996: 67, 1999d: 
31).  
Therefore, the “Irish experience” of mutual complementarity between the cohesion 
transfers and FDI attraction became a “‘good practice’ of the first order“ for present and 
future peripheral cases of development catch-up (EC, 2001: 71). Irish upward development 
could be thus traced in the changing shades of development which reattached it from the 
Southern shades to the North-Western ones (see Plate 4.2). For the present ones, only the 
FDI led to the upgrade. Within this fix, the domestic structures were otherwise viewed as 
producing “low value-added products“ either in agriculture or labour-intensive industries 
such as textiles or wood products. This made them “extremely vulnerable to increased 
competition from developing countries and Eastern Europe“ with the immediate effect of 
„deterioration of export performance“ and resultant „trade deficits“ (1991: 80, 1999d: 29). 
What is more, the Commission regularized the Irish experience as the development pattern 
for CEE as shown below. 
4.3 Embedding the East-Western Development 
The Commission reinscribed these restructuring visions for the post-socialist states “to the 
East of the Community“ (EC, 1991: 85). Since the mid-1990s, the Irish strategy became 
privileged as a development strategy of transforming CEE into growth opportunity more than 
“financial burden” as future member states given the increasing „heterogeneity of the EU“ 
(EC, 1994d: 167-9; 1999d: 161). The Irish-type restructuring strategy became more urgent as 
the status of CEE states moved from ´neighbouring´, ´applicant´, ´accession´, and ´candidate´ 
to ´new member´ states and once they became observed as more backward than the 
Southern periphery. Thus, the urgency of “geographical shift” eastwards was rearticulated  
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  Plate 4.2 Mapping Core-Peripheral Relations in Thompson, Periodic and Cohesion Reports, 1973-2017 
 
Thomson Report, 1973 – GDP Index 2nd Periodic Report, 1984 – Synthetic Index 
3rd Periodic Report, 1987 – Peripherality Index 5th Periodic Report, 1994 – Eligibility by Objectives 
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Source: own preparation; EC, 1973: 61a, 1984: 191, 1987: 120, 1994: 127, 20 7: 79, 88, 2010: 69, 2017: 22 
4th Cohesion Report, 2007 4th Cohesion Report, 2007 
7th Cohesion Report, 2017 5th Cohesion Report, 2010 
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as well as remapped as “an unprecedented challenge for the competitiveness and internal 
cohesion of the Union“ (EC, 2004a: xxv; see Plate 4.1). What is more, eastern enlargement 
co-constituted but also simply happened during the governmentalizing turn in the cohesion 
governance as explained in the chapter 3. As its institutional form shifted further to the 
effectiveness visions, its purpose shifted simultaneously to privileging new configurations of 
competitiveness under the “added value“ discourse (EC, 2001: 142; 2004a: iii; 2007a: vii; 
2010a: xxiv). In other words, the eastern enlargement invited the Commission to a 
rearticulation of its development intervention. 
The de facto first eastern enlargement with “new [East] German Länder” was a prelude to 
this comprehensive rearticulation (EC, 1991: 151). The deeper restructuralization of all post-
socialist economies was fixed as urgent because they suffered from the “same problems 
induced by centralised planning” as well as the „similar syndrome of distorted structures, 
decay, lagging development and low efficiency” (EC, 1991: 7). However, East German 
restructuralization was different. However, East German restructuralization was different. 
The new German Länder became fixed as “the weakest region, or collection of regions, of the 
strongest economy in the Community“ and thus primarily an internal matter of Germany and 
then the EU (EC, 1991: 92; 1994d: 151-6). This still required to normalize the “risks” inherent 
to the “inevitable short-term adjustment costs” produced by the sudden exposure to 
“monetary union with West Germany“ and the transition to the “competitive” and 
simultaneously “social” market economy (EC, 1991: 93; 1994d: 151). In contrast, the rest of 
post-socialist economies was initially fixed as an external source of “competition” to internal 
peripheries before it became viewed as a core “opportunity” for the FDI and trade expansion 
(EC, 1991: 10, 80; EC, 1994d: 15, 53; 1999d: 33, 161, 193). 
The added-value visions corelated with the governmentalization of Cohesion Policy 
through its strategic and conditionality turns. This made the semantic fixing more 
comprehensive, while prioritizing global competitiveness through the matrices of Lisbon 
indicators, objectives, and targets (EC, 2007a: 87, 22-23; see Plate 4.2). By doing so, the 
Commission attached the developmental purpose of Cohesion Policy to the Lisbon Strategy, 
agreed by the Lisbon European Council in March 2000, which was supplemented by the 
Gothenburg European Council in June 2001. Lisbon Strategy set the aim to make the EU „the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-driven economy in the world, capable of 
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sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion“ (EC, 
2001: 109; 2002a: 4; 2003a: 10; 2004a: 36). Orchestrated by the Commission, the 2005 
relaunch of Lisbon Strategy urged the EU to “renew the basis of its competitiveness“ (EC, 
2006a: 8). The Lisbon Strategy involved originally three principles of „transition to knowledge-
based economy“, „modernising the European social model“, and „sustaining the healthy 
economic outlook […] by applying an appropriate macro-economic policy mix“ (European 
Council, 2000). The Gothenburg addition complemented the principle of sustainable 
economic development with “environmental protection“ (EC, 2004a: xxvi, 59-63). In this 
sense, the peripheral backwardness and catch-up development were not only expanded in 
scope but became normalized as indicator-based targets. 
Both objectives of making EU globally competitive and expanded to CEE urged thus a call 
for a more comprehensive developmentalism. The Commission fixed the restructuring 
urgency when highlighting that enlargement added “much more to EU population (just under 
20 %) than to its GDP (around 5 % in terms of Euros)”, while rendering the new „EU of 25“ 
poorer as its average GDP per capital was „12½ % less than the average in the EU of 15“ (EC, 
2004a: 12). The accession of Eastern periphery did not solve the development problem of 
Southern periphery as its regions became more developed only through “statistical effect” in 
consequence (EC, 2001: 9). CEE states have nevertheless become new object of development 
surveillance and intervention throughout the expansion to the ́ EU25´ in 2004, ́ EU27´ in 2007, 
and ´EU28´ in 2013. Along with it, there remained the hierarchical differentiation between 
the old ´EU15´ and the new ´EU10´, ´EU12´, and ´EU13´. What is more, the urgency became 
more evident as the visions of sustainability and innovation were rapidly foregrounded in the 
grammar of Cohesion Policy as the Graph 4.2 documents. 
4.3.1. Governmentalizing Neoliberal Developmentalism 
Imagining the added value of Cohesion Policy as a development framework for enabling 
the Lisbon Strategy in European peripheries, the Commission normalized the past wave of 
neoliberalization through the EMU, Single Market, and open Trade Policy. In this sense, the 
developmental purpose of cohesion transfers was set as a “crucial link between Europe’s 
economic strength and its social model“ (EC, 2001: 37). This reattachment extended the 
“standard definition of regional and national competitiveness” from the endowment of 
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human and physical capital to include also “environmental capital”, ”innovation capacity” as 
well as “efficiency of public institutions” or, in other words, “good governance” (2001: 36; 
2004a: xxvi; 2007a: iv, 74). Such an extension merged the neoliberal strategy of the EU´s 
exposure to economic globalization with the newly emergent paradigm of “sustainable” 
growth or development and peripheral “sustainable convergence“ (EC, 2001: 109, 126; 
2004a: 36; 2007a: iv). Besides the economic infrastructures, the institutional infrastructures 
of political governance became new target of fixing peripheral backwardness and thus new 
area of development intervention. 
Extending the cohesion-competitiveness dilemma by rapid foregrounding of the visions of 
(i) sustainability, (ii) innovation, and (iii) institutional efficiency was not mutually exclusive but 
rather constitutive. The Graph 4.2 illustrates how the governmentalization of neoliberal 
developmentalism was supported and simultaneously rearticulated by the rapid rise of these 
three visions especially since the late 1990s. The Plate 4.1 pictures then how this related with 
the new scope of intervention into the peripheral development such as (i) social and 
environmental policies, (ii) R&D and innovation, education; (iii) quality of government policies 
and expenditures. Their articulation within the neoliberal developmentalism is explored 
below. 
Rather than real convergence, the measurement of cohesion became a quantification of 
successful or failed peripheral convergence with the interim 2005 or final 2010 targets of 
Lisbon Strategy. The governmentalization intensified thus the regularization of uneven 
development through benchmarking, indicators, and other goals. Spreading across the whole 
EU governance under the heading of Open Method of Coordination, this strategy aimed at 
new forms of securing the “coherence of national and community priorities” (EC, 2001: 148). 
Especially following its 2005 relaunch, the Lisbon strategy´s objectives renewed also an 
impetus to widen the technologies of surveillance with Lisbon synthetic “index” and 
“indicator” (EC, 2007a: 78-79, 87-88; 2010a: 196; see Plate 4.2). These indicators moreover 
changed the notion of such convergence to privilege new objectives of ´innovation´, 
´adaptability´ and ́ entrepreneurship´ in social, institutional, and infrastructural measures. For 
example, the R&D activities could be identified as innovation only when they enabled Europe 
“adapting to the conditions of competitiveness in a global economy“ (EC, 2001: 58). 
This indicator-generating governmentalization was fixed against the EU´s growing 
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concerns with “key competitors” (EC, 2007a: 5). Hence, the Commission shaped the 
globalization discourse so that it externalized uneven and dependent development in Europe 
as an effect of global economy. Since the mid-2000s, these global competitors were gradually 
diversified from Northern core economies like the United States and East Asia to the newly 
emerging China and other Global South economies. Therefore, the cohesion was no longer a 
question of solving internal uneven development but regulating it with respect to these 
differentiated competition of European core and peripheral states with their respective 
global – core and peripheral – rivals. Against this background, the EU´s global task was still 
the overall upgrade where the “shift towards the service sector is likely to continue, while 
agriculture and manufacturing will continue to experience consolidation of production in 
higher value added activities“ (2001: 3).  
Through this effectiveness-driven deepening of the standard definition of 
competitiveness, peripheral backwardness and thus a scope of co-optive development 
intervention were extended (see Plate 4.1; Graph 4.2). This involved the peripheral partners 
in public and private governance. First, the competitive development of public governance 
became dependent on “institutional and administrative capacity“ to engage in the vertical 
partnership of multi-level cohesion “governance“, while simultaneously managing horizontal 
“public-private partnership[s]“ nationally and regionally (EC, 2001: 132; 2002a: 3; 2004a: xiii, 
58, 141; 2005a: 7-8; 2006a: 8-9; 2007a: xiv, 111, 115, 124-125, 123-135, 160; 2008a: 6). The 
horizontal partnership involved the organization of domestic “productive relationships 
between the various actors involved in the development process” which included both “the 
social partners and representatives from civil society“ (EC, 2004a: xiii, xxxvi;). Second, the 
local domestic sectors of small and medium enterprises (SME) became foregrounded in these 
partnerships. Not only were they “predominant type of firm in the EU” but represented also 
“vital source of competitiveness and job creation” in peripheral regions (EC, 2001: 110, 133). 
The SME were observed as depending on the “capacity to access technology and know-how 
from outside“ through transfers in the „business networks“ and also links with public 
„knowledge base, including with universities and research centres“ (EC, 2004a: 53, 58). 
Therefore, the extended observation of this public-private governance, under the headings 
of entrepreneurialism, innovation, and adaptability deepened the scope of surveillance and 




4.3.2. The New Eastern Periphery 
For the Commission, the new Eastern periphery needed both deeper neoliberalization and 
more comprehensive development. The backward development of CEE states as a group was 
observed beyond comparison “with that in the present EU“ and as a subject to „the 
importance of [their] restructuring“ (EC, 2001: 8). The Commission picked the Irish-type 
strategies of attracting and integrating FDI as the main purpose of cohesion investment to 
assist these states to „realise their economic potential“ in order to “strengthen their 
competitiveness [and catch-up with the rest]“ (EC, 2004a: xxii, 2, 170). The CEE was not 
however fixed as „a single entity“, but in the manner of uneven inter-national and -regional 
development. Thus, the new hierarchization categorized most of CEE into “convergence” or 
Graph 4.2 Rise of Neoliberal Developmentalism in Key Hegemonic Visions, 2018-2017 (trends) 
 
 
































“less developed” regions when initially establishing the former peripheries as intermediate 
“phasing-out and -in” or “transition regions” that formed bridge to “more developed” regions 
in core economies (EC, 2008a: 8-9). This resembled the later differentiation between “less 
developed”, “moderately developed” and “highly developed” states (EC, 2010a: x; 2014a: viii; 
2017: viii). A new blend of “an intermediate group of Greece, Spain and Portugal, together 
with Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia and the Czech Republic“ emerged then between more 
developed member and less developed candidate states (EC, 2001: v). 
The restructuring urgency of physical and human infrastructures, with an increasing 
emphasis on institutional public and private governance, was fixed by the Commission already 
in the pre-accession period (EC, 1991, 1994d, 1999d). As the accession neared, the CEE 
transition status invited to repurpose their industrial legacies in the vision of convergent 
integration through immediate restructuring and future promise of cohesion investment. 
Scattered across reports and indices, the observation of “acute and wide-ranging” 
backwardness, given the “worn out, obsolete or non-existent” infrastructures, was 
summarized in tables referring to the cohesion „challenge ahead“ (EC, 2004a: 16, 174-5): 
Thus, the challenge consisted in replacing the „largely inadequate“ communication and 
transport infrastructures which had to be built with environmental concerns to overcome the 
„decades of neglect“ and the „[industrial] legacy of degraded areas“. Equally important was 
to adjust the human capital as the „ostensibly high“ educational levels of skilled labour did 
not respond to labour market needs „in the new economy which is emerging“. The similar 
diagnosis was provided for „productive investment“ into SME especially in service sector 
where the „most acute“ restructuring was matched with an overall urgency of „strengthening 
innovative capacity“. Inherent to all these problems was however the „questionable“ and 
„inadequate“ expertise of regional and state managers or, in other words, lack of 
„institutional capacity“ which risked misallocating the productive potential of cohesion 
transfers. This backwardness was, however, envisioned also as an opportunity by the 
Commission in the case of successful restructuralization (EC, 2004a: 14-5): 
The challenge for cohesion policy is to help them bring their infrastructure up to date, 
modernise their education and training systems and create a business environment 
favourable to investment […] This is not impossible, as the experience of Ireland 
demonstrates forcibly, but it will require effective support from the EU […] Given the 
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increasing interdependencies which exist in trade and investment, the economic 
development of the new Member States can potentially provide the dynamic to 
initiate and sustain higher rates of growth throughout the EU. […] Structural 
deficiencies in endowment of infrastructure and human capital mean that these 
countries, as well as many lagging and problem regions in the EU15, are not able to 
contribute as much as they might to the competitiveness of the EU as a whole. […] 
The [potential] gains to Germany and Italy, in particular, of stimulating growth in the 
new Member States are, therefore, substantial, though all existing EU countries stand 
to benefit from this and from the higher growth of the EU market. 
Against this background, the FDI was found “particularly important“ for CEE states given 
the „substantial restructuring of their economies“ (EC, 2004a: xiv). Once restructured, these 
economies represented growth opportunities in return because they facilitated „lower 
wages“, „proximity“ to the FDI countries of origin, and „low corporate taxes“ along with 
modernized infrastructural and institutional fixes (EC, 2007a: 73-4). Since the 1990s, the 
Commission had observed the EU-driven flows of “FDI to CEE countries” as establishing initial 
links for their later integration (EC, 1999a: 185). The FDI was privileged as the main solution 
to integrate and adjust their non-competitive domestic sectoral structures. Various “spill-over 
effects” were expected to produce “a significant impact on the productivity and 
competitiveness of resident enterprises“ in there (EC, 2004a: 97; 2007a: 74). That promise 
derived from observing CEE economies as „concentrated in [lower value added subsectors of] 
agriculture and manufacturing“ only (EC, 2001: 3). In this sense, the FDI-led development risks 
were normalized as only a dilemma of how „national and regional governments are likely to 
be able to influence its location“ (EC, 2004a: 84). This „dilemma“ derived from the tendency 
of FDI to concentrate in capital and few other second-tier regions which ruined their initial 
promise of „reducing regional disparities“, while reinforcing them instead (EC, 2001: 75; 
2004a: xiv, 97, 174; 2007a: 73). Given that intra-national enforcement of FDI to locate in more 
peripheral regions could „discourage the multinational from investing in the country“, the 
role of regional strategies was to rather „increase the attractiveness of problem regions for 
foreign investors“ (EC, 2004a: 97).  
Following the 2004 enlargement, the Commission (2007a: iv) fixed CEE states as 
converging overall but simultaneously positioned this convergence into the new „global 
context [where] catching up takes different forms“. Although in a variegated manner, CEE 
states were still observed as generally suffering from a combination of „low value added“ 
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production sectors and poor infrastructural conditions, which made them reliant on the risk 
of distorted „cost competitiveness“ especially when facing „competition from the emerging 
Asian economies“ (EC, 2007a: 32-36). Within these globalist forms of CEE integration, CEE 
convergence could be observed „occurring“ and likely to „continue“ but became framed as 
contingent on its competition with European and other global peripheries. Thus, CEE states 
succeeded in „reducing their budget deficits while at the same time expanding public 
investment in much-needed infrastructure“ (EC, 2007a: 149). The overall fix observed them 
as relatively sustaining „budget balance“ and „the rate of inflation“, as well as increasing 
„export performance“ in the conditions of appreciating „exchange rates“ on their expected 
way to the EMU (EC, 2007a: 147-154). No longer the vision of EU accession but the post-
accession integration under globalization formed thus the new developmental purpose of 
their peripheral restructuring in CEE. 
4.4. The Global Crisis of European Post-Fordist Order 
The 2008 global economic crisis, soon to be spilled over into the (mid-)2010s Eurozone 
debt crisis, disrupted the globalist visions and convergence optimism. The crisis also opened 
the contradictions between cohesion and competitiveness visions which had to be fixed anew 
in neoliberal developmentalism. In particular, economic disruption and the following social 
and political crisis in core and peripheries and within core-peripheral relations, as illustrated 
in the austerity management of Eurozone crisis (Ryner and Carfruny, 2016; Becker et al., 
2016), risked to delegitimize the post-Fordist order in crisis. What is more, the crisis formed 
a context within which the governmentalization of Cohesion Policy shifted from strategic to 
conditional turn as the chapter 3 analyses. 
Both the crisis context and ongoing governmentalization increased the contradictory 
tendencies of developmental purpose between hardening neoliberalization, on the one hand, 
and shifting emphasis on social development on the other. The crisis disrupted the Lisbon 
objectives by 2010, while forming context for the articulation of Europe 2020 strategy. Europe 
2020 foregrounded a vision of „smart“, „inclusive" and „sustainable“ development but 
articulated them under the framework of national and now explicitly subnational „budget 
consolidation“ during the fiscal crisis and reformist „smart specialisation“ under intensifying 
global competition (EC, 2010a: xx, 1, 57, 99; 2013a: 19, 2014a: xxv, 235; 2017: 181). 
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The economic vulnerability and social pains of the crisis were firstly regularized as an 
„opportunity“ which rechannelled the cohesion transfers to enable „necessary structural 
reforms and investments“ so that the EU could „emerge faster and stronger“ (EC, 2008a: 3-
5). Secondly, the „worst financial and economic crisis in recent history“ (EC, 2010a: xi) forced 
the Commission (2010: 169) to reemphasize the backgrounded role of cohesion transfers as 
complementing Keynesian national „stimulus plans“ and newly introduced indicators of 
sustainable social „well-being“. Following this logic, the transfers remedied “the funding 
difficulty and so accelerate[d] the process of convergence” in lagging areas (EC, 2014a: 205). 
The crisis reopened the peripheral question as a double one of Southern and Eastern 
periphery. This included reopening the Mezzogiorno and Eastern German questions. Indeed, 
the crisis „interrupted“ the visions of nominal convergence and the reality of real 
convergence which the Commission rearticulated as new strategies of „resuming“ 
convergence (EC, 2010a: xv-xvi; 2014a: 5, 96; 2017: 1-4, 9). As show below, the East came out 
of it as convergent periphery, the South as divergent one in real terms. As the Table 4.7 
evidences, this convergent-divergent trend remained only on the peripheral scale of crisis-
driven South and FDI-based East rather than the core-peripheral real convergence. 
In fact, the existence of double, yet different – Southern and Eastern – peripheral 
developments were fixed to individualize responsibilities for stalled converge as an internal 
peripheral problem and externalize its resumption as contingent on global competition. 
Hence, the crisis evidenced that „belonging to a large free trade zone alone is not sufficient 
to enable less developed regions to catch up“ because they were not capable to close the 
„gap in infrastructure, institutional efficiency and innovation“ (EC, 2010a: vii). As the crisis 
„disrupted many of these [investment and trade] flows“ underpinning convergence formerly 
(EC, 2010: viii), the post-crisis development expected its automatic resumption. To realize it, 
amidst global competition from „low-cost locations and highly innovative competitors“, 
peripheral states had to firstly match their global peers (EC, 2010a: 1; 2017: 24). Their 
post-crisis convergence was now only a subject of „sound economic governance“, on the one 
hand, and effective investment into closing the infrastructural and institutional gap so that 
they could „move up the value chain“ towards economic activity with „higher value added“ 




4.4.1. Indexing Neoliberal Developmentalism in Crisis 
Europe 2020 expanded the governmentalizing tendencies in crisis to fix the reopened 
contradiction of disrupted economic, social, and territorial cohesion. The Commission 
globalized it in practice, which integrated cohesion semantic fixing in the practice of global 
governance, as well as scope, which included the benchmarking with so-called key 
competitors such as the US, East Asia, and the so-called BRICS including China, India, and 
Brazil. A new „Europe 2020 [achievement] index“ (EC, 2010a: 29, 35-7, 40; 2014: 99; 2017: 
80-82) was invented to replace the Lisbon indicators. As illustrated in the Plate 4.2, another 
new „[regional] competitiveness index“ was integrated which was directly linked with the 
competitiveness index produced by the World Economic Forum (EC, 2010a: 68-69; 2014: 49-
54; 2017: 46-52). The EU „human development index“ was simultaneously inspired by the 
two human development and poverty indexes generated by the United Nations, while the 
following „EU Regional Social Progress Index“ derived from the Global Social Progress Index 
(EC, 2010a: 113-5; 2014a: 95; 2017: 91-4). Last, the „European quality of government index“ 
as well as the „corruption perception index“ were inspired with or adopted from the World 
Bank´s Doing Business rankings, Worldwide Governance Indicators, and Transparency 
International reports (EC, 2014a: 161-171; 2017: xx, 137-144, 154-7). 
Through these indexes, the Commission prioritized the need to intervene into economic 
and social impact of the crisis but normalized its severity as peripheral problem at once. First, 
it widened the social sustainability and well-being indicators only to integrate them into the 
competitiveness discourse. As the plate 4.1 suggests, the widening scope of health, gender 
equality, poverty, and social exclusion indicators proliferated in Cohesion Policy since the first 
Cohesion Report but turned into a comprehensive content only since the crisis (EC, 2010a: 
68, 113, 2014a: 50-53; 2017: 49, 167). Over time, it became thus clear that „health forms part 
of human capital and constitutes a key determinant of growth and competitiveness as well as 
of individual well-being“ (EC, 2010a: 190). Searching social cohesion „beyond GDP“, the 
competitiveness, human development and social progress indexes established nevertheless 
„close link“ with the economic (under)performance of peripheral areas (EC, 2014a: 196-2011; 
2017: 93-94). The bigger social pains of economic crisis were due to the peripheral 
backwardness, while the vision of more cohesive population was simultaneously 
mainstreamed as an effect of sustainable competitiveness. 
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Second, these indexes refixed peripheral backwardness to explain stalled convergence 
with respect to the institutional governance of „sound macroeconomic policies, a favourable 
microeconomic environment and strong institutional frameworks“ (EC, 2010a: xxv). As 
discussed above, the observation of efficient institutional governance emerged since the of 
the 1990s and the 2000s (EC, 1999d, 2001). Since the 2010s, the Commission foregrounded 
it as the „missing“ organizational factor behind the infrastructural fixing of „physical capital, 
human capital (or labour) and innovation (or technical progress)“ (EC, 2017: 136). Privileged 
at the centre of „economic and social development“, the inadequate governance institutions 
explained the stalled convergence and normalized it as the main factor behind the gap in 
„innovation and entrepreneurship, health, well-being and the reduction of poverty“ (EC, 
2014a: 161-177, 188, 196; 2017: 138-9, 145, 161). What is more, the corruption was 
mainstreamed as a new factor behind the peripheral lagging. Harming „the Union as a whole“, 
corruption became fixed as an important factor „particularly relevant for cohesion“ because 
peripheral states and regions tended „to score poorly on corruption and governance 
indicators“ (EC, 2014a: 165). 
 
 
Table 4.7 Comparison of GDP per capita in PPS between the North, South and East, 2000-2018 
(index: EU = 100, 4- to 5-year averages) 
Territory 
Pre-Accession Post-Accession Crisis Post-Crisis 
2000-2003 2004-2008 2009-2013 2014-2018 
North 130 129 130 128 
Austria 130 129 130 130 
Germany 123 120 122 124 
Denmark 127 127 129 129 
Netherlands 142 141 137 131 
     
South 99 98 90 84 
Greece 92 96 80 78 
Italy 120 111 104 98 
Portugal 84 84 80 78 
Spain 100 103 94 91 
     
East 60 66 73 76 
Czechia 76 82 84 89 
Hungary 59 63 66 69 
Poland 49 53 65 69 
Slovakia 54 65 76 75 
Source: Own preparation, Eurostat 
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4.4.2. Debt-Driven Divergence in Southern Eurozone Periphery 
Eurozone crisis reconstituted the relationship of Southern periphery to the core and new 
Eastern periphery in the semantic fixing. Indeed, the Table 4.7 shows its divergent trajectory 
from the North-Western core to the Eastern periphery. The South was the main victim of the 
debt crisis because it reduced the GDP per head “in around 40 % of regions, located mainly in 
Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece“ between 2009 and 2015 (EC, 2017: 6). This 
„contraction“ of GDP and employment reversed the „convergence achieved“ when the 
disposable income of these states declined to or below „2005 levels“ during the crisis (EC, 
2017: 10). Moreover, the Southern dependence on foreign debt was exposed due to the 
„deterioration“ of national and subnational budgets, which regularized „fiscal consolidation“ 
as a strategy of resumed convergence (EC, xiv, 2010a: 171-2; 2013a: 7-10; 2014a: xxxii, 140, 
152-4, 147-160, 235; 2017: 164). There was differentiation as the Commission regularized the 
Irish divergence as short-term, Italian divergence as regional, while the Spanish divergence 
remained intermediate between these more developed and those lagging peripheral states 
of Portugal and Greece. Overall, for the South, the developmental purpose of cohesion 
investment became conditioned by and privileged assistance in austerity reforms. 
The social costs of both the crisis and its austerity management were normalized as effects 
of the Southern lack of competitiveness. Therefore, their „deterioration” in the EU human 
development index could be observed as an effect of a long-term lack of or immediate decline 
in competitiveness. Indeed, „Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece“ suffered from immense 
„regional differences in competitiveness“ which affected their overall national 
competitiveness (EC, 2010a: 71). Moreover, these differences explained not only the „highest 
levels of human poverty“ therein before the crisis but also the deteriorating material 
deprivation during it (EC, 2010a: 113; 2014a: 71). As a common signifier for the Eurozone 
periphery, the „substantial increase in the unemployment rates” explained then the link 
between higher social costs and the lack of competitiveness in human capital (EC, 2011a: 32). 
Most of Southern regions were regularized to „score low“ historically in their capacity to 
produce skilled workforce, while the share of highly skilled workforce remained low „even in 
their capital region“ (EC, 2008a: 9-10; 2009a: 6). With the lack of competitive labour forces, 
which only added to the lack of overall competitiveness, the social pains of crisis restructuring 
could be fixed easily.  
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Beside non-competitive social and economic infrastructures, the „quality of government 
and institutions“ was identified as the „main obstacle to development“ in most of these 
countries as they belonged among the „least effective“ in the EU and witnessed 
„deterioration“ during the crisis (EC, 2014a: 168; 2017: 139). Inadequate governance 
structures explained then the „deterioration of public finances“ on (sub)national scales (EC, 
2014a: 171). The benchmarking could thus single out that „the highest ratios of government 
debt to GDP are recorded in Greece (156.9 %), Italy (127.0 %) and Portugal (123.6 %)“, while 
the Irish public debt remained still „higher than the annual GDP“ (EC, 2013a: 24; 2014a: 154). 
Despite of its relative decrease (Graph 4.1), the cohesion investment inflows could be 
rearticulated as an investment substitution at the time of sever budgetary cuts to restore 
„sustained and sustainable economic recovery“ (EC, 2017: 164). The funding was however 
conditioned by institutional reform and simultaneously oriented at „growth-friendly 
expenditure“ rather than remedying the social demand as the „decline was around 60 %“ in 
public investment in, among others, Greece, Spain and Ireland between 2008 and 2013 (EC, 
2014a: xv, 142). The vision of resumed Southern convergence, as supported by cohesion 
funding, expected thus strategies of sound economic governance as a priority.  
Although the primary script of EU15 and EU13 remained relatively intact, the 
Commission´s semantic fixing rearticulated the hierarchical relationship between the old 
Southern and new Eastern peripheries in two ways. Sharing the debt-driven growth and the 
rise in unemployment and EMU membership, Southern eurozone periphery was matched and 
compared with the successful austerity-led crisis management in „Baltic States“ (EC, 2001: 
13, 32; 2008a: 9, 34; 2009a: 5, 14; 2010a: 3, 31, 82, 117; 2014a: 12, 58, 71, 83, 168). At the 
same time, the low institutional efficiency and overall position „furthest away from achieving 
the EU targets“ attached Greece especially to the post-2007 CEE member states including 
Romania, Bulgaria, and eventually Croatia (EC, 2014a: 168; 2017: 80). Benchmarked with the 
East overall, the South was refixed as both really and nominally diverging periphery. 
4.4.3. FDI-Based Convergence of the EU´s Eastern Periphery 
During the crisis, the resilient Visegrád core of converging Eastern periphery became 
refixed as a catch-up model which partially overlapped with core trajectories. Once again, this 
convergence was however relative as the East converged with the diverging South rather than 
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with the North-Western core (see Graph 4.7). The Commission observed this model to 
“perform relatively well” or “recover quite quickly” along with generally retaining overall 
“public debt below 60 % of their GDP” even in times of contracting FDI inflows (EC, 2010a: 3; 
2013a: 7). Here, the social pains of deliberate fiscal austerity and the disrupted FDI inflows 
required regularization. The relative increase of cohesion investment (see Graph 4.1) became 
articulated as a complementary “source of public investment” which substituted FDI and 
equally supported the resumed convergence promise in the (post-)crisis years. The 
complementarity between FDI and cohesion investment was thus further regularized as a 
catch-up strategy for the East. This applied especially for the core of the Eastern periphery: 
While Czechia and Slovakia retained or acquired a ́ moderately developed´ status, Poland was 
fixed as a ´less developed´ catch-up model that “escaped the crisis relatively unscathed” (EC, 
2013a: 17). The moderately developed Slovenia and the less developed Hungary were 
associated with fiscal vulnerability but remained included in this semi-peripheral cluster. 
In this sense, the opened contradiction of FDI-based development had to be regularized 
through prioritizing its past developmental benefits in relation to present crisis. By the time 
of the crisis, the large sectoral share of “[gross] value-added” produced in the FDI-based 
export-oriented manufacturing was fixed as the main factor behind the convergence (EC, 
2010a: 3; 2013a: 8; 2014a: xxix, 11; 2017: 24). Recognizing that “the FDI is a crucial source of 
investments for almost all” CEE, the Commission foregrounded the advantages of its resultant 
exportist regimes, while normalizing its tendency of being “volatile and highly sensitive to the 
economic cycle” (EC, 2009a: 7; 2013a: 10). Although this form of integration risked to expose 
CEE to “major reductions” in the EU intra-trade and -investment transactions, it also formed 
“an opportunity to develop a strong cluster” to facilitate “positive knowledge spillovers” 
through these trade and investment links (EC, 2009a: 32; 2014a: xxx). Meanwhile, although 
“available resources [were directed] back to ´mother´ companies” in European core, the pre-
crisis “rise [in FDI] stocks was never reversed” in the Visegrád economies (EC, 2013a: 8-10). 
Moreover, the Commission normalized the volatility of increased FDI and export dependency 
as a trade-off for the sustained convergence. Therefore, Slovakia converged only to become 
part of a “geographical distribution of high and medium-high tech manufacturing” which 
consolidated through the FDI around “the central part of Europe, notably in Germany, 
Northern Italy and the Czech Republic” (EC, 2008a: 28; 2013: 8).  
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Indeed, the Commission highlighted the dependency as facilitating the catch-up model 
with the attribute of social cohesion on the level of core qualities during the crisis rather than 
causing its disruption due to austerity. By the end of the crisis, its resilience could be observed 
given the “growing regions” were identified “in Poland, Germany, Sweden, Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic“ (EC, 2013a: 32). Meanwhile, the EU human development index “increased 
considerably in all German and Polish regions”, while other Visegrád regions belonged among 
those with “an increase in the index” as well (EC, 2014a: 69). Indeed, “Poland achieved a 
remarkable reduction of its share of severely materially deprived persons” during the crisis 
(EC, 2013: 12). The group of “Sweden, Germany, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia” 
belonged then already among those with lowest levels of human poverty, while Czechia 
fulfilled “criteria used in Europe 2020” for social wellbeing already during the crisis (EC, 2010a: 
110-5; 2017: 81-2).  
Rather, the Commission normalized the stalling convergence as inherent to inadequate 
public governance, persisting infrastructural backwardness, and the lack of innovation 
capacity of domestic SMEs. Visegrád regions belonged thus among those where 
“competitiveness as measured remained largely unchanged“ during the crisis (EC, 2017: 51). 
Moreover, the „Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia” exemplified the CEE pattern wherein 
capital regions absorbed most of the high value-added investment but “not (as yet) boosted 
the competitiveness of neighbouring regions” (EC, 2010a: 45, 161; 2014: 54). The capital cities 
could thus selectively compete with leading regions in European core, as in the case of 
“people employed in high-tech sectors”, but remained “´pockets of excellence´” in their 
national economies (EC, 2010a: 45; 2017: 33). Much of this related to the innovation 
performance which was „lower than average” in core states, while only some CEE states 
“(Cyprus, Estonia and the Czech Republic) [tended to] perform better than Southern EU-15 
Member States” (EC, 2010a: 39-40). Thus, the “capital city regions in Hungary and Slovakia” 
reached the EU average but were “located in catching up countries whose overall innovation 
performance” remained below it (EC, 2010a: 42, 49).  
Hence, the slow convergence was not a result of the dependent model but inefficient and 
corrupt governance in CEE. Through the corruption and ease-of-doing-business indexes, the 
lower value-added of FDI and the quality of „transfer of innovative technologies” were fixed 
with their sensitivity to a “corrupt or inefficient government” (EC, 2014a: 163-4; 2017: 142, 
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155). Except of Hungary, CEE states experienced „improvements“ and “increases” which 
explained their convergence through FDI (EC, 2014a: 163-4; 2017: 142, 155). However, the 
peripheral lagging remained still contingent on the “relatively low scores” on the corruption 
perception index, as exemplified by Czechia and Slovakia, or “greatest variation between 
regions in“ Czechia and Hungary with regard to the quality of public services (EC, 2014: 166; 
2017: 139). 
Through this fixing of FDI and trade dependence as well as infrastructural and institutional 
gaps in convergence potential, the Commission highlighted the complementarity of cohesion 
transfers in the manner of neoliberal developmentalism. As the cohesion funds “accounted 
for half or more of the total“ in public investment of CEE states, they made “a substantial 
contribution to growth” and underlined “the benefits of joining the Single Market” this way 
(EC, 2014a: 54; See Graph 2.1). Not only did the cohesion investment substitute the FDI in 
crisis, it preserved „growth-friendly expenditure“ to resume CEE convergent trajectories 
afterwards (EC, 2014a: xv-xvii, 142-144; 2017: xxi-xxv, 164-170). In this way, the multiple 
dependency was fixed as convergence-prone but remained envisioned as hindered by 
national – infrastructural but especially institutional – incapacities in CEE with respect to the 
advanced development in core states. 
4.5. Development Fix – Ideology 
In parallel to the chapter 3 on the institutional form of cohesion governance, this chapter 
historicized its changing developmental purpose. Recognizing the ordnungspolitik-type form, 
this chapter traced the origins and the transformation of neoliberal developmentalism. CEE 
states and regions became subject to this developmentalism only when the semantic fixing 
in the Cohesion Policy shifted to the strategic selection of global competitiveness in EU 
peripheries. There were three reasons involved. First, the Commission regularized the visions 
of core-peripheral cohesion through real convergence as possible ends rather than means to 
pattern Europe´s capitalist heterogeneity. Second, the globalist vision normalized the 
regulation of core-peripheral relations as the responsibility of peripheral states to catch-up 
with the EU´s competitiveness-oriented transformation as a bloc in the intensified global 
competition. Third, the relative backwardness of the new Eastern periphery allowed the 
Commission to fix CEE societies as a threat and opportunity to this global competitiveness. 
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This, in effect, subjected it to the more comprehensive visions of neoliberal 
restructuralization. Under the added-value discourse, this no longer involved solely 
infrastructural fixing but extended also into the institutional fixing.  
Neoliberal developmentalism had been already skewed to the strategic prioritization of 
global competitiveness as a development strategy to enable the regulation of continental 
uneven and dependent development during and after eastern enlargement. During this 
process, cohesion became appendage to competitiveness which was reduced to the nominal 
convergence of peripheries with developmental indicators embedded in the Lisbon and 
Europe 2020 agendas. Thus, this variety of developmentalism was to embed the post-2004 
neoliberal integrations of CEE as a new periphery and was then instrumentalized to make 
them resilient during the crisis. By doing so, the Commission deepened, however, the scope 
of peripheral backwardness which originally denoted gaps in physical and human 
infrastructures but inevitably included the questions of political-institutional governance. The 
resultant surveillance of peripheral backwardness identified the strategic aims of its 
regulation but simultaneously normalized the core-peripheral relations as inherent to this 
peripheral backwardness. 
The TRPD-based development fix has thus tended to regularize uneven and dependent 
development as a normal fact of the EU´s globalist integration. Rather than shifting the 
cohesion-competitiveness dilemma into the equalizing visions of real convergence, it 
furthered the differentiating visions of varied embedded competitiveness which 
synchronized peripheral development with the supranational objectives of globally resilient 
Single Market and the EMU. Two – Southern and Eastern – peripheries were fixed in effect. 
Accordingly, the Southern Eurozone periphery failed to take the complementary 
opportunities of FDI and cohesion investment transfers and became a debt-driven threat to 
the EU competitiveness. In contrast, following the Irish strategy, especially the (Visegrád) core 
of Eastern periphery was fixed as taking the same complementary opportunities of FDI and 
cohesion investment flows in a catch-up model which combined fiscal austerity with export 
performance. This developmental model is the subject of next chapters.  
123 
 
5. Dependent Developmental State: A Visegrád Model 
This chapter takes the advantage of two previous historicizing chapters. By doing so, 
I investigate how the TRPD-based developmental fix has translated into dependent 
developmental state projects in the Visegrád dependent market economies (Drahokoupil, 
2009a; Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009). As conceptualized in Table 2.2, which is empirically 
substantiated by this chapter in the Table 5.1, the cohesion investment inflows are thus 
explored through their complementarity with the FDI impact on such developmental 
arrangements. In other words, this chapter shows the effects of Cohesion Policy on the 
transnationalization-cum-transformation of Visegrád state projects during their post-2004 
integrations. First, I study this transnationalization as governmentalization which fixes the 
technologies of cohesion governance (see Table 3.1) and the effectiveness-driven nodal 
agency to promote developmental coalitions inside the Visegrád state-society complexes. 
Second, I investigate how these forms of interiorized transformation (Poulantzas, 1974b) 
powerfully shaped, albeit hardly determined the Visegrád state strategies. These regime 
strategies of embedded neoliberalism (Bohle, 2009; Bohle and Greskovits, 2007a, 2018) could 
be thus sustained with the neoliberal developmentalism. 
More particularly, the chapter illustrates the scalar rearticulation of the supranational 
dilemmas on the national scales of peripheral Europe: the (national) consumption-
(integrationist) investment dilemma (Box 1.1). Having illustrated the material dependence 
(Graphs 1.1 and 2.1), I inquire into the commonalities and then varieties of how it has been 
institutionally organized and ideologically articulated. In other words, I ask about the national 
interiorizations of this dilemma and interpret it as inherent to the Visegrád dependent 
developmental states. I illustrate this through the comparative analysis of national 
documents within the cohesion governance – CSuFs, NSFRs, PAs, and OPs strategies (see 
Table 3.3) – to investigate their commonalities in the early parts of this chapter. The later 
parts investigate the Czech single case to explore the main contradiction in the consumption-
investment dilemma inherent to these developmental arrangements. I illustrate the impact 
of cohesion governance on identifying the Visegrád innovation incapacity, while enabling the 
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developmentalist visions of investment for the innovation-led catch-up (see Table 5.1; 
Drahokoupil and Myant, 2015; Medve-Bálint, 2018). As well, I explore how the 
governmentalizing tendency to fix the Visegrád institutional incapacity of nationalist 
consumption becomes implicated in the reproduction of state capture (Innes, 2016; Fazekas 
and King, 2018). 
By deciphering this inherent contradiction, I research the interiorization of cohesion 
bureaucracies and the resultant articulation and realization of state developmental strategies 
(Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009; Drahokoupil and Myant, 2015). More concretely, the Table 5.1 
follows the production of (trans)national institutional complementarities in the Visegrád 
economies. As already discussed in the chapter 1 and 2, there was a dominant cleavage in the 
Visegrád states: an ambivalent tendency to inward-looking nationalist and outward-looking 
integrationists projects. The chapter explores how the Cohesion Policy institutionalized an 
embedding framework behind the post-accession integrationist projects, while making the 
resultant FDI-led strategies resilient during the crisis. Given the (post-)crisis turn to a more 
nationalist developmentalist projects, especially in Hungary and Poland (Bluhm and Varga, 
2019; Toplišek, 2019; Scheiring, 2019), I document how the Cohesion Policy was made more 
inward-looking, albeit within the confines of neoliberal developmentalism. Furthermore, I 
illustrate then the Czech case. This involves the two contradictories tendencies of 
consumption-investment dilemma: On the one hand, the integrationist investment into the 
large innovation infrastructures as an innovation catch-up. On the other, the case of state 
capture of cohesion governance by the crony and oligarchic networks around the prime 
minister Andrej Babiš and the ANO party (Innes, 2016; Hanley and Vachudova, 2018) is 
discussed. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it explores the transnationalization of Visegrád 
states through the governmentalizing interiorization of cohesion governance within their 
state-society relations. Second, it investigates the (post-)accession and (post-)crisis 
articulations of neoliberal developmentalism in the Visegrád dependent market economies. 
Third, the chapter refocuses on the Czech case to exemplify the national variation of 
consumption-investment dilemma and the essential contradiction in the Visegrád states 
where the national networks and transnational integration co-constitute each other. 
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5.1. Governmentalizing Dependency 
The operationalization of cohesion bureaucracies has been central to the socio-
institutional fixing of Visegrád dependent developmental states. This aimed at transforming 
the Visegrád power blocs into developmental coalitions. Under the effectiveness visions, the 
governmentalization aimed contradictorily at upgrading their organizational capacity 
(Drahokoupil and Myant, 2015; Bruszt and Vukov, 2017; Medve-Bálint, G. and V. Šćepanović, 
2019) but simultaneously reducing their autonomy (Drahokoupil, 2009a; Bandelj, 2017) under 
the Commission´s developmental leadership. Although taking different national shapes, this 
socio-institutional fixing was modelled on common institutional arrangements. These 
arrangements were complementarily grounded in the CSuFs, NSFRs, PAs in Czechia (GoCR 
2003a, 2007a, 2014a), Hungary (GoRH 2003, 2007a, 2014), Poland (GoRP 2003a, 2007, 2014a) 
and Slovakia (GoSR 2003a, 2007, 2014) and their elaborations in the respective sectoral and 
territorial OPs as the Table 5.1 illustrates below. Therefore, the cohesion bureaucracies 
formed a distinctive category inside Visegrád state apparatuses. They were responsible to 
establish a partnership-based nodal agency which organized supranationally-led governance 
technologies inside the Visegrád state-society relations. Since the CSuFs in 2004, these 
governance technologies underpinned this agency as being driven by an “effective” system 
of “management”, “monitoring”, “evaluation”, and “control” (GoCR 2003a: 128-148; GoRH 
2003: 199-212; GoRP 2003a: 145-160; GoSR 2003a: 141-171). 
The conflicting aim of increased developmental capacity and upscaled autonomy of 
Visegrád developmental coalitions was organized across the three levels of (i) nodal agency, 
(ii) institutional complementarities, and (iii) management practices. First, the partnership 
technology underpinned the nodal agency of cohesion bureaucracies, which were 
operationalized especially as the new MAs, to embed them into public-private networks of 
various institutional actors in the MCs among others. This social nodal agency of cohesion 
bureaucracies underpinned the (trans)national institutional complementarities. Second, 
through the programming and concertation technologies, these complementarities were 
rearticulated in the CSuFs, NSFRs, PAs but sectorally embedded in the OPs. All these 
documents aimed to operationalize the sectoral and territorial synergies between Visegrád 
economies and the Lisbon and Europe 2020 strategies. Third, the additionality technology 
along with the decentralization and simplification configured the cohesion  
126 
 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Complementarity with Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020 agendas (i.e. 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































bureaucracies´ everyday management practices of command and control from their 2004 
introduction to the increasing demand of “effective implementation” (GoCR 2014a: 157; 
GoRH 2014: 118; GoRP 2014a: 180; GoSR 2014: 118). 
5.1.1. Governing through Nodal Agency 
Nodal agency is organized through the partnership technology. It underpins the role of 
cohesion bureaucracies as the organizational backbone of the developmental coalitions in the 
state apparatus and embeds the institutional complementarities. Partnership is a 
precondition to both articulate the programming documents during their negotiations with 
the Commission and implement them during the programming periods. Since its origins, it 
fixed these developmental coalitions as vehicles of comprehensive “coordination” 
mechanism (GoCR 2003a: 2, 128; GoRH 2003: 145; GoRP 2003a: 114; GoSR 2003a: 7) of 
effective and transparent investment. It established thus variegated networks which were 
supranationally disciplined but equally oriented at their capacity-enhancing national 
embedded. These networks originated already in the pre-accession period within the Phare 
through the processes of “preparation and implementation of pre-structural instruments and 
also programme periods of 2004-2006 and 2007-2013” (GoCR 2014a: 137). This nodal agency 
was driven by contradictory logic which deliberatively incorporated “[all] relevant” and “key 
partners” (GoCR 2014a: 138; GoRH 2014: 101; GoRP 2014a: 172; GoSR 2014: 107) but 
disciplined them within the supranationally designed governance frameworks. 
As a central node, the DG Regio governed the national nodes of cohesion governance at 
distance by responsibilizing the national MAs, CAs, AAs, their IBs, and MCs. This governance 
from afar was hierarchically skewed to the DG Regio´s control, surveillance, and command 
functions. DG Regio bureaucrats “consulted” and “approved” (GoRP, 2007: 5-9; GoSR, 2007a: 
7-9) the operationalization of national cohesion bureaucracies at the outset of every 
programming period. During its implementation, they were the receiving end of the 
information chain of reporting and evaluation, the main intermediator of methodological 
guidance and recommendation and a final approver, auditor, and payer of the nationally 
certified investment. The MAs were thus responsibilized to “guaranteeing flow of“ or 
“supplying continuous information to the Government and to the European 
Commission“ where the DG Regio was to receive „information“ for its evaluation, verification, 
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and command function (GoCR, 2007a: 94; GoRH, 2007a: 137, 147; GoRP, 2007a: 113). The 
authorities supervised then the subnational “compliance” with the Commission´s 
“methodological” guidance and directives, while remaining responsible for the 
“coordination” and “submission” of regular reports to it (GoCR, 2007a: 94-5; GoRH, 2007a: 
142-7; GoRP, 2007a: 108-111). 
Managing authorities constituted thus main national nodes of cohesion bureaucracies to 
organize the central “coherence” or “synergies” between the Commission and the state 
apparatuses (GoCR, 2007a: 34-35; GoRH, 2007a: i-iii, 72; GoRP, 2007a: 151-152; GoSR, 2007: 
97). As the Table 5.1 documents, two – more and less institutionally centralized – forms of 
coordination developed by the mid-2010s. In Czechia and Slovakia, there were two central 
MAs: the Slovak Ministry of Construction and Regional Development and the Czech Ministry 
of Regional Development. However, individual OPs remained managed by the “division of 
competencies” on the level of “state/Ministries” so that they became sectoral MAs of these 
OPs as illustrated later in this chapter. For example, the OPs Environment were managed by 
Slovak and Czech Ministries of Environment (GoCR 2012b; GoSR 2015b). In Poland and 
Hungary, one central body formed MA for all the OPs: the Polish Ministry of Regional 
Development and the Hungarian National Development Agency (GoRH, 2007a: 45-6; GoRP, 
2007a: 109-10). Although still reliant on the “relevant [line] ministers [and national agencies]” 
(GoRH, 2007a: 14, 147-9; GoRP, 20), this coordination was more centralized. Irrespective of 
these differing forms, MAs constituted the primary object of partnership, while being 
responsibilized to interconnect the agenda with the rest of state apparatus in a dual logic. 
Within this logic, the resultant “inter-ministerial” (GoCR, 2007a: 35, 89; GoHR, 2007: 154, 164; 
GoSR, 2007a: 7, 100-1) networks established a bureaucratic backbone of the cohesion 
governance. The MAs firstly organized the surveillance and control systems to retain national 
organizational autonomy, while being subjected to the supranational leadership. They had to 
then extend the bureaucratic nuclei into deliberative networks encompassing the whole 
state-(civil)society relations. 
As the Table 5.2 illustrates, MCs (Cartwright and Batory, 2012) materialized this 
incorporative extension as they integrated the most powerful economic and social partners 
and non-governmental organizations (GoCR 2014a: 138; GoRH 2014: 100-9; GoRP 2014a: 
172-3; GoSR 2014: 107-110): Based on the tripartite logic, they firstly incorporated the 
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collective capital-labour interests through the representation of business “associations” and 
labour “unions” so that the otherwise weak labour and national capital were co-opted. Other 
civil society and sectoral “organizations” were included sectorally as the Table 5.2 exemplifies 
on the representatives of higher education in the innovation-based OPs. These committees 
were embedded in broader forms of incorporation like “roadshow” (GoCR, 2003a: 2), 
“workshops” (GoSR, 2007: 8), “seminars” (GoSR, 2007: 8), “working groups” (GoRH, 2007b: 
10), and “fora” (GoRH, 2007a: 169-171). Thus, the preparation of Polish NSFR included “60 
meetings and conferences“ with a participation of approximately „4800 persons“ (GoRP, 
2007a: 151). Meanwhile, the preparations of Czech and Hungarian NSFRs included 
consultations with the biggest capital and labour interest representations: the Czech 
Chamber of Commerce and the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, as well as the 
Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions and the National Confederation of Hungarian 
Trade Unions (GoCR, 2007: 5, GoRH, 2007a: 169-171). The forms of MCs differed once again 
as the Slovak MC for Knowledge Economy monitored three OPs Research and Development, 
Information Society, and Competitiveness and Economic Growth (GoSR, 2011a: 3-4), while 
there were two separate MCs needed for two OPs in Czechia (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2). 
Irrespective of its differing forms, the operationalization of nodal agency followed a 
purpose to consolidate developmental coalitions behind the increase of Visegrád state 
capacity, while upscaling the governance hierarchies at once. Rather than reducing Visegrád 
state power, this upscaling of command and control powers to the Commission and the 
downscaling of coordination responsibilities was programmed to selectively reorient the 
strategic intervention of these dependent developmental states. This was linked to the 
operationalization of institutional complementarities. 
5.1.2. Operationalizing Complementarity 
The nodal agency operationalized the increasing emphasis on transnational institutional 
´[synergies and] complementarities´ (GoCR, 2014a: 157-173; GoRH 2007: 154-164; GoRP, 
2014a: 185-9; GoSR 2007: 80). It has been driven by the programming and concentration 
technologies. These technologies established the conditions through which the national 
developmental strategies of 2004 CSuF, 2007 NSRFs, and 2014 PAs could enable 
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xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx Table 5.2 Partnership: Membership in Czech, Polish, and Slovak Monitoring Committees for OPs in the 
Innovation Domain, 2007-2013 
MC for Knowledge Economy* 
(Slovakia) 
MC for OP Innovative Economy 
(Poland) 
MCs for OP EC, RDI, and EI 
(Czechia) 
Governmental Representative for Knowledge Economy 
Ministry of Regional Development 
(8) 
Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports 
(14) 
Office of the Government (4)** Ministry of Digital Affairs Ministry of Industry and Trade (10) 
Ministry of Education, Science, Research, and Sport (2) 
Ministry of Science and Higher 
Education 
Ministry of Regional Development (3) 
Ministry of Economy (3) Ministry of Economy (2) Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2) 
Ministry of Transport, Construction and Regional 
Development 
Ministry of Sport and Tourism Ministry of Environment (3) 
Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family Ministry of Finance Ministry of Finance (3) 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Ministry of Labour and Social Policy Ministry of Heath 
Ministry of Interior 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Ministry of Justice Ministry of Environment Individual Regions or Regional Councils (29) 
Ministry of Environment Office of Prime Minister Council of Higher Education (3) 
Governmental Representative for Territorial Authorities 
and Integrated Management of Waters and Landscape 
Union of Polish Metropolises Czech Rector Conference (2) 
Governmental Representative for Information Society Association of Polish Cities Czech Chamber of Commerce (3) 
Association of Towns and Communities Association of Polish Voivodeships Confederation of Industry (3) 
Union of Towns and Cities Convention of Marshals 
Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade 
Unions (3) 
Individual Regions (8) 
Independent and Self-Governing 
Trade Union Solidarność 
Association of Towns and Municipalities (2) 
Ministry of Finance (2) All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions 
Governmental Council for Roma 
Community Affairs 
Ministry of Culture Trade Unions Forum 
Governmental Council for Non-
Governmental Non-Profit Organisations (2) 
Research Agency of the Ministry of Education, Research 
and Development, and Sport 
Employers of Poland Czech School Inspectorate 
Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency Lewiatan Confederation Czech Academy of Sciences (3) 
Slovak Agency for Tourism Association of Polish Crafts 
Research, Development and Innovations 
Council (3) 
Slovak Innovation and Energy Agency Business Centre Club Union of School Associations 
Slovak Research and Development Agency 
Polish Federation of Engineering 
Associations 
Permanent Conference of Associations in 
Education 
Slovak Rector Conference Polish Academy of Sciences CzechInvest (2) 
Slovak Academy of Sciences 
Main Council of Science and Higher 
Education 
Association of Research Organizations (2) 
Federation of Employers' Associations Main Council of Research Institutes CzechTrade 
Confederation of Trade Unions  
Czech-Moravian Guarantee and 
Development Bank 
Slovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry  
Association of Non-Governmental Non-
Profit Organizations 
Association of Research and Development Industrial 
Organizations 
 Food Chamber 
National Union of Employers  
Confederation of Employers' and 
Entrepreneurs' Associations 
Slovak IT Association  
Association of Female Entrepreneurs and 
Managers 
Partnership for Prosperity   
Source: GoSR, 2007c; GoRP (2014b); GoCR (2013a, 2017a, 2017b) 
* Slovak MC integrated monitoring into one committee for three OPs Research and Development, Information Society, Competitiveness and Economic Growth; Polish MC served 
for one OP which encompassed whole innovation domain; There were then three Czech MCs for three OPs Education for Competitiveness (EC), Research and Development for 
Innovations (RDI), and Enterprise and Innovation (EI), however, with overlapping memberships. 




the transnational integration of Visegrád dependent economies (Table 5.1): This concerned 
the investment finance in structural funds – ESF, ERDF, and CF – and the OP-led 
institutionalization of the developmental frameworks. These frameworks derived from the 
Lisbon Strategy and the Europe 2020, as articulated by the 2006 CStF and 2014 CSG (Table 
3.3), but were nationally organized through the sectoral and territorial OPs. Thus, the 
dependent developmental state could be tightly fixed to and simultaneously reshape the 
national socioeconomic institutions. 
In the absence of any fixed supranational guidelines, the 2004 CSuFs and their OPs retained 
loose link to the post-accession integration. Following the 2007 strategic and 2014 
conditionality turns, the national strategies and their OPs were more firmly “match[ed]”, 
“interlink[ed]” and “condition[ed]” with the supranational CSG and CStF (GoCR, 2007: 38-58, 
GoRH, 2007: 182-190, GoRP, 2014a: 77-87, 185-6; GoSR, 2014: 78-74). Here, these national 
CSG and CStF formed an enabling framework for prioritizing the targets of Lisbon Strategy 
and Europe 2020 in the national developmental strategies. Therefore, the NSRFs and PAs 
were gradually instrumentalized as transmission belts which strategically privileged 
supranational imperatives in Visegrád development trajectories. However, these strategic 
documents constituted also rulebooks which organized the institutional complementarities 
so that the investment finance were productively invested into the transnational integration 
across the sectoral institutions.  
Through OPs, the national complementarities were then concentrated around and 
simultaneously overlapping the socioeconomic institutions. Between 2004 and 2014/2020, 
their thematic concertation in the domain was fixed in the main headings which followed a 
set of simple keywords. These keywords in the OPs often implied the developmental purpose 
(see Table 5.1): Oriented at integrating the cohesion bureaucracies and improving the state 
capacities, the State Governance domain was underpinned by OPs “Technical Assistance”, 
“Implementation”, “[Electronic] Public Administration” or “State Reform”. Industrial/Welfare 
Relations were managed by OPs “Human Resources [Development]”, “Employment”, “Social 
Infrastructure”, “Health” or “Social” to promote a sustainable workforce under activating 
employment policies. They overlapped with the Education and Training which was oriented 
at the “Education [for Competitiveness]”, bringing together the “Research, Development and 
Education”, and improving the “Human Capital”. This production of human capital spilled 
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over into the Innovation domain in the OPs oriented at “Research & Development”, 
“Innovation” and “Digital” transformation for a “Smart Growth” through upgrading the 
universities and research facilities. Indeed, the Innovation domain brough together the public 
infrastructure and workforce production with the Business Development in the OPs oriented 
at the “Industry and Enterprise” as well as “Innovations” for “Economic Competitiveness” and 
“Development” for the “Innovative Economy” and “Economic Growth”. What is more, the 
investment purpose remained vastly oriented at built environment in the domain of Physical 
Sustainability which includes “Environmental Protection”, “Integrated Transport”, as well as 
the “Environmental and Energy Efficiency”. The next chapter 6 overviews the territorial OPs 
which were less important and rather appendages to the sectoral ones. 
Establishing these overlapping – supranational and national – complementarities was 
lastly operationalized through the detailed priority axes and the strategic and thematic goals 
in 2007 and 2014. The axes enabled the OPs to span multiple socioeconomic institutions by 
privileging particular priorities and aims across them. Grounded in the innovation domain, 
the Polish OP Innovative Economy of 2007-2013 consisted of nine “axe[s]” to interlink 
investment across the institutions of state governance, business development, and education 
and training. These axes foregrounded “R&D”-, “innovation”-, “ICT”-oriented modernization 
of “infrastructures”, “institutions”, and “human resources” within these domains (GoRP 2015: 
82-140). This OP illustrates as well how the aforementioned nine national priority axes 
derived from the six supranational “goal[s]” within the CGS, while re-appropriating them 
under the “main goal: development of Polish economy on the basis of innovative enterprises” 
(GoRP 2015: 62-86). Although the strategic content of individual OPs and their synergies were 
articulated by the national cohesion bureaucracies and the wider national partnerships, they 
remained thus constrained by the ever-tighter transnational frameworks of axes and goals. 
As the next subsection discusses, such goals could be then quantified in indicators which fed 
the performance systems of monitoring, compliance, and evaluation. 
The programming and concentration technologies enabled thus the developmental 
capacity of Visegrád state intervention when simultaneously fixing institutional arrangements 
for the Commission-led strategic leadership. They enabled the reordering of Visegrád 
institutional complementarities when hierarchically integrating them into the EU´s 
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transnational regulation. Through the ongoing governmentalization, these 
complementarities were made comprehensive in the performance system. 
 
5.1.3. Performing Governance 
The complementarities have been made more comprehensive by the every-day 
responsibilities of nodal agency within the compliance and performance framework of 
ongoing monitoring, evaluation, reporting, and control. Here, the governance technologies of 
additionality, decentralization, and simplification legitimized its gradual hardening. Under the 
“transparency”, “efficiency” or “simplicity” headings (GoCR, 2007: 22-3; GoRH, 2014: 65-71; 
GoRP, 2014a: 152-5; GoSR, 2007: 74, 97), the framework normalized the governance 
hierarchies to retain autonomy of cohesion bureaucracies from the domestic political 
influence. With the progressing governmentalization, such frameworks moved from the aim 
to enhance state developmental capacities to enforcing the supranational surveillance and 
intervention. In this sense, the institutional transformation of state has become the 
developmental goal itself to be monitored, (self-)evaluated, and reported. 
Besides the MAs and MCs, the CAs and AAs became important nodes in this compliance 
responsibilization (GoCR, 2007: 92; GoRH, 2007a: 152-3; GoRP, 2007a: 111; GoSR, 2007: 99). 
In all Visegrád states but Poland, the certifying and auditing functions were overtaken by the 
Finance Ministries and their respective departments. While the Ministry of Finance became 
an auditing authority in Poland, the certifying function remained with the Ministry of Regional 
Development. The formalization of these functions was symptomatic for the “audit 
explosion” after the 2006 reform according to Mendez and Bachtler (2011). The auditing turn 
has become thus a contradictory vehicle of this effectiveness-driven governmentalization. 
The state capacity was articulated as an “institutional”, “administrative”, and “absorption” 
(GoCR, 2007: 98-110, GoRH, 2007a: 126-30; GoRP, 2014a: 152-7, 194-7; GoSR, 2007: 92-100). 
This capacity expected the Visegrád state apparatuses to comply with the cohesion 
governance and effectively absorb the cohesion investment. In the 2004-2006 period, this 
cohesion investment was conditioned by the public reforms of “public procurement”, “state 
aid”, and “competition policy” to make them compliant with the “Community” or 
“Commission” rules (GoCR 2003a: 84-90; GoRH 2003: 146-9; GoRP 2003a: 76-90; GoSR 2003a: 
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165-9). The next programming period aimed at a much deeper institutional transformation. 
Using the OPs on the technical assistance and public reform, this transformation supported 
the integration of cohesion bureaucracies into the state apparatuses, while simultaneously 
reconfiguring their bureaucratic functioning beyond simple legal compliance. Financing the 
human resources through the technical assistance to support the performance frameworks 
working smoothly, the public administrations were required to undergo structural reform 
even outside of the cohesion governance. This was made necessary given the “problems” in 
Visegrád state governance which could cause “negative impacts” on the “fulfilling of cohesion 
policy” and the “whole economy and society” (GoCR, 2007: 32). As the 2014-2020 
programming period neared, this tendency deepened, while requiring concrete transparency 
“measures” and programs of “battle against corruption” among others (GoCR 2014a: 61-71; 
GoSR 2014: 63-7). 
After 2014, the conditionality turn indicated this deepened emphasis on the state 
apparatus restructuralization. While the conditions of effective cohesion governance were 
already involved in the ex-ante evaluation of NSRFs, the ex-ante conditionalities for PAs 
included wider scope of inquiry into the general functioning of whole public administrations. 
Such “conditionalities” (GoCR 2014a: 180-2; GoRH 2014: 135-210; GoRP 2014a: 191; GoSR 
2014: 126-258) narrowed further the surveillance of state governance frameworks which 
could be ranked “fulfilled”, “partially fulfilled” or “not fulfilled”. When not fulfilled, the 
negotiations over the Actions Plans – ranging from transparency strategies against corruption 
to macroeconomic conditionalities – were opened between the Commission and the national 
governments for fulfilling these conditionalities as a condition for the cohesion funding. 
This framework of “[ongoing] evaluation” was established through the “indicator”-based 
surveillance (GoCR, 2007: 66-70; GoRH, 2007a: 61-74; GoRP, 2007a: 81-4; GoSR, 2007: 66-
74). The system of indicators derived from the system of quantified goals and axes established 
in the supranational strategic programming. These indicators bound together the 
operationalized complementarities with the financial management and control, while 
prioritizing the programmed developmental purpose across various OPs. The indicators 
included simple statistical indicators such as the growth in GDP, employment or productivity. 
As analysed by the chapter 4, these indicators were however embedded in the EU´s semantic 
fixing which included the European Innovation Scoreboard and various global rankings such 
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as the World Economic Forum´s competitiveness index, World Bank´s Doing Business or the 
Transparency International´s Corruption Perception Index, among others (GoCR, 2007: 67-8; 
GoRH, 2014: 46, 157, 200; GoRP, 2014a: 18-20; GoSR, 2007: 37, 69). 
Meanwhile, the new instrument of mid-term (self-)evaluation was introduced in the 2009 
and 2012 strategic reports (GoCR, 2009a, 2012a; GoRH, 2009, 2012; GoRP, 2009, 2012; GoSR, 
2009, 2012c). The reports utilized the indicator-based performance evaluation to make the 
national MAs comprehensively inform the Commission about the implementation, 
investment progress and the major problems. They also served to express the need to 
reorient the developmental purpose in the new context like the economic crisis as detailed 
below. The reports regularized thus the process through which Visegrád cohesion 
bureaucracies regularly informed the Commission on deficiencies and best practices in both 
the fulfilment of Lisbon and Europe 2020-based developmental targets and the management 
and control systems implementation. 
Hence, the compliance and performance frameworks completed the governmentalization 
on everyday level of bureaucratic practices. The inherent asymmetry was double-edged with 
respect to the questions of state capacity and autonomy. While these frameworks aimed at 
increasing the state capacity, they rather tendentially regularized the Commission´s proxy 
control and command powers. This fixed the supranational articulation of neoliberal 
developmentalism within the Visegrád state apparatuses. As documented on the Czech case 
below, the deepening governmentalization and bureaucratic formalization contradictorily 
reproduced the state capture by Visegrád economic and political elites which these 
frameworks tried to target and prevent. 
5.2. Articulating Neoliberal Developmentalism 
Neoliberal developmentalism imbues the developmental purpose of cohesion governance 
as a socio-institutional basis of the developmental projects in Visegrád states. Although varying 
among the Visegrád states as documented by the Graph 5.1 in terms of investment priories, 
Visegrád investment priorities could be singled out in comparison with other arrangements in 
the EU. Besides this real investment, the neoliberal developmentalism underpinned the deeper 
ideological level to shape the consumption-investment dilemma. From the (post)accession 
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2000s to the (post-)crisis mid-2010s, this purpose rested on the prioritization of the 
“sustainable development based on competitiveness” (GoCR, 2003a: 54-9). Such convergence 
visions were thus produced through a varying “economic strategy” oriented at the FDI-led and 
export-oriented “modernisation and catching-up to the EU-15 average“ (GoRH, 2007a: 20). 
The model of export-led FDI dependence and strategies of complementing or overcoming 
its vulnerabilities figured prominently in the Visegrád articulations of neoliberal 
developmentalism. They accepted the perspective of “trade[-based]” and “open” economies 
in an ever more “competitive” and “European” or “global” conditions and overcoming the 
“crisis” of such conditions (GoCR 2003a: 8, 2007: 7, 2014a: 110; GoRH 2003: 9, 2007a: 19-24, 
2014: 7-22; GoRP 2003a: 33, 2007: 43-52, 2014a: 50-1; GoSR 2003a: 34-7, 2007: 53-9, 2014: 
84). Although varying among the Visegrád states and the (post-)accession and (post-)crisis 
phases of their integration, the Visegrád articulation(s) of neoliberal developmentalism have 
remained generally resilient as discussed below. Across the complementarities showed in the 
Table 5.1, the catch-up visions contemplated the cohesion investment (see Graph 5.2) as 
supporting the upward value positioning in the global production networks. 
There was a shift to economic nationalism from more integrationist strategies between 
the mid-2000s and -2010s. It has been rather gradual and less radical than suggested by the 
proliferating literature on the national or conservative developmentalism in the post-2010 
Hungary and post-2015 Poland (Naczyk, 2014; Appel and Orenstein, 2018; Buzogány and 
Varga, 2018; Bluhm and Varga, 2019; Toplišek, 2019; Scheiring, 2019; Toplišek, 2019). The 
shift remained fixed at the “catch-up” or “convergence” visions with the “levels” or “scales” 
of EU(-15) “average[s]” (GoCR 2014a: 8, 29; GoRH 2007a: ii, 2, 11, 20-3, 59, 2014: 8-11; GoRP 
2007: 15-8, 2014a: 18; GoSR 2007: 55-8, 2014: 8). Three periods and forms of articulating 
these catch-up visions could be analysed: First, the catch-up was inherent to the 
self-evaluation of Visegrád backwardness as a form of identifying the scope of developmental 
intervention. Second, this established semantic space for (re)articulating the convergence 
visions of sustainable competitiveness, while privileging the visions of overcoming 
innovation- and institutional-based backwardness as major factors of failing but also future 
catch-up. Third, the shattering of FDI-based visions through the global and Eurozone crises 
foregrounded the national economic resilience but simultaneously opened scope for a more 




Graph 5.1 Concentration: Thematic Comparison of Cohesion Investment in the EU, Baltic, Southern, 
North-Western, and Visegrád states, 2007-2013 (averages, % of total funding) 
 
 
Source (both graphs): European Commission, Cohesion Data database (cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu) 
*Averages of structural funding in the Visegrád (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), EU-27, Baltic (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), 
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5.2.1 Self-Evaluating Own Backwardness 
The self-evaluation of backwardness has had a dual purpose when regularizing the 
“ineffective”, “backward”, “lagging”, “weak”, “inadequate” or “insufficient” forms of 
Visegrád “competitiveness” or “development” under the EU(-15) averages (GoCR 2003a: 
50-3, 2007: 27-30; GoRH 2003: 61-7, 2007a: 23-58; GoRP 2003a: 5-41, 2007: 17-24; GoSR 
2003a: 156-60; 2007: 43-51). Enforcing Visegrád governments to identify the gaps in the 
human, infrastructural, and institutional conditions of their respective economies, it 
legitimized the cohesion investment inflow as an economic concession and developmental 
assistance at once. At the same time, the self-evaluation fixed the domestic conditions as 
inherently backward and normalized thus the FDI-oriented reindustrialization in combination 
with the Commission-led supranational intervention as necessary developmental trajectories. 
In the post-accession years, the barriers to the actual convergence were thus regularly found 
in the domestic growth conditions, while its resumption had to be oriented at maximizing the 
transnational integration. These barriers originally consisted in the physical and human 
infrastructures but were gradually reoriented at the inadequacies of institutional and 
innovation-driven governance in the state governance and business development. 
The Graph 5.2 identifies the physical and environmental sustainability as major investment 
targets. These targets involved infrastructural gaps or obsoleteness of all sorts of transport – 
roads, rail, airport – and energy transmission networks. The environmental infrastructures 
like sewage, waste disposal or water supply systems were included. The absence of these old 
Fordist infrastructures fixed the sheer scale of infrastructural underdevelopment, while 
highlighting the necessity of physical integration between the new Eastern periphery to 
establish connectivity through the transport and transmitting infrastructures with the rest of 
the Single Market. The “backward”, “missing” or “not yet constructed” transport “links” had 
to be built from the scale of intra-regional and -national to underpin the trans-regional 
and -border links within the eastward expansion of the Trans-European Transport Network 
(GoCR 2003b: 16-25, 2011b: 22-33; GoRH 2007i: 43-51; GoRP, 2003c: 7-23; GoSR 2012b: 12-
54). Moreover, the Visegrád physical conditions were characteristic of lacking “sustainability” 
which consisted in the missing or obsolete “environmental infrastructure” and led to the 




The Visegrád workforce was simultaneously framed as backward due to the combination 
of “unreformed” labour markets and welfare states, “underdeveloped” social infrastructures, 
and “outdated” educational and training systems (GoCR, 2003d: 9-54, 2012a: 8-78; GoRH, 
2007e: 11-56, GoRP, 2003b: 93-153, 2016b: 7-102; GoSR, 2003c: 5-14). First, the labour 
markets suffered from the inadequate flexibility which hindered the lack of “[profession and 
spatial] mobility” only to expose the low “adaptability” of workforce and firms to the 
structural and technological restructuring (GoCR, 2012a: 19; GoRH, 2007f: 19). Second, this 
reflected the inadequate instruments of “active” labour market policy and missing 
infrastructures and institutions to enable the “equal opportunities” for the labour market 
participation (GoSR, 2013a: 29-43; GoRP, 2016b: 20-4, 150-3). There were incomplete 
systems of strategic monitoring and human capacities and institutions, that is the 
employment offices and agencies to provide the employment assistance and information. 
The most detrimental was however the quality of educational and training systems which 
were unresponsive to the market signalling and generally weak in terms of life-long learning, 
requalification, and other activating forms of workforce training. In result, the qualification 
supply of Visegrád populations could not thus appropriately respond to the “investor demand 
for labour force in its full complementarity (from workers up to developers, researchers, and 
mainly qualified managers)” (GoCR, 2012a: 43). 
The lagging physical and human capital indicated the backward conditions for the new 
post-Fordist economic governance due to the weak institutional coordination of innovation 
and business development domains This strategic incapacity had a triple nature: weak 
domestic public institutions, weak corporate governance in the domestic SMEs, and weak 
coordination between both private and public governance (GoCR, 2011c: 11-37, 2011e: 9-37, 
2012c: 8-42; GoRH 2007h: 13-46; GoRP, 2003d: 233-53; 2015: 9-49; GoSR, 2011: 15-47). 
Concerning the public governance, the state institutions failed in cultivating sustainable 
business environment, while offering no consultancy assistance to the domestic enterprises. 
Meanwhile, the educational and research institutions lacked infrastructural and human 
capacities not only to produce highly-skilled workforce but also form partnerships with 
private sector for technology, know-how, and innovation “diffusion” and “transfers” (GoCR, 
2012c: 37; 2011e: 35-46; GoRH 2007h: 20-9; GoRP: 2015: 7, 86; GoSR, 2012a: 42; 2011: 46). 
Regarding the corporate governance, domestic SMEs suffered simultaneously from low 
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“innovation capacity” which belonged among major side effects of their low 
“internationalization” and utilization of spill-overs resulting from their subcontracting 
function to foreign TNCs. In contrast to the TNCs, the domestic enterprises suffered from 
lacing modern strategic and managerial skills (GoCR, 2003c, 2011c; GoRH, 2007b; GoRP 2015). 
The urgent need to solve the underdevelopment legitimized thus the inflows of cohesion 
investment, while however constructing it as an internal problem of Visegrád socio-economic 
development. Articulating their national development strategies, Visegrád state managers 
constructed thus the relative domestic backwardness within the Commission-led semantic 
fixing of neoliberal developmentalism. Therefore, the multiple backwardness as an internal 
barrier to the convergence was equally fixed as set of catch-up “opportunities” for unleashing 
the unused “[developmental] potential” (GoCR 2003a: 52-6, 2007: 30-6; GoRH 2003: 18-20, 
2007a: 22-3; GoRP 2003a: 61-7, 2007: 20-5; GoSR 2003a: 158-63, 2007: 14-5). 
5.2.2. Articulating Peripheral Catch-Up 
Overcoming these “performance gaps” (GoCR, 2007: 34) through the cohesion investment, 
the Visegrád state managers have been incentivized to articulate strategies to utilize the 
aforementioned opportunities for their sustainable competitiveness. Facing the domestic 
gaps, the combination of cohesion investment and FDI gained priority. Therefore, the 
convergence strategies aimed at channelling the cohesion investment to make the FDI 
“organically imbedded” (GoRH, 2003: 20). From that viewpoint, the cohesion investment 
could strengthen the Visegrád competitive advantage. The advantage consisted in the 
“integration into the European economic space” and “competitive wages” of otherwise 
“adaptable and skilled” workforce, while the “industrial tradition“ enabled the presence of 
“internationally integrated manufacturing amongst large firms“ thanks to the „massive” 
waves of FDI (GoCR 2003a: 50, 2007: 27; GoRH 2003: 159, 2007a: 23; GoRP 2003a: 60, 2007: 
21; GoSR 2007: 43). This catch-up strategy of transnational reindustrialization could then 
become politically legitimate by sourcing investment for a more socially cohesive and 
environmentally-oriented, yet market-enabling restructuralization. 
For the business development (see Table 5.1), the cohesion investment underpinned the 
main infrastructural backbone of incentive packages for “domestic and foreign investors”, 
that is the “business infrastructure” (GoCR, 2003c: 81, 2011c: 42-3; GoRH, 2003a: 81, 121, 
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2007b: 80-4). Although the cohesion investment could serve as direct incentives, it 
complemented these types of “indirect support” or “incentives” (GoCR, 2003a: 55, 61, 94) 
especially for the FDI. The business infrastructure denoted the construction of new “industrial 
zones” and “parks” for the “greenfield” FDI and in attempts to revitalize the post-socialist 
brownfields, while offering complementary infrastructure such as new roads and consultancy 
services (GoCR, 2011c: 66; GoRH, 2007b: 82-3; GoRP, 2003d: 297-9, 2015: 58-9; GoSR, 2013b: 
63-6). These cheap infrastructural conditions formed the most important forms of investment 
promotion besides other “nonmarket” direct incentives and “favourable investment 
environment which is characterized by skilled labour power, low labour costs, low tax burden” 
among others (GoSR, 2007a: 27, 32, 53). 
Attracting primarily the FDI, this business infrastructure was deemed complementary with 
the interests of domestic capital as well. The zones were held as infrastructures for productive 
spillovers which internationalized the domestic SMEs by offering their “supplier” function to 
the foreign TNCs and thus integrating them into the global “subcontracting chains” (GoCR, 
2007c: 74; GoRH, 2007a: 80-1, 2007b: 85-89; GoRP, 2015: 117; GoSR, 2013b: 63-6). While 
driving the intra-Visegrád competition over the FDI, these transnationally-led industrial 
strategies could be supplemented by the cohesion investment to upgrade the SMEs. Investing 
into the SMEs remained an imperative because the “multinational firms are not willing to 
subcontract with firms that lack appropriate management skills, products, trained workforces 
and modern technology” (GoRH, 2003a: 21). 
The FDI-led strategies necessitated also social and environmental embeddedness to 
become politically legitimate within the visions of “competitive sustainable economic 
growth” (GoCR, 2012a: 9). Investing in the physical sustainability was thus articulated as 
necessary, desirable and complementary. This increased the “capital” and “economic and 
social attractive[ness]” of Visegrád city-regions because the urban redevelopment 
modernized their transport, environmental or cultural infrastructures to make them 
attractive locations to live, work, visit and invest in (GoCR, 2007: 35; GoRH, 2007a: 83; GoRP, 
2007a: 46-7; GoSR, 2007a: 54). Therefore, the (re)construction of transport facilities ranging 
from roads to airports, cultural institutions or sewage systems translated the FDI 
development into sensible real convergence to be consumed by local populations but equally 
increase the locational attractiveness for the “foreign investors” (GoCR, 2011: 64; GoRH, 
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2007i: 71-4; GoRP, 2003c: 14, 2016a: 109-111; GoSR, 2003b: 80, 2012b: 72-3). Even the 
environmental sustainability could be paired with “competitiveness” exactly when being 
envisioned to promote the “investment attractiveness” of Visegrád city-regions with respect 
to the “localization of [their] economic activities” (GoCR, 2012b: 9-10; GoRH, 2007c: 14; GoRP 
2016a: 88; GoCR, 2015b: 127). 
Following the same dual logic, the upgrade of human capital and social infrastructures 
co-opted Visegrád labour, while promoting flexible labour market restructuring. This 
promoted the conditions of relatively skilled, appeased but subordinated labour in the 
industrial and welfare relations, as well as education and training. The cohesion investment 
promoted the upgrading of educational and training systems beyond basic education. 
Therefore, the “inclusive” labour force was to retain high employability through its increasing 
“qualified”, “adaptable”, “flexible”, and “mobile” profile when matching the qualification 
demand of the “investors” (GoCR, 2003d: 56-7, 2012a: 49-50, 85-7; GoCR, 2012c: 90-3; GoRH, 
2007f: 59-66; GoRP, 2003b: 129-33, 2016b: 165-177; GoSR, 2003c: 31-5, 2013a: 116-37). To 
appease the Visegrád populations, the cohesion investment flew into social infrastructures 
and inclusion arrangements within the industrial and welfare relations. Besides this, the 
healthcare infrastructures (GoCR 2011a; GoRH, 2007f; GoRP, 2016b) were sponsored. From 
this viewpoint, the health formed a “basis of competitiveness“ and „one of the most 
important factors influencing its level and quality“ because „healthy workforce is a synonym 
for a prosperous and productive workforce creating higher profit“ (GoSR, 2007c: 23). 
The FDI-based contradiction opened in the innovation and business development domain. 
Although being discursively privileged, the reality of innovation-driven and SME-based 
investment remained comparatively low in Visegrád states as the Graph 5.2 documents. This 
investment was needed because, as claimed by the Czech NSRF (GoCR, 2007: 29, 36), the FDI 
dependency posed a “threat” because the TNCs focused mostly on “low-cost strategy” which 
entrapped the Czech economy in a “low added value” position in the global production 
networks. They deepened the problem of “dual economy” where the TNCs determined the 
economic development vis-à-vis the domestic SMEs which lagged behind. Articulating the 
promise of upgrading to the “higher value added” positions (GoRH, 2007a: 77-80; GoRP, 
2007a: 59-71; GoSR, 2007a: 26-27, 52-60), Visegrád state managers found a common 
strategy. The strategy rechannelled the investment from the industrial zones to the new 
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business infrastructure: “[knowledge-]technological”, “R&D”, and innovation “networks”, 
“clusters”, “parks” and other “centres [of excellence]” (GoCR, 2011c: 52-8, 2011e; GoRH, 
2007b: 80-7; GoRP, 2015: 62-80; GoSR, 2011b, 2013b: 85-100). Through this infrastructural 
fix, the future channels of cohesion investment aimed at enabling cooperation among TNCs, 
SMEs, and local public research institutions. Rather than abandoning the FDI-led 
development, its contradiction was thus solved by shifting the developmental focus but also 
responsibilities on the domestic SMEs and university and research institutions. 
Until the 2008 crisis, neoliberal developmentalism has been fully realigned with the 
FDI-based strategies to regularize the integrationist state projects. Such developmental 
visions streamlined the catch-up opportunities in a transnationally-led and complex industrial 
strategy. This strategy stood at managing complementarity between the cohesion investment 
and FDI inflows. Through this, the Cohesion Policy enabled the otherwise observed intra-
Visegrád convergence on the dependent export-led model of peripheral catch-up. 
5.2.3. (Post-)Crisis Resilience? 
Since 2008, the economic crisis shattered the integrationist features of Visegrád FDI-based 
state projects. Especially in the post-2010 Hungary and post-2015 Poland, the new 
governments led by the conservative parties FIDESZ and PiS discursively privileged the more 
nationalist economic strategies. This political “rhetoric” has brought only an “asymmetric 
path-correction” as explained by Bohle and Greskovits (2018: 2). Indeed, the centre-right 
nationalist governments, which were led by the neoliberal and Eurosceptic ODS, ruled Czechia 
already from 2006 to 2013 before the post-2014 turn to the Czech variety of populist 
governmental forces (Císař, 2017; Hanley and Vachudova, 2018). As the chapter documents 
above and shows below, the neoliberal developmentalism has been rather rearticulated than 
abandoned after the crisis. Such a rearticulation has partially contradictory as it expected to 
utilize the cohesion dependency to overcome the FDI dependency. Despite of the gradual 
shift to economic nationalism, the FDI-oriented trajectories remained rather resilient. 
In Hungary, the FIDESZ-led government exemplified the rhetorical trick. It initiated a New 
Széchenyi Plan in 2011 to correct the 2007 NSFR, while producing  a prelude to the PA titled 
Széchenyi 2020 (GoHR, 2007a, 2010, 2014). Titled after one of the biggest 19th century 
economic reformer István Széchenyi, the strategic plans were framed as a patriotic plan of 
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economic renewal. In Poland, the 2017 Strategy for Responsible Development 2020, which 
was informally known as Morawiecki Plan, rearticulated the Polish PA (GoRP, 2014a, 2017) 
under the PiS governments led by economic deputy prime minister and then prime minister 
Mateusz Morawiecki. Against this rhetoric, the Hungarian and Polish nationalist 
developmentalism was not however radically different from the less articulate Czech PA 
(GoCR, 2014a: 38) and its (post-)crisis developmental repurposing: 
Besides its unquestionable positive sides, the established strong dependence of local 
economy´s performance on foreign firms has also negative sides which have become fully 
evident since the outbreak of serious problems in world economy in 2008. The global volume 
of production, investment, and thus employment is considerably dependent on decisions of 
foreign firms. Especially SMEs are not able to compensate for the lowered demand of their 
major buyers. Their own ability to find and enter new (territorial and product) markets is 
limited. On these grounds, besides the SME development, Czechia needs to support also large 
firms which have bigger capacity to systematically invest into the R&D, including the KET [key 
enabling technologies], and improve thus the innovation performance of the economy as a 
whole. 
The 2009 and 2012 strategic reports explained the gradually shifting resilience on both 
levels of accumulation regimes and state strategies (GoCR, 2009a, 2012a; GoRH, 2009, 2012; 
GoRP, 2009, 2012; GoSR, 2009, 2012c). The continuing inflow of cohesion investment proved 
as “a major contributor to alleviating impact of the crisis“ in Czechia (GoCR, 2012a: 45) and 
“probably the only significant source for a possible fiscal stimulus” in Poland (GoRP, 2009: 3). 
In the hardly hit Hungary, the cohesion investment could be viewed to ease the “balance 
adjustment measures” which were conditioned by the “loan agreement” from the IMF, the 
Commission, and the World Bank (GoRH, 2009: 6-7). In the contrasting success of Poland, it 
belonged among the factors of its “relatively high resilience“ (GoRP, 2009: 8). Articulated 
within the EERP, Visegrád state managers could use it as an immediate macroeconomic 
injection which however retained orientation on the convergence with Lisbon and Europe 
2020 targets. Therefore, the cohesion investment facilitated scarce capital which materialized 
an “important stimulating factor of qualitative, pro-innovation changes” (GoRP, 2009: 11) 
even during the crisis. 
The FDI “dependence” and export “openness” had been meanwhile matched with the 
“vulnerability” of especially Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary as small and more trade-based 
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economies (GoCR, 2009a: 8-20; 2014a: 38; GoRH, 2009: 90-3; GoSR, 2009: 14, 2012c: 134, 
2014: 17). In contrast, the “low[er] share of exports in GDP, substantial internal market and 
strong [domestic consumer demand]“ explained Polish resilience (GoRP, 2009: 8, 2012: 7). 
The „extensive presence of foreign ownership“ and export openness were still fixed as an 
“advantage” which helped to “recover faster” from the crisis (GoRH, 2009: 18; GoSR, 2009: 
14, 2012c: 134). The crisis made however apparent the immediate negative impact and 
structural limits of pre-crisis catch-up trajectories. Immediately, the dependency was made 
urgent as the Czech full post-crisis rebound depended on the recovery of FDI from and trade 
with “Western Europe (especially Germany)“ (GoCR, 2009a: 8). Structurally, the potential of 
pre-crisis developmental strategies proved to be “exhausted” and “not sustainable” anymore 
in Slovakia (GoSR, 2009: 15; GoSR, 2012c: 15). It was thus realized by the Visegrád state 
managers that the post-crisis recovery had to overcome the FDI-based growth organized 
around the “low[er]”-cost factors and move from “low[er]” to “high[er] value added” 
economic activities (GoCR, 2009a: 7-10, 2012a: 6-7, 2014a: 29-38; GoRH, 2009: 13, 2012: 26; 
GoRP, 2009: 14, 2012: 14, 2014a: 18-22; GoSR, 2014: 16-23). 
All this opened the question of “dual economy” at full scale (GoCR, 2009a: 18; GoRH, 2014: 
20-1; GoSR, 2014: 16-17). The duality was envisioned as an unintended consequence of past 
FDI strategies which embedded the TNCs by adapting the domestic SME subcontractors to the 
demand of foreign capital, while leaving other domestic sectors underdeveloped. There was 
thus an investment shift to prefer “endogenous business sector” and promote the innovation-
oriented upgrade of SMEs but “large [domestic industrial] enterprises” as well (GoCR, 2014a: 
39-41). Rather than repudiating the FDI integration, the cohesion investment was to assist the 
national capital to move upwards in the global and innovation “supply” and “value chains” or 
succeed in foreign “markets” alone (GoCR, 2014a: 38-43; GoRH, 2014: 10-24; GoRP, 2014a: 19-
22, 98-103; GoSR, 2014: 16-23, 78-80). More surprisingly, this positive rearticulation of de facto 
integrationist strategy was most keenly articulated in the post-2010 Hungarian strategies. The 
draft of the New Széchenyi Plan blamed the previous decade for deepening the problem of 
“duality” structure on “declining competitiveness”, while urging to utilize the “EU and state 
funds to create [European and global] competitiveness” of domestic business (GoRH, 2010: 16-
7, 22). Presented as a national economic strategy under the title Széchenyi 2020, the Hungarian 
PA (GoRH, 2014: 21-22) solved the duality in a predictable way: 
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As close links between the global corporate sector and the domestic SME sector have only 
partially developed [….] The great challenge of Hungarian economic policy for two decades has 
been how to connect these two sectors more closely, how [the domestic] small and medium-
sized enterprises can catch up with large [foreign] enterprises in technology, business 
knowledge, and productivity (see below for opportunities). [….] In order to improve the growth 
potential of SMEs, it is essential to develop resource-deficient SMEs in a focused and 
differentiated way including the creation and expansion of already developed capacities of 
enterprises belonging to key sectors, regions and target groups of entrepreneurs. These 
developments will help bring the production and service infrastructures of SMEs closer to the 
level represented by large enterprises, thus enabling SMEs to enter markets, retain their 
markets and further expand. 
Neither did the post-2010 Hungary under FIDESZ engineer any radical departure from 
neoliberal developmentalism, nor was the post-2015 Polish turn under PiS exceptional in the 
broader Visegrád trajectories from this viewpoint. Although the economic crisis shifted the 
pre-crisis developmental visions towards a more internally oriented investment, this 
remained within the confines of FDI-led development. What is more, the implicit tendencies 
of this turn could be found in the Czech NSRF under ODS-led governments before the 
economic crisis only to become mainstreamed in PAs of all Visegrád states for the post-crisis 
period. 
5.3. Investing in Development in Czechia 
Innovation has emerged as the main priority in the catch-up visions, while signalling major 
deficiency. Drahokoupil and Myant (2015: 163) observe the “lack [of private and public] 
infrastructure for high-level innovations“ as a major deficiency of the Visegrád developmental 
model. As the chapter 4 shows, the innovation promotion followed the trends in the 
supranational articulation of neoliberal developmentalism as well. Such visions ran against 
the reality of infrastructural fixing as the new innovation investment lagged behind the one 
into the old transport infrastructures (see Graph 5.1). For some, this indicated a consumption-
oriented case of “misallocated funds” (Medve-Bálint, 2018) instead of effective investment 
into the innovation-led catch-up. As the Czech case documents in the Graph 5.2, the cohesion 
investment played nevertheless an important material role in underpinning the innovation 
visions even during the economic crisis. The graph exposes the coincidence between the rise 
of structural (foreign public) funds and the gradual catch-up of Czech governmental 
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investment with the EU average since 2010. It shows the scale of Czech and Visegrád 
dependency too when the effect of decreasing cohesion inflows is observed between the end 
and the start of new and old programming periods in the mid-2010s. 
Between 2004 and 2013/2020, the Czech innovation domain was institutionally fixed in 
the following OPs: Industry and Enterprise (OP IE), Enterprise and Innovation (OP EI), 
Enterprise and Innovations for Competitiveness (OP EIC), Education for Competitiveness (OP 
EC), Research and Development for Innovations (OP RDI), and Research, Development and 
Education (OP RDE) (GoCR, 2003c, 2011c, 2011e: 68-72, 2012c, 2014b, 2015a). As the Tables 
5.1 and 5.2 illustrate, the Czech innovation domain involved two to three different OPs, two 
different ministries as MAs and two to three MCs. In comparison, the Slovak management 
included three different OPs and MAs but remained monitored in a shared MC between 2007-
2013 (GoSR, 2007c). Then, Polish governments retained the domain managed in one OP 
under one MA and one MC (GoRP, 2015). This was also the Hungarian case (GoRH, 2007b). 
Regardless of these changing forms, the OPs consolidated similar types of developmental 
coalitions in this domain. 
Investigating how the innovation domain was fixed in Czechia through the Cohesion Policy, 
the subchapter focuses on the OP RDI along with the OP EC and the OP RDE. The Czech 
Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (henceforth as Education Ministry) managed these 
OPs. First, I show how the OPs incubated the cohesion bureaucracies inside the state 
apparatus, while providing institutional and infrastructural conditions for a broader 
innovation-oriented agenda in the Czech state apparatus and planning. Second, I document 
how the OPs enabled the institutional and infrastructural establishment and consolidation of 
the complementary agenda of Large Research Infrastructures outside of the cohesion agenda. 
Organized in partnership with the “industry”, this national programme enabled Czechia to 
join the institutional networks of European Research Area and the Lisbon Strategy-based 




5.3.1. Inside the Operational Programme: OPs EC, RDI, and RDE 
The OPs RDI, EC, and RDE enabled to establishment and construction of innovation 
infrastructures and human capital through the inflowing investment (see Graph 5.2). 
Institutionally fixing the investment concentration on innovation, their vision was clear. The 
OPs “enhance[d] the research, development, and innovation potential of Czechia to 
contribute to the growth, competitiveness, and producing highly qualified jobs” so that the 
country´s “worsening global competitive position” was reversed and reoriented to the 
upward direction in the “global value chains” (GoCR, 2011e: 6, 2014b: 6). Enabling visions of 
internal innovation for external competitiveness, the OPs socio-institutionally secured the 
investment process into the infrastructures which validated these visions in return. 
Since becoming the MA for innovation OPs in 2007, the Education Ministry almost doubled 
its original capacities. The establishment of cohesion bureaucracies required thus both the 
quantitative expansion of state apparatus and its purposeful responsibilization to the 
Graph 5.2 Indicator: Gross Domestic Expernditures on R&D (GERD) and the Composition of R&D 
Expenditures in Czechia by Sources (both in %) 
 
Source: Czech Statistical Office and Eurostat 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
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hierarchies of cohesion governance. Comparing the Ministry´s Organizational Structure prior 
and after becoming the MA (cf. GoCR, 2007b, 2009b, 2014c), the Cohesion Policy became 
institutionalized in 1 section consisting of 2 subsections, 10 departments, and 30 units in 
2014. The Ministry´s other 5 sections were meanwhile structured into 4 subsections, 23 
departments, and 35 units in the same year. This organizational fixing was gradual. In 2008, 
the new Section for the Management of Operational Funds was established as the Section IV 
next to other six of these highest organizational units. This equalized the Cohesion Policy with 
other core agendas in the Ministry. Managed by a temporary Section Director, the section 
received own Deputy Minister only in 2011. Since then, it has become the biggest and most 
complex section, while being institutionally reshaped to serve its nodal position on a regular 
basis. Securing the Ministry´s MA responsibilities, the section established a chain of 
departments and units named and authorized to facilitate the “management” of the OPs, 
“implementation” of their investment purpose, ongoing “evaluation” of this implementation, 
“methodological” guidance for other actors, “financial control” and “audit” of the investment 
projects, while securing the public relations “promotion”, “archiving” of documents, and also 
“analysis” for the “preparation” of the future OPs (GoCR, 2014c). 
The MCs for the OPs embedded then the Ministry´s cohesion bureaucracies into broader 
coalitions of interest as the Table 5.2 illustrates. The MCs commonly included between 40 
and 50 institutional members for each of the three OPs reviewed (GoCR, 2017a; 2017b; 2020), 
albeit there was a similar pattern in this representation. Besides the representation of the 
Ministry´s complementary sections as the Section III for Higher Education, Science and 
Research, there were other representatives of complementary ministries. This concerned 
especially the Ministry of Industry and Trade, which was responsible for the innovation-
oriented OPs IE, EI and EIC, and its agencies like the investment-promotion agency 
CzechInvest as IB for these OP. Other newly established state agencies participated which 
included the Technological Agency. The city-regions were represented individually and 
through the Association of Regions. Following the sectoral logic, Academy of Sciences was 
included next to the Rector Conference and Council of Higher Education. Among the variety 
of smaller and bigger NGOs and professional associations, the social partners were 
incorporated as well: Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions, Czech Chamber of 
Commerce, and the Czech Confederation of Industry. 
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The OPs established such developmental coalitions but regularized their organizational 
purpose too: enabling the technological transfer. Fixing the innovation infrastructures, the 
OP RDI was central to this. It was based on five priority axes: European Centres of Excellence, 
Regional R&D Centres, Commercialization and Popularization of R&D, Infrastructure for 
Teaching in Higher Education Connected with Research, and the Technical Assistance (GoCR, 
2011e: 80-93). Investment into these axes enabled “technology transfer” when fixing 
infrastructural “´bridge´ between Czech regions and key foreign public and private partners 
[….] in developed regions“ and also incentivizing public research institutions into the 
“cooperation” with the “application sphere” (GoCR 2011e: 24-5, 80). There had to be then 
“coherence” with the EU and national innovation but also “synergy” with the OP EI which 
were managed by the Ministry of Industry and Trade to incentivize the “application sphere” 
in return (GoCR, 2011e: 56, 71-2). The application sphere included SMEs “and their 
associations” but especially “strong growth of interest from the side of foreign firms” given 
the “growing private spending on R&D and attractiveness of Czechia for the investment in the 
R&D activity” (GoCR, 2011e: 25-27). Against this background, the public research sector 
suffered not only from the “absence” of innovation infrastructures but also the “lack of 
incentives and unsatisfactory motivation” to purpose the “involvement of partners from 
business sphere” (GoCR, 2011e: 24-32, 35-6). In order to become innovation infrastructures, 
the priority axes had to simultaneously become sites for both research but also “excellent 
partnerships with the application sphere” (GoCR, 2011e: 47). 
The priority axes were translated into the investment process which led to the 
construction of these innovation infrastructures as the Table 5.3 documents. The investment 
could be legitimized as “appropriate prerequisites for overcoming the negative trend [of 
losing competitiveness] that has been identified and even for overcoming the economic 
crisis” (GoCR, 2009c: 17). In total, the OP supported 48 research centres (GoCR, 2018: 12-3). 
The flagship axis of European Centres of Excellence was allocated one third of the total 
allocation around 806 million EUR. Out of these six flagships, the ELI, BIOCEV and SUSEN were 
located on the Prague outskirts in the Central Bohemia Region, while the IT4Innovations 
project was located in Ostrava. As the next chapter 6 details, the CEITEC and ICRC were 
integrated into the Brno urban landscape. An outcome of competitive tenders among major 
national research institutions, these projects became integral institutional and infrastructural 
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components of Academy of Sciences, the Centre of Research Řež, Masaryk University in Brno, 
and Technical University of Ostrava along with their other local partners. Fixed as “pioneer” 
or “exceptional” in the IT or natural science fields across the national, ECE or European scales 
(GoCR, 2014d: 85-8), the compliance logic viewed them firstly as completing essential 
evaluation indicators of the increasing R&D jobs, reported academic outputs and their 
commercialization in the application sphere (GoCR, 2014d: 66-7). They could thus 
infrastructurally fix the visions of upgraded “[inter]national” and also “regional 
competitiveness“ (GoCR, 2018: 19-48) as discussed below. 
The operationalization of the cohesion bureaucratic machinery required thus to equalize 
the Cohesion Policy with the other agendas and establish their mutual complementarities in 
the state apparatus. The Education Ministry´ Section IV exemplified it in the case of Czech 
innovation domain. As an institutional precondition for the cohesion investment inflows, the 
Section fixed embedded the cohesion governance within the state apparatus and wider 
socioeconomic coalition, while however reorienting their purpose towards the neoliberal 
developmentalism. The infrastructural outcomes materially underpinned the institutional 
afterwards. 
5.3.2. Complementarity: Large Research Infrastructures 
Although the six large infrastructures in the OP RDI were only finished by 2015 and 2017, 
their infrastructural visions played a central role in the institutional fixing of “Large Research, 
[Experimental] Development and Innovation Infrastructures” programme already since 2009 
(GoCR, 2010, 2011f: 10-12, 2015b, 2019). Constituting two separate initiatives, there was a 
tight institutional complementarity between the OPs and the national programme of large 
research institutions which “mingle” and “cannot be easily categorized, differentiated, and 
separated” (GoCR, 2018: 15). In this “full complementarity“ between national and cohesion 
funds, the „investment costs“ of the infrastructural development and „operational costs“ of 
such infrastructures could be thus underpinned by the OPs RDI and RDE (GoCR, 2015b: 10-3, 
2019: 11). Besides this infrastructural fixing, the institutional practices and strategic content 
overlapped as well.  
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Academy of Sciences 
“ELI Beamlines will host a major international research 
infrastructure attracting world leading researchers and businesses. 
The facility will provide more than 2200 researcher days per year 
yielding an additional local economic impact. By a projected 
workforce of more than 250 employees, ELI Beamlines will 
generate high-level long-term career opportunities for 
researchers, engineers and technicians, primarily those involved in 
optics and laser sciences, electronics, mechanical engineering, and 
material sciences. In addition, the Czech optics and photonics 
industry is expected to take a significant role in developments 
required for the construction of ELI Beamlines and future 








Academy of Sciences, 
Charles University 
“CIISB [Czech Centre for Phenogenomics, collaboration of CEITEC 
and BIOCEV] stimulates national and trans-national collaborations 
across mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology and medicine at 
academic and industrial levels. CIISB serves mainly basic research. 
Nevertheless, innovations and technology transfer are among the 
strategic priorities of the hosting institutions of CIISB. CIISB 
supports progressive development in biomedicine and 
biotechnology by providing the best available technological 
platform for obtaining high resolution structural data for 
biotechnological applications, drug related research, development 

















Academy of Sciences 
“One of the most important characteristics of CEITEC Nano is the 
open access to technological equipment of the research 
infrastructure with shared self-service equipment, which enables 
researchers to control devices without help. Further, together with 
the sharing of research know-how between the users and the 
CEITEC Nano staff, enables the research groups to reach high 
expertise and international level. The positive impact of CEITEC 
Nano is also the cooperation with high-tech companies on 









St. Anne´s Faculty 
Hospital (FNUSA) 
“The goal of the FNUSA-ICRC project is to establish a top-quality 
international centre for applied medical research, which will use 
the most contemporary methods for cooperation in order to speed 
up the development of breakthrough medical and diagnostic 
techniques, new technologies (including biotechnologies and 
nanotechnologies), and new medications by at least 50%. […] The 
ICRC will be focused primarily on cardiovascular and neurological 










“HPC [high performance computing] is globally recognized as an 
important innovation enabler in research as well as industry. 
Supercomputing simulations are often the only way to understand 
complex problems and to solve grand scientific challenges. The 
expertise and capacity of IT4Innovations supports multiple R&D 
areas having significant socioeconomic impact, e.g. in flood 









Řež (main), West 
Bohemian University 
in Pilsen 
“International range and uniqueness of SUSEN research 
infrastructure will contribute to the development of a highly 
professional competence of researchers, technical personnel and 
young researchers and students. SUSEN will contribute to the safe 
operation of power units, both present and future generations of 
fission and fusion reactors. This will support the energy security of 
the Czech Republic, reduction of the greenhouse gas emissions and 
safe operation of current and future nuclear power plants.“ 




This national programme remained thus institutionally synchronized with the cohesion 
governance, while enabling its further transnationalization. It was supervised by the “Large 
Research Infrastructures Council” as a parallel to the MC model, which was presided by the 
Minister of Education, involved other Ministry´s representatives including the cohesion 
bureaucrats, the country´s delegates in ESFRI, and the research and university sector (GoCR, 
2016a). Although its “evaluation methodological approach“ was “inspired by ESFRI evaluation 
processes“, the newly established practices of „ex-ante“ and „interim evaluation“ were 
synchronized into the „7-year Large Infrastructures funding framework“ to copy the sequence 
of 7-year programming periods (GoCR, 2015: 14-5, 2019: 16). While the national framework 
adapted the EU general governance frameworks, it was thus deeply intertwined with the 
cohesion governance. There was then a mutually reinforcing purpose of enabling 
transnational integration of Czech innovation “ecosystem” (GoCR, 2015: 9-12). 
Out of 58 large research infrastructures, 26 ones have been financed by the OPs by 2015 
(GoCR, 2015: 122-5). They underpinned the innovation visions through neoliberal 
developmentalism. As put by the two subsequent Ministers of Education in their forewords 
to the periodic revisions of this infrastructural strategy, this integrated ecosystem enabled a 
“knowledge triangle” of “education, research and industry” (GoCR, 2015: i, 2019: 4). The 
infrastructures were thus regularized as “a key prerequisite for the competitiveness of Czech 
research“, which subsequently enabled the “higher [crisis] resistance and economic 
competitiveness“ on both sides of „the Czech Republic and the entire EU“ (GoCR, 2011f: 18; 
2019: 5, 22). After being subjected to the Commission´s “assessment” and “decision”, the six 
flagships (see Table 5.3) developed from “major individual RDI OP projects” to those of 
“nation-wide, but also European, macro-regional, and exceptionally also global dimensions, 
importance and impact“ (GoCR, 2011f: 10, 2019: 11). 
As this global exception, ELI project developed from an original plan to construct the 
“world’s most modern laser facility“ which was oriented at „attracting world leading 
researchers and businesses“ and the subsequent formation of industries based on “highly 
developed technologies with high value added” (GoCR, 2011f: 11, 2019: 45). On the European 
level, CEITEC brought together two fields of “nanostructures and advanced materials“ and 
„biomedicine“, while its division Nano exemplified a „cooperation with high-tech companies 
on development of products with high technological and knowledge added value” (GoCR, 
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2011f: 12, 2019: 44). The “high[est]-performance supercomputer“ nation-wide was then 
established under the IT4Innovations so that it could be integrated into the national e-
infrastructure network to ensure „the competitiveness of the Czech Republic on both 
European and global scales“ (GoCR, 2011f: 12, 2019: 119). 
Through the complementarity-seeking arrangements, the innovation OPs enabled the 
visions of catch-up in the Czech developmental strategy within the confines of neoliberal 
developmentalism. As only developmental visions in the late 2000s, the Cohesion Policy was 
infrastructurally fixed only in the mid-2010s. It could meanwhile enable, if not condition the 
institutional integration of the national innovation domain through the transnational 
complementary of the OPs, the large research institutions programme, and the ESFRI. 
Appropriating the competitiveness visions, this combined fixing could not be made an 
effective investment only as competitive research sites but had to facilitate a promise of 
turning their research into innovation through partnership with foreign or domestic 
enterprises. Only in this way these infrastructures could be evaluated as contributing to the 
sustainable competitiveness. 
5.4. Consuming Development in Czechia 
With innovation as one end of the consumption-investment dilemma, its opposite end was 
the corruption-prone institutional incapacity. The chapter 4 describes how the governance 
issues and corruption were added into the semantic fixing since the early 2010s. Using the 
Czech case, the rest of this chapter discusses how this governmentalization aimed at resolving 
the “corporate state capture” (Innes, 2016) which became an inherent and contradictory 
feature of the Visegrád developmental states. The grand corruption risk was increasingly 
reproduced by “redirecting the bureaucratic effort toward [effectiveness-driven] formalistic, 
procedural compliance“ (Fazekas and King, 2018: 4-5). As I claim below, this was caused by 
the contradictory tendency of the governmentalization between the Commission´s 
promotion of institutional capacity through the reduction of Visegrád state autonomy, on the 
one hand, and the state capture tendencies from the selected sectors of Visegrád local and 
state elite on the other. 
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Two major cases of Regional Operational Programme (ROP) North-West and Andrej Babiš´ 
Agrofert are analysed. The former case documents the regional capture in the early 2010s, 
while the later one shows how these regional captures were pushed into state captures. The 
Agrofert case illustrates the post-2014 Czech turn to the nationalist tendency in the Visegrád 
states under the coalition governments of technocratic populist ANO and the social-
democratic ČSSD. The Czech turn is less recognizable than the post-2010 Hungarian and post-
2015 Polish examples for two reasons. The ANO´s populism replaced the centre-right 
governments which were led already by the Eurosceptic and neoliberal nationalist ODS as 
discussed above. The Czech case remained also more internally contested and formed rather 
a capture from economic than political sphere (Hanley and Vachudova, 2018). However, the 
two cases compared exemplify the contradictory nature of Visegrád developmental states 
between the investment for FDI-led competitiveness and the consumption of local crony 
networks. 
The ROP North-West was a part of the territorial ROPs which I analyse closely in the next 
chapter 6. During the ODS-led governments, the ROP North-West came to represent the 
corruption and capture of regional governments to explain the lagging of the most backward 
regions such as the North-Western Bohemia (RCNW, 2013: 46-7). The latter case of Agrofert 
Holding documents the state capture on national level (OLAF, 2017; EC, 2019b, 2019c). As put 
by the Commission´s audit, “the AGROFERT group comprises approximately 900 companies, 
including branches throughout the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, the 
Netherlands, Russia and Germany” (EC, 2019b: 18). The group has been owned by Andrej 
Babiš who, after establishing his anti-corruption populist movement ANO in 2011, served 
simultaneously as the Czech Minister of Finance since 2014 and the Prime Minister since 
2017. As the largest domestically owned agro-chemical industrial enterprise, Agrofert 
depended heavily on the cohesion investment. Given that one of the biggest national 
capitalists became the leading state manager, the ongoing struggle over interpreting Babiš´ 
“conflict of interests” (EC, 2019b, 2019c) between the Commission and the Czech government 
exposed these aforementioned contradictions. 
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5.4.1. Regional Capture: ROP North-West 
The ROP North-West became notorious for the institutional incapacities of Czech 
(regional) governance. It is also a helpful case study of the audit-driven governmentalization 
in the conditions of more integrationist tendencies where the Czech state apparatus complied 
with the Commission´s leadership. The North-West was established as a NUTS 2 region upon 
the EU accession but consists of two city-regions around Karlovy Vary and Ústí nad Labem. As 
the Plate 4.2 shows, it has been envisioned as generally “lagging” behind and having “below-
average” indicators on both the EU and national scales (RCNW, 2013: 28, 47, 52, 59, 63-6). 
This backwardness proved to be institutional once the ROP operations were “suspended” by 
the central MA and AA – the Regional Development and Finance Ministries – due to the high 
rates of audited “irregularities” between 2011 and 2013 (RCNW, 2017: 86-90). The police 
investigation exposed then the capture of the regional MA – the Regional Council North-West 
(RCNW) – by the crony networks of high regional managers. They included a party cartel of 
ČSSD and ODS, that is the leading government and opposition parties on the national level at 
that time. The national actions followed the Commission´s 2012 “audit mission” which issued 
a “correction” which demanded the ROP to return back “approx. 1,8 billion CZK (i.e. 66,6 
million EUR)” due to such irregularities only to repeat this practice after its 2015 “audit 
mission” in a smaller extent (RCNW, 2017: 94-7). Through this governmentalization, the 
ongoing lagging of the North-West was fixed as a simple problem of the region´s self-
governing incapacity. 
According to the evaluation audit (RCNW, 2016: 12-3), the ROP capture by the “employees 
of the bureau of RC [Regional Council] and political representation of regions“ legitimized the 
reassertion of governmentalizing authority. This “political” capture was “organized” in the 
wider regional networks of “political [inter-]party” interests of ODS and ČSSD in cooperation 
with the local entrepreneurs (RCNW, 2016: 15-6, 171-2). Soon, this invited an audit-driven 
conflict over the nature of these irregularities. In 2011, the results of external audit by the 
Prague-based office of global consultancy Deloitte gave the content to the Commission´s (EC, 
2011h: 1-3) correction “letter[s]” which asked “Czech authorities” for information on the 
“police investigation” and the implementation of “corrective measures”. In result, the RCNW 
was reorganized (RCNW, 2012). Following its own audit mission in 2012, the Commission 
demanded a financial correction of 66,6 million EUR. By this time, the Regional Development 
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and Finance Ministries (GoCR, 2012b, 2012e, 2013b) took a “common approach” to downscale 
the “responsibility”, while suspending the ROP operations and declining the RCNW´s calls for 
co-financing the correction. Meanwhile, the audit control was upscaled to the national level 
from all ROPs (RCNW, 2013, 2017). The ministries resumed the ROP´s operations only after the 
RCNW submitted to this supranational and national demands in 2013. 
The Commission´s command and control power was thus reasserted during the complex 
“negotiation[s]” and “meeting[s]” or interpretations of “audit” results and “letter[s]” across 
the rescaled hierarchies of cohesion governance (RCNW, 2012: 13-7, 2013: 13-20, 2017: 86-
97). This disciplining endeavour involved cohesion bureaucracies at their marginal regional 
scale, national nodal scale, and the dominant scale of the DG Regio and OLAF. It also involved 
political negotiations between the prime minister and the regions´ political representations. 
In result, the developmental purpose got skewed to the institutional affairs. The ROP NW 
bureaucracies had to subsequently catch up with the advancing delayed timelines of 
investment process due to the previous suspended operations by the end of the programming 
(RCNW, 2016, 2017). In the result, the rather than prioritizing the upgrade of regional 
developmental indicators, the ROP North-West activities were consumed with resolving the 
compliance issues. 
Becoming recognized as a developmental failure, the ROP North-West fits well into the 
governmentalizing logic. The chapter 6 shows that such city-regions could be foregrounded 
as a case of ongoing backwardness in contrast to the leading city-regions as the ROP South 
East. Instead of regional catch-up, they became subjectivized to the external imperatives of 
corrective governance. Although the ROP North-West was regularized as an exemplary case 
of developmental pathology, similar problems occurred in other ROPs which resulted in the 
upscaling of their governance to the Integrated Regional Operational Programme (GoCR, 
2014e) under the management of the Ministry of Regional Development. 
5.4.2. State Capture: Agrofert, Babiš and the Conflict of Interests 
What is more, the regional capture was upscaled to the state capture. Following the post-
2014 populist rise of Babiš´ “anti-corruption” technocratic movement ANO (Císař, 2017; Hanley 
and Vachudova, 2018), the Agrofert case shows how the state capture became reproduced 
through the cohesion governance. This time, the Czech government contested the 
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Commission´s interpretations of Babiš´ “misappropriation”, “fraud”, “irregularity”, and “conflict 
of interests” (GoCR, 2016b; OLAF, 2017: 1; EC, 2019b, 2019c). Rather than simply reinforcing 
the Commission-member state audit-driven conflict, I exemplify how this state capture 
intensified internal power cleavages in the state apparatus, if not the whole state-society 
relations. Here, the national failure to comply with supranational rules and the ongoing 
competition over their interpretation reinforced the governmentalizing tendencies. It could 
validate the hardening of these rules, while fixing the Czech corruption-prone and institutionally 
deficient governance as a barrier to the real convergence (see chapter 4). 
In a paradox, the electoral support of ANO derived initially from its anti-corruption and 
managerialist rhetoric which promised to provide effective managerial solutions to the state 
governance. This included the cohesion governance. Including the ROP North-West, the ANO 
attacked the ODS and ČSSD already within the governmentalizing logic. Under the ODS-led 
governments, there were ongoing problems with the absorption capacity of cohesion 
investment. Starting slowly, the national and regional OPs faced repeated suspensions of 
operations by the Commission due to the reported irregularities and non-compliance with 
the Commission´s Action Plan on shared management (see chapter 3; EC, 2008d; GoCR, 
2012d; KPMG, 2012; SAO, 2013: 30-3). Moreover, the ongoing lag in the funding absorption 
performance placed Czechia below the EU average in this indicator and risked depriving it of 
the non-allocated part by the de factor end of the 2007-2013 period in 2015/6. The 
expectation of this non-allocated funding was “EUR 436,8 million“ (SAO, 2014: 36). Given the 
political resonance of these issues, they were foregrounded in the ANO´s populist strategy. 
The state capture was symptomatic by the capture of AA, CA, and MA by the ANO. In the 
two coalition governments with ČSSD since 2014, ANO took firstly the positions of Minister 
of Regional Development and Minister of Finance only to turn Babiš into Prime Minister in 
2017. On the national level, the escalation over the Agrofert case with the Commission and 
within the national power cleavages only incentivized the stronger capture of these central 
AA, CA, and MA. From the supranational level, given that Babiš served as Minister of Finance, 
the Vice-Minister for Economy and the Prime Minister, while formally and then informally 
owning Agrofert, invited the Commission to intervene through the audits and the threats of 
funding suspensions and corrections (OLAF, 2017; EC, 2019b, 2019c). Although played out in 
the late 2010s, the roots of the conflict date back to the 2008 project Farma Čapí hnízdo 
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(Stork´s Nest Farm), while developing into the dispute over the interpretation of Babiš´ 
conflict of interests. 
The difference between the Čapí Hnízdo project and the conflict-of-interests procedure 
illustrates the rescaling dynamics from a regional and family-based capture to the state and 
the party-based state capture. Čapí Hnízdo was an EU-funded project for conference and 
tourist sites in the countryside areas which was turned by Babiš into the construction of a 
private manor. The project involved the use of Babiš “family” ownership networks and was a 
“project” within another ROP Central Bohemia (OLAF, 2017: 5-7, 46). Implemented between 
2008-2010, it was uncovered in 2015 within the ongoing internal political struggle. The case 
was simple. In order to exploit ROP´s cohesion investment, which was allocated to the SMEs, 
an autonomous family-controlled SME was established to first receive cohesion assistance 
and be then reintegrated into the Agrofert structures. In contrast, the conflict-of-interests 
procedure concerned Babiš in office when covering the Agrofert-related operations in the 
OPs EI and EIC, Environment, Human Resources and Employment, and the OP Prague-
Adaptability in the 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 periods (EC, 2019b: 1). Inquiring into the quality 
of “regulatory framework and its effective functioning as regards avoiding conflict of 
interests”, the Commission audits opened the conflict over interpreting the nature of the 
Prime Minister´s indirect control of Agrofert through a newly formed “AB private trust I and 
private trust II” funds (EC, 2019: 18). 
Externally, both matters became thus a conflict between the Czech government and the 
Commission. The Čapí Hnízdo formed a small risk of corrections amounting to around 1,6 
million EUR (OLAF, 2017: 2). Involving the likely return of either 11,77 or even 17,49 billion 
EUR due to “random errors” in Agrofert funding operations and “systemic errors” due to 
Babiš´ conflict of interests (EC, 2019c: 66), this risk turned the Agrofert interests into the 
national economic ones. The division between the intensifying ANO-led state capture through 
the executive control of central MA, CA, and AA and the preservation of national autonomy 
became similarly blurred. Identifying systemic errors in the management and control system, 
the Commission´s (2019b, 2019c) draft audit report interpreted the national regulation, as 
well as its compliance with the EU rules. Including the national response from the Regional 
Development and Finance Ministries, the final audit offered thus the Commission´s (2019b: 
13) “findings and actions to be taken/recommendations” for the national level. 
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However, the conflict line did not go simply between the Commission and the member 
state. Rather, it shaped the internal political cleavages in the state apparatus and the legal 
system. The OLAF audit procedure on Čapí hnízdo was initiated once the case was reported 
by an “anonymous source” (EC, 2017: 4). It primarily relied on the outcomes of ongoing police 
investigation and the earlier audit prepared by the Ministry of Finance (GoCR, 2016b). As well, 
the Commission´s secret audit draft and final reports were leaked to the public by one of the 
national bureaucrats to further politicize the issues in the national political struggle. 
The internal and external interventions reinforced thus each other. The Commission´s audit 
procedures reinforced the national political struggles and vice versa. This was illustrated by the 
sessions of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament (CDPCR, 2016, 2017a, 2017b, 
2018, 2019a, 2019b) on these issues: Already in March 2016, there was an “extraordinary” 
meeting on the “Čapí hnízdo”. In January 2017, the Chamber´s meeting approved the so-called 
Lex Babiš as an amendment to the Law on the “Conflict of Interests” thanks to the majority 
which consisted of the ODS in opposition and the ČSSD in government. Among other rules, the 
amendment explicitly excluded all enterprises, which are owned by government members, 
from claiming public procurement, subsidies and investment incentives. Not only has this 
forced Babiš to establish the AB private trust funds, it eased the Commission´s position during 
the auditing procedure. Meanwhile, there were decisions before and after the parliament 
elections which repeatedly deprived Babiš of immunity against the “criminal investigation” in 
September 2017 and January 2018. Finally, the Commission´s audit draft report returned the 
favour as it allowed to hold sessions on the potential national “financial loses” in June 2019 and 
to discuss the final audit on the “conflict of interests” in December 2019. 
The Czech state capture and the Commission´s governmentalization reproduced thus each 
other. Although differing from the Polish and Hungarian cases, this dynamic was at the centre 
of the Czech so-called populist turn. Rather than unfolding on the division between the 
transnational integration and national embeddedness, it asymmetrically reshaped the power 
relations inside the Czech state-society relations. At the same time, the audit-driven 
governmentalization fixed the Czech state as institutionally weak in this conflict, while 
enforcing the Commission´s interpretation of national regulation to reassert its command and 
control powers. Through this contradictory dynamic, the state capture was reproduced as an 
inherent feature of dependent developmental state in Czechia. 
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5.5. Dependent Developmental State 
The chapter exemplifies how the Visegrád dependent developmental state projects are 
formed by two countervailing forces of asymmetric transnationalization and national state 
capture. In the conditions of Visegrád peripheral integrations, the TRPD is a powerful factor 
in their reproduction. Accordingly, it reinscribes the supranational dilemmas into these state 
projects as a domestic investment-consumption dilemma. Effective investment has been 
envisioned in the convergence strategies of FDI-based development where the cohesion 
investment supports the sustainable competitiveness of Visegrád economies. Such strategies 
legitimize the nodal agency of cohesion bureaucracies which increases the state 
developmental capacities only through reduced state autonomy vis-à-vis the Commission. 
In contrast, the consumption signifies the national strategies which restore the national 
autonomy by capturing the networks of cohesion bureaucracies. Rather than negating the 
governmentalizing logic, the outcome is its further reproduction which privileges the self-
governance problems as the reason for ongoing backwardness and the site for the deepened 
supranational intervention. 
We can thus understand the governmentalization as a variety of Poulanzanian interiorized 
transformation. This chapter illustrates it on the two differing periods of Commission-led 
(post-)accession integration and post-crisis renationalization under FIDESZ-, ANO-, and PiS-
led governments. In terms of economic strategies, it shows how these differences remained 
a variation within the enduring trajectories of dependent developmental states projects. First, 
the Commission-led governance hierarchies are not simply superadded on the Visegrád state-
society relations but are internalized within them through the technologies of cohesion 
governance. Given the Visegrád dependency on the cohesion investment, the state 
transformation represents asymmetric transnationalization which has being nationally re-
embedded before and after the crisis. Second, this transformation both incentivizes and 
enables the Visegrád state managers to embed the FDI-led export-oriented regimes within 
the catch-up visions of neoliberal developmentalism. Indeed, rather than giving up on the 
competitiveness visions, the post-crisis renationalization partially reoriented from 
embedding especially the foreign capital to assisting more the national one. By doing so, these 
strategies paradoxically plan to use the cohesion dependency to balance rather than simply 
remove the FDI dependency. 
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The Visegrád developmental states were rescaled states given that the Cohesion Policy 
served as the EU´s urban and regional policy. Therefore, the next chapter 6 details how the 
TRPD has downscaled the responsibilities for management of Visegrád dependency the scale 
of city-regional competition. The next chapter benefits from but equally corrects this chapter 
in two ways. First, it explores how the TRPD-driven developmental projects (see Table 5.2) 
unevenly redistribute the Visegrád national models of dependent market economy through 
the regulation of regional development. Second, it benefits from the understanding that the 
city-regional actors and projects should not be analytically reduced as regional because they 
not only operate and are projected as national but become incentivized to act in the European 
if not global accumulation horizons (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3). While this chapter opens the 
question of uneven city-regional development with the ROP North-West, the next chapter 




6. Rescaled Dependency: From Lagging to Leading Regions 
As the previous chapters exemplify, the TRPD is structured by the inter-governmental 
negotiations over the EU cohesion consensus, while being translated into the national 
developmental frameworks in peripheral states. Given that the Cohesion Policy is the EU´s 
multi-level urban and regional policy, the Visegrád developmental projects remain rescaled 
states. They tend to downscale the developmental responsibilities to the subnational 
management. As the Table 6.1 documents, these projects remain de facto national because 
they cover almost all Visegrád city-regions due to their status as less developed or transition 
regions even in the late 2010s. What is more, the exception of Visegrád capitals as developed 
regions shows that the envisioned national convergence has led to the increasing 
differentiation which solidified the duality between the leading and lagging regions. This 
made the rising intra-national core-peripheral inequalities much more visible. In this chapter, 
I document how the Cohesion Policy´s developmental purpose has become implicated in this 
inter-local polarization contrary to the Cohesion Policy´s official formal target of restoring 
sociospatial justice and equality. 
Observing the differentiating process, I investigate it as a result of rescaled dependency. 
For this, I study the institutional form and the developmental purpose of the Regional 
Operational Programmes (ROP). Complementary to the sectoral OPs, which are analysed in 
the previous chapter, the territorial ROPs endow the Visegrád developmental projects with a 
spatial bias. Organized by the central governments or city-regional governments in the NUTS 
2 frameworks (see Table 6.1), the ROPs rescale the Visegrád state more directly than the 
sectoral OPs ones. Primarily through the partnership technology, the rescaled dependency 
mobilizes the city-regional elites to design own local catch-up projects, while downscaling 
thus the management of dependent development. While the OPs mobilize the local elites 
through the interregional competition over the nationally redistributed competitive funding, 
the ROPs have been directly allotted to the city-regions. In this chapter, I research thus how 
the TRPD enables these city-regional elites to form local developmental coalitions. 
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Furthermore, I inquire into this rescaling process to decipher how it allows these coalitions to 
design their developmental projects and strategies which give them coherence. 
From this analytical extension, the chapter inquiries into the last dilemma between the 
sociospatial justice and competitive city-regionalism (see Box 1.1). This dilemma defines the 
“inter-regional” and “intra-regional” forms of “dual[ity]” in the “spatial differences” between 
the FDI-based leading regions and those lagging regions without FDI (GoRP, 2016: 110; GoCR, 
2011a: 70; GoRH, 2007p: 46; OMV, 2011: 110). I argue that the neoliberal developmentalism 
skews the dilemma in favour of competitive city-regionalism in the local developmental 
projects. In result, the duality is widened between the FDI-led city-regions, which win the 
competition over the cohesion investment, and those lagging losing it. This reinforces the FDI-
based transborder cluster of leading city-regions which encompasses the South-Western 
Poland, most of Czechia, Western Slovakia, and North-Western Hungary (see also Table 6.1). 
Inquiring into the developmental purpose of the regional projects, I extend thus the 
institutionalist observations of this differentiating trend (Brown et al., 2007; Medve-Bálint, 
2017) to explain how the Cohesion Policy reproduced the overlap between the national 
sectoral and regional duality.  
The chapter focuses on the programming period 2007-2013/6. It is structured in parallel 
with the previous one as follows: First, I discus the forms of institutional downscaling in the 
cohesion governance and its impact on the regulation of Visegrád inter-regional 
development. Second, the chapter studies how the neoliberal developmentalism skews the 
catch-up strategies to competitive city-regionalism, while regularizing thus the division 
between lagging and leading regions. Third, I detail both processes on the case study of 
leading city-region of South Moravia within the NUTS 2 South-East. More precisely, I look on 
the formation of the region´s developmental project: Central European Silicon Valley. Last, I 
illustrate how the project is being infrastructurally underpinned by the local universities and 






Table 6.1: Uneven Convergence of Visegrád City-Regions as the NUTS 2, national and regional 









Type of Development 
2018 
Czechia  85 91  
Prague – 185 192 Developed 
South-East Brno – Jihlava 76 84 Transition 
Central Bohemia Prague 80 82 Transition 
South-West Plzeň – České Budějovice 72 78 Less Developed 
Moravia-Silesia Ostrava 71 76 Less Developed 
North-East 
Hradec králové – Pardubice – 
Liberec 
69 76 Less Developed 
Central Moravia Olomouc – Zlín 67 74 Less Developed 
North-West Ústí nad Labem – Karlovy Vary 66 64 Less Developed 
     
Poland  56 71  
Warsaw - 126 156 Developed 
Lower Silesia Wrocław 64 78 Less Developed 
Greater Poland Poznań  60 76 Less Developed 
Silesia Katowice  61 72 Less Developed 
Pomeranian 
Trojmiasto (Gdańsk – Gdynia – 
Sopot) 
55 69 Less Developed 
Lodz Łódź  53 66 Less Developed 
Lesser Poland Kraków 50 63 Less Developed 
Mazovian Warsaw 48 60 Less Developed 
West Pomeranian Szczecin 48 59 Less Developed 
Lubusz Lubusz 47 58 Less Developed 
Opole Opole 46 56 Less Developed 
Kuyavian-Pomeranian  Toruń 47 57 Less Developed 
Swietokrzyskie Kielce 43 51 Less Developed 
Warmian-Masurian Olsztyn 41 49 Less Developed 
Lublin Lublin 40 48 Less Developed 
Subcarpathian Rzeszów 40 50 Less Developed 
Podlaskie Białystok 41 50 Less Developed 
     
Slovakia  73 78  
Bratislava - 171 173 Developed 
Western Slovakia Trnava – Trenčín – Nitra 69 67 Less Developed 
Central Slovakia Žilina – Banská Bystrica 58 59 Less Developed 
Eastern Slovakia Prešov – Košice 51 53 Less Developed 
     
Hungary  64 71  
Budapest - 139 145 Developed 
Western Transdanubia Győr 63 72 Less Developed 
Central Transdanubia Székesfehérvár 58 66 Less Developed 
Pest (Central Hungary) Budapest 56 56 Less Developed 
Southern Great Plain Szeged 40 52 Less Developed 
Southern Transdanubia Pécs  43 49 Less Developed 
Northern Hungary Miskolc  39 49 Less Developed 
Northern Great Plain Debrecen 40 46 Less Developed 
Source: Eurostat, own preparation  
6.1. Governmentalizing Regional Development 
There were multiple institutional forms of cohesion governance which differed among the 
Visegrád states and across the programming periods within them. The basic distinction 
oscillated between the centralized and decentralized ROPs. The centralized ones have been 
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managed by the MAs in central governments, while the regional governments received the 
position of IBs (see chapter 5). The decentralized ones have been managed by the regional 
governments in the NUTS 2 delineations (see Table 6.1). Between 2004-2006, the integrated 
ROPs were centralized in all four states. In Slovakia, the ROP remained centralized in the next 
programming periods of 2007-2013 and 2014-2020. In Hungary, the management remained 
centralized but was split into eight ROPs for the next programming period to be recentralized 
into one integrated ROP since 2014. In Czechia, there was a decentralized management in 
seven ROPs and OP for Prague which was however recentralized into one ROP since 2014. In 
Poland, the management of seventeen ROPs remained decentralized for the following 
programming periods. 
Regardless of these varying institutional forms, the main purpose of the ROPs was simple. 
As on the national scale, they consolidated the subnational coalitions in an attempt to increase 
their strategic capacity. Many of these coalitions gained institutional coherence in the “pre-
accession programmes SAPARD, Phare a ISPA“ (RCCB, 2012: 26; GoSR, 2016: 77; OVLP, 2012: 
40-3). Through the partnership technology, these programmes nevertheless incorporate 
simultaneously these coalitions into the governance hierarchies of cohesion governance and 
subject them to its other technologies. Here, the nodal agency of cohesion bureaucracies is 
fixed in the downscaled system of MAs, MCs, and IBs: In Poland, the sixteen Offices of the 
Regions served as the MA to institutionalize the most decentralized system. In Slovakia, eight 
regional governments gained IB position under the ROP management by the central ministry. 
In Hungary, the central National Developmental Agency served as the central MA only to share 
the management with the regional developmental agencies as the IB. In Czechia, the fourteen 
regional governments within the eight NUTS 2 regions established the Regional Cohesion 
Councils as MA of their seven ROPs and one OP for Prague between 2007-2013. 
When downscaling the multi-level networks of cohesion bureaucracies, the 
governmentalization of Visegrád dependency was thus further operationalized as a problem 
inherent to the regulation of uneven regional development. First, oriented at increasing the 
regional developmental capacity through improved “coherence, complementarity and 
coordination” (GoRH, 2007l: 116), the governmentalization locked the local elites into the 
competition over their strategic positions within the Visegrád developmental states (see 
Table 5.1). This was driven by the technologies of programming and concentration (Table 3.1). 
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Second, shifting thus the developmental management downwards, the rescaling process 
subjected the local coalitions to the already discussed management of "implementation", 
"financial management", "control and audit", "monitoring", and "evaluation" (RCNE 2011: 
206, 212, 215, 218, 224) at once. In practice, the partnership principle downscaled the nodal 
agency of cohesion bureaucracies (Table 3.1). 
6.1.1. Building Complementary Regions 
The cohesion governance and the ROPs in particular signified the first comprehensive 
programmes of strategic planning in Visegrád city-regions after post-socialism (Dąbrowski 
and Piskorek, 2018). Through the concentration and programming technologies, they 
mobilized and funded the local coalitions to self-organize this planning but reoriented it 
upwards. The strategic regional planning was thus integrated into the multi-level hierarchies 
of cohesion and national economic governance. First, the ROPs mediated the 
“complementarity/synergy” (GoSR, 2016: 135) between the EU and national strategic 
documents and the newly articulated regional strategies. Second, the ROPs were designed to 
define their “complementarity and demarcation” (OWPV, 2016: 81) with the sectoral OP 
through the priority axes so that they complemented the national developmental state 
projects (see Table 5.1). Such a socio-institutional fixing of decentralization through enabling 
regional planning was thus already built in and further reproduced its inter-scalar and inter-
regional hierarchies. 
Through these inter-scalar hierarchies, the Lisbon and Europe 2020 agendas have been 
transmitted to the regulation of uneven regional development through the programming 
technology. Although the degree of centralization varied among the Visegrád states, the ROPs 
were generally instrumentalized to interlink the complementarities among the European, 
national „sectoral and/or regional strategies“ (GoRH, 2007m: 107). There was an inter-
regional inequality because the leading regions had a more advanced planning, although the 
ROP necessitated the “preparation or update of developmental documents” (GoSR, 2016: 77) 
which had been funded in all regions previously. Articulating the “comprehensive and 
integrated urban development strategy” (GoRH, 2007o: 58), the ROPs “fulfil basic mission” 
(GoCR, 2011a: 60) of the Lisbon and Europe 2020 agendas inscribed in the CStF between 
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2007-2013. In the same way, the national level of the NSRF and other various national 
strategies of “economic growth” (RCCM 2011: 89-90) and “sustainable development” (OKPV, 
2011: 55-7; GoRH, 2007l: 115) had to be reflected. On the most marginal scale, the ROP was 
thus the dominant document which required the adherence of local “multiple principle 
documents” such as sectoral “strategy”, “plan[s]”, “programmes”, and other “conceptual and 
analytical documents” (OLV, 2007: 2; RCSW, 2012: 60; GoRH, 2007k: 36; GoSR, 2016: 179). 
The hierarchical pattering of inter-regional relations was already shaped by the 
concertation technology. The difference between the capital regions of Prague, Budapest, 
Bratislava, and Warsaw and the other second-tier metropoles (see Table 6.1) made this most 
visible. As core regions above 90% of the EU average, Prague and Bratislava risked being 
attributed lower cohesion investment but followed the “competitiveness and employment” 
(MACCP, 2007: 6; 2011: 4; GoSR, 2011c: 6) objectives for developed regions in the special 
OPs. Integrated into the ROP Central Hungary and Mazovian Voivodship, Budapest and 
Warsaw´s GDP was lowered statistically to mix the benefits of the “‘phasing in’” (GoRH, 
2007p: 7) and “less developed” (OMV, 2011: 4) regions. The investment in both capitals was 
still concentrated more on the so-called developed objectives such as innovation. As Prague´s 
less developed surroundings, the ROP Central Bohemia illustrated the hierarchical pattering 
because it formed appendage to the OP Prague through their mutual “coordination” (RCCB, 
2012: 47-8). On the other end of most lagging regions, the OP Development of Eastern Poland 
was set up as an “additional instrument of support” (GoRP, 2016c: 7) to the ROPs. Thus, the 
economic integration of the five easternmost lagging Voivodships of Swietokrzyskie, 
Warmian-Masurian, Lublin, Subcarpathian, Podlaskie was secured additionally by the central 
ministry. 
Even in the decentralized Poland, the territorial ROPs formed elementary conditions for 
the planning and investment frameworks. Their institutional and infrastructural purpose 
reoriented the city-regions for the integration into the OP-based national developmental 
project managed by the central government. Through the “priority axes” (GoSR, 2016: 124), 
the developmental objectives of lagging and leading regions were partially differentiated 
again. While the lagging regions comprised of the basic axes shared by all ROP, the leading 
regions extended these axes to the innovation sphere. The first axis of “technical assistance” 
aimed at integrating the cohesion bureaucracies in the subnational governments, as well as 
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the “modernization” of the regions´ “administrative” and “absorption” (GoSR, 2016: 96; 
OPodV, 2011: 118; GoRH, 2007i: 109) capacities. The second axis included the regeneration 
of natural and built environment in the “urban and regional development” (GoRH, 2007k: 
132). The third axis of transport “infrastructure” and “services” was another basic priority 
(RCNW, 2013: 165). All these axes corelated with the last one of the “income-generating” 
development of tourist infrastructure (GoRH, 2007l: 65). Furthermore, the health and “social 
infrastructure” were included (OKPV, 2011: 70). Even though outlined in all ROPs for Poland 
and Hungary, especially the leading regions in all Visegrád states prioritized the advanced 
axes of the “firm competitiveness” (OGPV, 2015: 109) and the “innovation- and enterprise-
oriented development of the knowledge-based economy” (GoRH, 2007p: 77). 
The ROPs established the basic institutional conditions for downscaling the management 
of Visegrád uneven and dependent regional. Building thus the city-regional capacity of 
strategic planning, they have reoriented it to the national and EU hierarchies of decision-
making. Through organizing the regional complementarity with the national developmental 
projects, the regional decentralization only institutionally reproduced the emerging inter-
scalar hierarchies and historical inter-regional differences. 
6.1.2. Rescaling Governance 
The aforementioned institutionalization mobilized local elites into developmental 
coalitions which shape this process in return. Similar to the national level, the partnership 
principle extended the nodal agency of cohesion bureaucracies. The nodal agency aimed at 
incorporating and simultaneously subjecting these coalitions by introducing the regional 
networks of MAs, IBs, and MCs. These “coordination” networks shared similarities across 
Visegrád states and regions, yet they varied not only inter-nationally but also intra-nationally. 
The inter-national variation relied on the scale of the ROP centralization which ranged from 
the most centralized Hungary to the most decentralized Poland. The intra-national variation 
highlighted the difference between leading and lagging city-regions again. Besides the ROP, 
the OPs were a powerful factor as well which sustained these developmental coalition-
making through inter-regional competition in their competitive calls. In the leading city-
regions, the coalitions were already mobilized, while their members were often de facto 
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actors of national importance. This is most evident in the capital regions but also the leading 
second-tier metropoles (see Table 6.1): Brno in Czechia; Wrocław, Poznań, Kraków, Gdańsk 
and Trójmiasto in Poland; Győr agglomeration in Hungary; Košice in Slovakia. In the lagging 
city-regions without large metropoles, these coalitions included historically less nationally 
prominent actors. 
The MAs underpin the organizational nuclei of cohesion governance-based developmental 
coalitions. The institutional forms of decentralization varied. Through the “substantial 
decentralization” (OLSV, 2007: 49), the Polish ROPs were managed by specialized 
“departments” (OPodV, 2011: 133) or “sections” (OSiV, 2011: 147) in the Voivodships´ Offices 
of the Executive Boards (zarząd województwa). In Czechia, they were managed by the Offices 
of the Regional Council (regionální rada) which represented one to three regional 
governments (krajský úřad), while remaining entrenched in their “organizational structure” 
(RCSW, 2012: 111). In Slovakia, the integrated ROP was managed through the 
“decentralization principle” (GoSR, 2016: 197) whereas the central ministry was MA and the 
regional governments (samosprávný kraj) shared the status of “IB/MA” (GoSR, 2011c: 153-
155, 2016: 197-8). In the most centralized Hungary, the “separate organisational units of the 
National Development Agency“ managed the ROPs, while sharing the responsibilities with the 
regional developmental agencies established already earlier for implementing the 
“Hungarian and Phare programmes“ (GoRH, 2007p: 125). These forms mirrored the differing 
scales of formal regional self-governance but remained nonetheless integrated in the 
Commission-led hierarchies of cohesion governance. 
The coalition-making was extended with the MCs. Here, the decentralization was copied: 
The Slovak ROPs had one MCs, the Hungarian ROPs were monitored by the national 
“Convergence Monitoring Committee” but separated into “Regional Sub-Committees“ for 
each ROP (GoRH, 2007n: 128-9). The Czech and Polish ROPs had their own separate MCs. 
Before the official monitoring committees were established, the regional “partners” were 
mobilized already during the ROP preparations in various “steering”, “expert” or “working 
groups”, “consultations“, „conferences“ or “fora” (RCCM, 2011: 9; GoRH, 2007m: 5; GoSR, 
2016: 13; OVLP, 2012: 65). The committees facilitated an intermediate body for incorporating 
all city-regional actors given that “besides reliable partners from the programming phase, all 
subjects participating in the financing process become partners” (RCSE, 2013: 172). As the 
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regions participated in the MCs of sectoral OP on national level, the regional MCs included 
national ministries, developmental and also investment agencies to “improve partnership and 
synergic effects” (RCCM, 2011: 189). The local municipalities and regional governments 
ranging from their associations to various agencies followed. The “employees’ and employer’s 
sides“ (GoRH, 2007l: 125) were represented as well through the regional branches of business 
associations and federations and labour unions. Furthermore, various sectoral associations 
and regional professional clubs were involved, as well as universities and other research 
institutions and non-governmental associations. 
Through the decentralization, the regional actors in MAs and MCs were subjected to the 
tight system of coordination and control “determined in partnership with the European 
Commission“ (GoRH, 2007o: 79). Within this system, the priority axes were meanwhile turned 
into performance “system” of “core” and “measurable” indicators (GoSR, 2016: 18). As MAs 
or IBs, the regional administrations became responsible for the implementation. 
Their obligations included “recording and storing the accounting records for each 
[investment] operation”, while turning them into “data” to feed the ”financial management, 
monitoring, audits and evaluations“ (GoRH, 2007l: 117). Such data filled the “annual and final 
reports“ (OLSV, 2007: 143) for the Commission as well. Meanwhile, the MCs overviewed the 
“strategic, formal, and technical” (OLSV, 2007: 149) dimensions of the investment process. 
Before the data reached the upper levels of cohesion bureaucratic networks, the MCs had to 
„consider and approve“, „periodically review“ or „be informed“ about them to „examine the 
results“ of the implementation process or propose its „revision” (GoRH, 2007i: 127). 
Mobilized for the self-organized economic strategies, the developmental coalitions were 
thus simultaneously subjected to the rescaled hierarchies of cohesion governance. As shown 
in the next sections, the sectoral and interest nature of these local elite coalitions has 
simultaneously shaped their capacities as developmental coalitions to comply with this 
governance. In effect, this had effect on the ongoing differentiating regional integration in 




6.2. Articulating Competitive City-Regionalism 
Neoliberal developmentalism gave a strategic purpose to the regulation of uneven 
regional development. In two ways, it solved the dilemma between the equalizing 
sociospatial justice and the differentiating competitive city-regionalism in favour of the later 
side. In its deeper version, the city-regional governments are “firstly“ incentivized to 
articulate their priorities in improving own regional “competitiveness and attractivity” as a 
way to “secondly” ensure the “sustainable” or “even” development (RCSW, 2012: 43; GoRH, 
2007l: 58; GoSR, 2011c: 83; OVLP, 2012: 59-62). This articulation of regional catch-up 
strategies made them realize the regions´ specific forms of backwardness in competition on 
both “national and European” scales (OLSV, 2007: 56). Second, this was articulated on the 
shallower basis of inter-local competition. Among the developmental “threats” to Lower 
Silesia, there was thus an “economic competition of neighbouring Voivodeships or [regions 
in] Czechia and Germany” (OLSV, 2007: 51). The same went for Budapest as the “competitor 
regions (Vienna, Bratislava, Prague) [have been] gaining strength“ (GoRH, 2007p: 43). 
The competitive city-regionalism reproduced Europe´s divide between the leading West 
and the lagging East which had historical roots but was reproduced again within and through 
the cohesion agenda. The regional duality reflected the sectoral duality between the FDI-led 
and the FDI-scarce regions. It was regularized by the Commission´s cohesion reports when 
explaining the regional leadership through the “larger share of employment in foreign firms” 
and the “proximity to the rest of the EU internal market” (EC, 2014a: 49). Moreover, the 
Visegrád capital regions represented “the most competitive [ones] but this has not (as yet) 
boosted the competitiveness of neighbouring regions” with a hope that once the „economic 
and transport connections between the capital and the other regions become stronger, spill-
over effects are likely to emerge” (EC, 2014a: 54). These visions were supported by the central 
and regional governments. There was thus a “national divide between the innovative Poland 
´A´ [in the West] and the lagging Poland ´B´ [in the East]” which cut parallelly through the 
Mazovian Voivodship between the Warsaw agglomeration and the region´s lagging rest 
(OMV, 2011: 20). In a similar way, there was thus a diverse gap “especially between the more 
developed west and the less developed east of Slovakia” (GoSR, 2016: 29) in general. 
The Graphs 6.1 and 6.2 evidence how the competitive city-regionalism reproduces the 
leading-lagging divide in material terms. They compare the regional redistribution of 
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Graph 6.1 Capital and Second-Tier City-Regions: Regional Development and Cohesion Inflows, 2004-2018 (EUR)
 
Graph 6.2 Second-Tier City-Regions: Regional Level of Development and Cohesion Inflows, 2004-2018 (EUR) 
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cohesion investment in relation to the regional development levels since 2004. Rather than 
finding a strong redistribution to poorer regions, as it would be the official narrative, 
redistributive pattern is weaker. It is stronger when the capital regions are included (see 
Graph 6.1), albeit exposing the contradictions as well. In the starkest one, Bratislava has 
accumulated an equivalent cohesion investment stock per capita as the Eastern Slovakia. 
Comparing the redistribution among the second-tier city-regions only (see Graph 6.2), the 
trend even the still favouring the leading regions: The leading city-regions of above 20,000 
EUR per capital accumulate often a similar stock to the lagging ones below 18,000 EUR per 
capita. As documented below, the competitive city-regionalism shapes and legitimizes this 
pattern by promoting a “spatial concertation of resources” into various “growth”, 
“development” or “competitiveness” poles (GoRH, 2007m: 11, 142; RCNE, 2011: 157; OGPV, 
2015: 30). The Slovak ROP is illustrative for this. It established a hierarchy of metropolitan 
“innovation poles” and marginal “cohesion poles” where the former ones develop the 
“knowledge economy” (GoSR, 2016: 109) among and within the city-regions. Through these 
frameworks, the lagging city-regions were already fixed as having secondary priority, while 
still expected to participate in the competition over the cohesion investment with the leading 
regions. 
6.2.1. Leading Regions 
The leading city-regions are concentrated in a transregional FDI-based cluster along the 
western borders with the EU core states and the neighbouring leading regions in Visegrád 
states. Their local developmental coalitions could thus position them as “strategic place” at 
the crossroad of “east-west and south-north” links (OLSV, 2007: 4). Besides the capital 
regions, this included second-tier regions reaching above the threshold of 20,000 EUR per 
capital or 24,000 in Czechia respectively by the late 2010s (see Graphs 6.1 and 6.2). These 
regions remained still eligible to cohesion funds due to achieving only slightly above 75% of 
EU GDP average in Czechia, 70% in Slovakia, and 60% in Hungary and Poland respectively (see 
Table 6.1). Therefore, “5 areas of metropolitan scale compete with Warsaw (Trójmiasto, 
Poznań, Łódź, Wrocław, Kraków)“ (OVLP, 2012: 25) over economic leadership in Poland. 
Although the capitals were more dominant in the three smaller Visegrád states, other leading 
second-tier metropoles emerged there too. This included Brno as the “industrial, trade, 
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administrative and cultural centre of the South-East and the whole Czechia” (RCSE, 2013: 33) 
among others. Outside of Budapest, the “Central-Eastern European (Vienna-Prague-Brno-
Bratislava-Győr-Budapest) growth pole“ (GoHR, 2007p: 62) absorbed the North-Central 
Hungary. The “Bratislava-Trnava agglomeration” connected Slovakia into this transboundary 
cluster along with the rest of Western Slovakia (GoSR, 2011c: 22, 75). The national leadership 
in the Visegrád inter-metropolitan competition legitimized thus the redistribution to these 
growth poles as a national priority. 
Distinguished by the “significant engagement of foreign capital” (OGPV, 2015: 31), these 
poles had a new horizon of reaching “the attractiveness and competitiveness of the region´s 
economy, as well as its resilient success not only in the domestic competition“ (OLSV, 2007: 
59). This shifting horizon moved from the “investment oriented“ to the „innovation oriented 
economic development“ (GoRH, 2007i: 53). The existing “industrial parks”, which were 
previously co-sponsored by the EU funds, had to transform into innovation-oriented 
infrastructures and institutions of business environment. The new clusters had to thus bring 
together the “existing regional advanced industries with high productivity“ and the 
„innovation-oriented improvement and expansion of the higher-education institutions 
network“ (GoRH, 2007n: 42). Such innovation-led catch-up was possible only thanks to the 
existing universities and necessarily developing “so-called innovation infrastructures (e.g. 
industrial parks, technology parks, entrepreneurship incubators, centres of technology 
transfer, centres of excellence, and research units)” (OLSV,2007: 74). Much of the strategy 
had to moreover “assist SMEs by enhancing the attractiveness and availability of knowledge-
intensive, higher added-value activities” for them to “close the gap with large [foreign] 
companies” (GoHR, 2007p: 18) in this respect. Despite the favourable conditions, even the 
developed regions as Prague required cohesion aid to solve their “inadequate development 
of R&D capacities” (MACCP, 2007: 45). 
The same unfulfilled potential went for the human capital with respect to the labour 
markets, training and education facilities. Characterized by large metropoles of national 
importance, the city-regions had a highly skilled workforce and generally lower 
unemployment. They also hosted leading national research and university institutions. This 
made them competitive nationally but required an additional support to retain positions of 
“most dynamic and successful Central European regions” (MACCP, 2011: 4). What is more, 
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even the capitals such as Budapest faced the risk of “[out]migration of qualified workforce to 
Western Europe” (GoHR, 2007n: 29), while losing competitiveness due to the lack of key 
professions as the ones “with IT skills” (GoHR, 2007i: 29). Hence, the leading regions faced 
the same national dilemmas of improving the adaptability and mobility of its workforce, as 
well as solving the problem of mismatch between the workforce supply and investor demand. 
The supply of highly qualified workforce highlighted that the “effective development of 
human potential must be especially conditioned by the appropriate additional infrastructure 
along with the development of progressive economic sectors with high added value” (RCSE, 
2013: 19). 
Forming already the “main transport node[s]” (GoHR, 2007p: 29), the leading regions 
suffered from the underdeveloped intra-regional and inter-national transport infrastructures. 
Their positioning as „very important axis of international importance“ (RCSW, 2012: 17) in 
terms of “all modes of land, water, and air transport” (OPomV, 2010: 19) prioritized their 
region´s physical infrastructures as those of national importance. If these “preconditions of 
competitiveness” (GoHR, 2007p: 76) were missing even in the leading metropoles, these 
metropoles gained national investment priority in the inter-metropolitan competition on the 
EU scale. Not only was it important for the “effective use of the developmental potential” 
intra-regionally but it underpinned the “complex improvement of transport accessibility and 
interconnection of the region´s developmental poles” (RCSE, 2013: 63). More importantly, it 
was needed as connecting these city-regions to the “trans-European networks of transport 
(TEN-T)“ (OVLP, 2012: 67) conditioned the whole national integration. 
In the inter-European and -Visegrád competition, the leading metropoles had to be equally 
supplied by the cohesion investment through the territorial ROP in their complementarity 
with the sectoral OP. As innovation poles, their FDI potential and sectoral structures 
privileged them once again in the national upgrade to the “high value added” (OLSV, 2007: 
81; GoRH, 2007n: 83-5; RCSE, 2013: 19; GoSR, 2011c: 75) positions in the global value chains. 
In order words, tending to “exceed” (GoRH, 2007i: 22) the national averages, the competitive 
city-regionalism legitimized the disproportionate redistribution to the leading regions for 
organizing the national catch-up with the EU averages. 
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6.2.2. Lagging Regions 
In contrast, the lagging city-regions suffered from remaining or regressing “decisively 
under the national average” (OPV, 2007: 18) in most of the developmental indicators, let 
alone the EU one. By the late 2010s, they remained under the 18,000 EUR per capita or 22,000 
to 24,000 in Czechia respectively (see Graph 6.2). Falling thus under the 75% of EU average 
GDP in Czechia, 70% in Slovakia, and 60% in Hungary and Poland respectively, they were more 
eligible for cohesion funding than the leading regions (Table 6.1): As already documented on 
the ROP North-West (see chapter 5), the continuing regional inequalities were blamed on the 
“ongoing backwardness” and self-governing incapacity of these city-regions (RCNW, 2013: 
81). There were two types of regions: agricultural or those undergoing restructuralization 
from the “original sectors of heavy industry (mines, steelworks, heavy engineering, etc.) to 
effective activities with high value added” (RCMS, 2011: 15). Such regions “did not attract 
significant foreign investments“ (GoRH, 2007l: 14), while being disconnected from the crucial 
westward transport nodes. There are second-tier metropoles of national importance such as 
Ostrava in Czechia, Košice in Slovakia, Miskolc or Debrecen in Hungary. These metropoles are 
however often losing with their national western counterparts in the FDI-oriented 
competition, while being encouraged to bandwagon into the similar catch-up strategies.  
In the developmental strategies of these regions, the transport infrastructures and built 
environment became priority as they form not only socio-economic but also territorial 
peripheries. On the one hand, investing into transport and other physical infrastructures 
could establish the preconditions for attracting foreign investors, on the other, the priority of 
this investment regularized these regions´ “low competitiveness” (OPV, 2007: 20). “Especially 
in Eastern Slovakia, where there was low share of roads of higher class (highways and 
expressways)”, there was thus need to firstly modernize the roads of class II and III which 
were of “poor” quality anyway (GoSR, 2016: 85-6). In Hungary, South Transdanubia suffered 
from the lack of “basic infrastructural conditions”, while the West Pomeranian Voivodship 
was inaccessible due to the “very serious lack of transport infrastructure” in Poland (GoRH, 
2007k: 12, 100, 104; OWPV, 2016: 44). In Moravia-Silesia, “only the commencement of works 
on the D47 highway and the R48 speedway on the regional territory has somewhat increased 




In terms of workforce, these regions suffered from demographic decline due to the 
“interregional and foreign [out]migration” in the conditions of “highest level of 
unemployment” than the national averages (GoRH, 2007o: 20; OPodV, 2011: 9). They also 
included “disadvantaged” and “marginalized” (GoSR, 2016: 126) populations such as Roma 
communities in Czechia, Hungary, and Slovakia. Just as the missing transport links, the 
“under-average shares of basically trained, as well as persons with higher professional and 
university education and simultaneously the over-average shares of persons with only basic 
or no education” normalized these regions lagging position. Indeed, the „shortage of labour 
force in the demanded professions“ was regularized as a “barrier” to the foreign and domestic 
investment (RCMS, 2011: 19-20). Much of the blame fell on the regional education and 
training systems in the predictable way. They required modernization due to lagging behind 
the “changing needs of the economy“ from basic education to universities, while even the 
training systems failed to „stress practice oriented training and improving skills“ of the 
regional labour force (GoRH, 2007m: 33). Following the adaptability-oriented strategies, the 
local educational and training systems were to use the cohesion investment to adjust to the 
investor demand. 
The dependence on external investment was much stronger due to the outdated sectoral 
structures. Either lacking the “presence of large companies” (GoRH, 2007l: 14) in rather 
agriculture-based economies or having “concentrated industrial production in large 
enterprises” (RCMS, 2011: 18), the domestic regional structures remained unreliable either 
way. The various “industrial” and “economic zones” were already sponsored in these regions 
since the pre-accession Phare (OPV, 2007: 16; RCMS, 2011: 39). However, the cohesion 
investment was necessary given these regions´ “still limited attractivity for investors” (RCCM, 
2011: 66), even though they could offer “higher investment incentives in comparison” (RCCM, 
2011: 45) due to being poorer than the leading ones. There was moreover a limited number 
of “complexly equipped areas of investment complying with the expectations of potential 
investors” (OHCV, 2011: 87) or “inadequate infrastructure for the establishment of new 
technological firms using the R&D results“ (RCMS, 2011: 46). Although some regions had a 
“long tradition of higher education” (RCCM, 2011: 37), it was clear that “incentive actions 
should be put in place with a view to set up institutions designed to utilise research findings, 
innovations among as wide a range of entrepreneurs as possible” (GoRH, 2007m: 21). For 
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this, the shift to the technology- and knowledge-oriented sectors required a double task to 
attract the foreign investment in these sectors and catch-up in terms of appropriated 
infrastructure with the leading city-regions. 
Losing the competition over becoming the national leading poles, the developmental 
coalitions in lagging regions could only compete over the cohesion investment through self-
evaluating themselves as more backward. Their resultant catch-up strategies articulated a 
much similar purpose as those of the leading regions, that is the investment into locational 
conditions for the FDI. Having less capabilities to compete over both the FDI and cohesion 
investment in consequence, their convergence remained attached to the developmental 
priorities of leading regions. This way, it only reproduced the uneven outcomes (see Table 
6.1). 
6.3. A “Central European Silicon Valley”: South Moravian Region 
South Moravia belonged historically among the most developed city-regions in CEE thanks 
to its metropole Brno. Since the mid-2010s, its ambitions to retain this position has been 
reproduced by local and national state managers, as well as mainstream media under the 
city-regional project of “Central European”, “Czech”, “Moravian”, “Brno” Silicon Valley 
(Kočička, 2010; Toman, 2010; CEITEC, 2011; SMIC, 2015: 5, 29; 2017: 38; CoB, 2020). Included 
with the poorer Vysočina Region in the NUTS South-East, its city-regional leadership has been 
supported thanks to its fast catch-up but also developmental status of transition region (see 
Table 6.1). Since the early 2000s, this hegemonic vision emerged among the nuclei of local 
growth coalitions, while developing into a comprehensive city-regional project by the end of 
2010s. As documented below, its following success remained entirely dependent on the 
discursive and material complementarity between the FDI and the cohesion investment. 
The NUTS South-East exemplifies the trend by which the more prosperous city-regions 
accumulate disproportionately higher stock of cohesion investment than their less 
prosperous counterparts within their own states and on the Visegrád scale (see Graphs 6.1 
and 6.2). Rather than solely either FDI- or cohesion investment-driven visions, the 
entanglement of both sources of external dependency underpinned the city-regional 
mobilization for such Visegrád-type Silicon Valley visions since the early 2000s. The ROP 
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South-East (ROP SE) expressed this purpose in its main “vision” for the region which was “to 
become the highly competitive region through several realms of development: growing 
knowledge-based economy of urban centres, well interconnected regional poles of 
development, and also through sustainable development of important and attractive tourist 
destinations” (RCSE, 2013: 62). This was possible only through the “joint influence of 
interventions” (RCSE, 2013: 63) among the South Moravian strategies, the ROP SE and the 
sectoral OPs. To increase the “scientific, research, innovation and educational potential of the 
region”, this was possible only through the complementarity among the “OP RDE, OP HRE 
[human resources and employment], OP EI, OP EC a ROP SE“, as well as the „experiences from 
the previous programming period“ (RCSE, 2013: 63; see chapter 5). 
The hegemonic project of South Moravian competitive city-regionalism can be thus 
researched as follows. The project was established and historically emerged through the 
mobilization of a specific city-regional coalition. This coalition legitimized itself by the 
production of catch-up strategies which translated into an infrastructural development. This 
development underpinned the strategies of innovation-oriented regional competitiveness in 
return only to legitimize the South Moravian dependency. 
6.3.1. Developmental Coalition 
By the late 1990s, the socio-institutional nucleus of South Moravian growth coalition 
consolidated around the public sector, university sector, and the newly emergent regional 
business sector. This coalition-making merged three interrelated processes of 
Europeanization, privatization, and decentralization. In 2000, the South Moravian Regional 
Authority (SMRA) was officially established to give this coalition the socio-institutional 
platform for its self-organization and -governance through the state decentralization. The 
newly formed regional government was complemented by the City of Brno´s metropolitan 
governance, while the new Association of South Moravian Cities and Municipalities was 
established in 1999. In 1997, the South Moravian Regional Chamber of Commerce emerged 
to consolidate and represent the newly formed class of regional business which emerged 
from the wave of privatization and post-socialist restructuring. In contrast to most of the 
other regional metropoles, the new coalition could moreover rely on the fully developed and 
diverse university and research sector of national importance. It combined the traditional 
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Masaryk University (MU), the Brno University of Technology (BUT), the nature-science 
Mendel University, the University of Veterinary and Pharmaceutical Science, as well as the 
departments of Czech Academy of Sciences. This loose nucleus was mobilized only with the 
dual prospects of cohesion funding and the inter-regional competition over the FDI. 
Two regional development, investment, and innovation agencies played a crucial role in 
the dual process of this coalition-formation and its dependent reorientation: The Regional 
Development Agency of South Moravia (RDASM) and the South Moravian Innovation Centre 
(SMIC). Familiar to other Czech and Visegrád city-regions (McMaster, 2006), the RDASM was 
“founded in September 1997 with the aim of supporting the use of funds of the European 
Union“ (RDASM, 2007: 1). The agency was established by the Association of South Moravian 
Cities and Municipalities and the predecessor of the Regional Chamber of Commerce only to 
include the SMRA as its third shareholder since 2002. Ever since being contracted by the 
national investment promotion agency CzechInvest in 2000, it has also offered the “complete 
services to foreign investors” (RDASM, 2017: 33). Blending the cohesion investment and FDI, 
the coalition has become however innovation-oriented only after the SMIC establishment. 
Outlined in the Phare-funded Regional Innovation Strategy in 2002, the innovation centre 
broadened the existing coalition with the aforementioned hub of Brno universities and 
research institutions. Established within the RDASM in 2003, the SMIC soon became an 
independent agency with an aim to “enhance the level of utilization of EU resources in 
connection with research and development – both on the [foreign and local] company level 
and on the university level” (RDASM, 2002: 56). 
Since the mid-2000s, the preparation and the management and monitoring of ROP NS and 
the South Moravian coalition-making for competing over the resources in the national OP was 
already secured. The coalition was broadened on the local level, while being integrated into 
the bureaucratic structures of cohesion governance. During the ROP strategic preparations, 
all the aforementioned institutions participated in articulating the regional priorities, while 
other actors were incorporated into the process. This included the Regional Council of Czech-
Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions, the Association of Non-State Non-Governmental 
Organizations of South-Moravian Region or the Regional Agrarian Chamber (RCSE, 2013: 89). 
Some of these actors filled the MC. Besides the regional authority, this included the MU and 
BUT, the regional chamber of commerce and the NGO sector, while the trade unions 
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representation was missing (RCSE, 2008: 9): They were complemented by their counterparts 
from the Vysočina Region but also the representatives of responsible national ministries of 
regional development, transport, and finance, as well as the DG Region. Seated in Brno, the 
Offices of the Regional Council South-East operated as the semi-independent MA of the ROP 
NS entrenched in the structure of the Regional Authority. 
The coalition became legitimized only when integrating the foreign capital interests and 
the endogenous innovation-led upgrade. How the RDASM and SMIC underpinned with the 
combination of FDI investment-promotion subsidies and EU funding is explored below. The 
electronics manufacturing TNC Flextronics case was illustrative in this. Arriving in Brno as a 
key large investor through the investment-promotion schemes in 2000, Flextronics relocated 
to cheaper destinations already in 2002 when preserving “only the research and development 
centre that employed 34 researchers” (Drahokoupil, 2004: 351). Given that the following 
“wave of redundancies was the impulse for formulating“ the innovation-led project, the SMIC 
(2014: 14) could declare the project´s resilient success when informing that the „Flextronics 
is coming back to the region because of it“ in 2013. The immediate replacement of Flextronics 
by another TNC Honeywell in 2002 and the following R&D investments were an important 
factor for the innovation-led project. By the late 2010s, the RDASM (2017: 33) assisted in 
attracting and embedding these types of investment from the TNC in the field of advanced 
manufacturing, engineering and IT such as Honeywell, ABB, Phillips, Siemens, USU Red Hat, 
Daikin Devices, Daido Metal, SIAD, Zebra Technologies, IBM, Acer, PPG Industries, Lufthansa. 
This coalition gained legitimacy as it incorporated the local IT and star-ups from small to 
expanding and globally operating enterprises. Besides the anti-virus industries Avast and AVG 
(Beblavý and Mýtná Kureková, 2014), this included newly emerging companies hosted in the 
SMIC and the technological parks as illustrated in the next section. 
Deepening the Silicon Valley vision, the coalition became deliberately articulated as an 
innovation “ecosystem” consisting of “strong [large foreign and smaller Czech] technological 
firms, representatives of the research centres, representatives of local government and the 
intermediary organizations” by the late 2010s (SMIC, 2014: 4). This was visualized as a multi-
layered circle where the logos of key actors filled the particular layers of mutually 
interdependent stakeholders (SMIC, 2016). This ecosystem both shapes the regional strategic 
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planning in various working and steering groups to further prioritize the interests of its 
integral members as the general South Moravian interests. 
6.3.2. Developmental Strategy 
The innovation-led coalitions became consolidated around the renewed strategic planning 
which re-emerged since the late 1990s. Once again, the strategic planning was supported by 
the EU funds in order to incentivize the developmental strategies for absorbing the post-
accession investment. The first such a document appeared in 1999 to underpin the 
establishment of the South Moravian Region on the regional level. Since then, it has become 
regularly updated as a long-term Development Strategy (SMRA, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2012a, 
2012b, 2012c, 2012d) and the mid-term Development Programme of the South Moravian 
Region (SMRA, 2014a, 2014b, 2018). The second such a document appeared on the City of 
Brno (CoB, 2009a, 2009, 2016) metropolitan level in 2002, while being updated in the long-
term Strategy for Brno and its sectoral parallels in 2007 and 2016. Central to the innovation-
led project, the four generations of the Regional Innovation Strategy (RIS) (RDASM, 2002; 
SMIC, 2005, 2009, 2014) were formed. These strategies have been prepared either by the 
RDASM and SMIC or the private consultancy companies in consultation with the key 
stakeholders of developmental coalition. Moreover, the regular updating of these “basic 
strategy and programme documents“ became synchronized with the cohesion governance 
programming “in the interest of having better targeting” (SMRA, 2007: 4). 
Hence, the developmental strategies and programmes emerged originally to synchronize 
the periodicity, structure, analysis, and also targeting of South Moravian development 
planning with the strategic content and programming of cohesion investment. A de facto first 
comprehensive strategy, the 2006 strategic update of the region´s Development Strategy 
served as the “basic strategic document of the region for the upcoming programme period of 
2007-2013” (SMRA, 2006a: 23). The resultant “priority strategic measures” were 
subsequently “adjusted” to succeed as complementary projects in competition over the 
cohesion funding from various OP (SMRA: 2006b: 3). The following 2012 update could thus 
further build on the previous strategy when readjusting it for the “EU Cohesion Policy 
priorities 2014+” (SMRA, 2012a). To evaluate the implementation impact of these 
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documents, the easiest way was then to overtake the “indicator system” or “method” used 
in the “individual operational programmes” (SMRA, 2012b: 11, 2012c: 9). The strategies and 
the immediate programmes conceptualized the region´s adherence to the “systemically 
linked, complementary and mutually non-duplicate” hierarchy of strategies from the Lisbon 
and Europe 2020 to the national strategic documents (2006a: 21). At the same time, they 
positioned the city-region´s edge in this rescaled system of strategy-making. Therefore, there 
was a “clear overlap of European priorities” with the focus on the “development of 
knowledge-economy, support for the firm competitiveness, and the area of education and 
social cohesion” (SMRA, 2012a: 12). 
Among the South Moravian stakeholders, it has been regularly reminded that the region 
prepared the “first of its kind” RIS in Czechia (SMIC, 2005: 6), while playing the role model for 
other regions. The RIS 1 resulted from a Phare project. The RIS 2 of 2005 and the RIS 3 of 2009 
reacted to new “opportunities” and the interest of “most effective use of resources prepared 
in the framework of structural funds” and the rapidly “changing firm environment” (SMIC, 2005: 
7, 2009: 4). Since 2014, the RIS 4 became an “ex-ate conditionality” for receiving the EU funds, 
while being “reviewed” by the Commission during its preparation among other stakeholders 
(SMIC, 2014: 4, 14). Prepared by the SMIC, the RIS has been at the heart of the innovation-led 
project, while oriented at maximizing the capacities and strategies for accumulating “the 
biggest possible finances from external resources” (SMIC, 2009: 45-6) and the EU funds above 
all. During its updating, peer reviewing, consulting, implementing and steering in the 
“workgroups” and “steering committees” (RDASM, 2002: 55; SMIC, 2014: 31), the RIS merged 
the particular interests of local coalition with the developmental purpose of cohesion 
governance in this regard. This has therefore established a “link” (RIS, 2009: 79-81) with other 
strategic documents, especially the Development Programmes and the Strategy for Brno. 
The ROP NS shaped but was simultaneously embedded in the regional strategic planning 
(RCSE, 2013: 62-79). Guaranteeing the cohesion investment for South Moravian actors solely, 
it formed a supportive framework for the nation-wide competition over the investment in 
other sectoral OPs. The innovation-led project emerged from the Phare funding but became 
underpinned by a search for complementarities with the OPs organized across the domains 
of education and training, business development, and innovation in the Czech developmental 
project (see chapter 5 and Table 5.1). The steady success in identifying the “links” between 
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the RIS and innovation-oriented OP IE, EI, RDI, and EC and their translation into 
“infrastructures” and “projects” legitimized the established regional planning and strategies 
within the innovation-led project (SMIC, 2005: 10, 2009: 2, 39, 52, 2014: 8-10). 
Through this asymmetric matching of the South Moravian city-regional strategic planning, 
the Silicon Valley regional project could be fully integrated into the Czech developmental 
project. In the anticipation of the EU funding and the synchronization of the regional planning 
with programming technology, the developmental coalition could become mobilized. This 
was through the regular updating and realization of these documents to uphold the 
coalition´s interests as the regional developmental targets. This asymmetric interaction 
impugned the projects with a particular discourse which foregrounded the innovation as the 
developmental catch-up strategy. 
6.3.3. City-Regional Competitiveness 
The South Moravian and Brno´s competitiveness through innovation stood at the heart of 
the regional project´s developmental purpose. Through the visions of innovation-based 
competitiveness “on European/global scale” (SMRA, 2012d: 28), the diverse coalition of 
public institutions, local and foreign capital, and university and research sector could establish 
an ideological cohesion. These visions relied at modernizing the local potential by reinforcing 
the region´s mutual complementarities with and between the cohesion investment and the 
FDI. The “position of Brno in the hierarchy of cities” as the “second biggest and most 
important city” was important in this respect (SMRA, 2014a: 10). In this catch-up “vision”, 
South Moravia would become “the most innovative region in Czechia and belong among the 
fifty most innovative regions in the European Union” (SMIC, 2009: 4). The vision was integral 
to the “mission” of guaranteeing the region´s socio-economic convergence by increasing the 
city-region´s “international competitiveness” (SMIC, 2014: 19): First, it identified but 
searched also inspiration from the city-regional competitors in Czechia, CEE and the EU. 
Second, it set the sectoral priorities in the firm development of local SME and the 
specialization in attracting particular type of foreign investment. Third, this foregrounded 
Brno university sectors as the main actor and beneficiary of such a strategy. Fourth, this 
strategies envisioned also the necessary restructuring of local populations by turning them 
into students, scientists, and managers and advanced professionals. 
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Identifying the rival city-regions as competitors and inspirations was a moving target from 
the project´s inception to its advanced stages. In its inception of early 2000s, the direct rivals 
were identified nationally “beyond Prague” and the Central Bohemian circle around it which 
represented “dominant” innovators: South Moravia was the Czech “most innovative region” 
along with the peer regions such as Moravia-Silesia given the shared “above-average 
conditions for the development of science and research” activities (SMRA, 2006: 52). As the 
project matured, it legitimized itself by reasserting the position of the most innovative region 
which is catching up with Prague and Central Bohemia. Here, the use of cohesion investment 
on unlimited scale was a competitive advantage unlike Prague which “could and can use 
funding from European funds only in the limited scale” (SMRA, 2018: 187). The new horizons 
for moving upwards to achieve the “level” of Europe´s most innovative regions had to be 
found in the West. The competitors were identified within a four-level pyramid where Brno 
occupied the second level along with Bratislava, Kraków or Leipzig, while surpassing the 
bottom level of Košice, Szeged, Ostrava, Wroclaw, “and many others” (SMIC, 2016). The 
immediate aim was to move up into the third level along with West European second-tier 
city-regions such as Stuttgart, Graz, Leuven or Turku. These cities constituted inspiration at 
the same time for the regional catch-up as a second-tier city-region. 
This catch-up relied on the aim of “development of knowledge economy in key/strategic 
sectors of the region, high attractivity of the region for foreign investment and functioning 
segment of small and middle-sized firms” (SMRA, 2014b: 9). This strategy received 
legitimization thanks to the “improving” inter-regional position in receiving the FDI which 
went “especially into services, engineering and electrotechnical industry” and came “almost 
exclusively” from the EU´s core states (SMRA, 2018: 43). Moreover, Brno became “the main 
destination region besides Prague” for hosting the “renowned global enterprises doing 
business in sectors with higher added value” (CoB, 2016: 25). The South Moravia “coped with 
the economic crisis” and was the most quickly one to “adapt to new conditions and changes” 
in the interregional comparison (SMRA, 2018: 38). Within this, Brno only reproduced the 
differentiating trend as its metropolitan area accumulated around 73% of all incoming 
investments to the region by 2014 (SMRA, 2014a: 71). Even though the dependent position 
was clear as “the headquarter structures of the foreign enterprises do not reside in the 
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region”, the support to “endogenous” enterprises was to be realized only within the shared 
FDI-led ecosystem (SMRA, 2018: 187). 
As explored below, the vision of this ecosystem relied heavily on the “ultimately great 
potential” (CoB, 2016: 27) of Brno universities and research institutions to attract investors 
(SMRA, 2018: 43-5; SMIC, 2014: 9-10). In essence, the capacity and specialization of local 
universities in attracting and embedding the innovation-led FDI substituted the role of local 
SME structures. They played a crucial role in the establishment of infrastructural conditions for 
the localization of foreign capital. These strategic conditions have been sponsored mainly by 
the cohesion investment. These key infrastructures and institutions included technological 
parks and incubators, centres of excellence and other R&D centres (see Table 6.2). Since the 
mid-2000s, these new proliferating infrastructures represented an upgrade from and 
complement of industrial zones and business centres. For the project´s resilience, as already 
explained in the case of innovation infrastructures in the chapter 5 (see Table 5.3), it was 
important that such investment projects could be realized precisely during the economic crisis. 
The transport infrastructures and the built environment was equally found important to 
increase the region and Brno´s “(global) transport accessibility” (CoB, 2009b: 17). Much of 
this related to the regional production and inward migration of “qualified and educated 
indigenous and foreign workforce which participates in the production with hight added 
value” (SMRA, 2012d: 28). This foregrounded the university interests and the newly emergent 
innovation infrastructures because “the foreign students and the highly qualified employees 
of the established science-research workplaces and newly developing research 
infrastructures” became a key source of Brno´s increasing investment attractivity. Indeed, the 
regional human resources management was conceived as the weak point in the endeavour 
to either “attract” or “retain” the local “talent” or foreign “elites” such as managers and 
scientists (CoB, 2016: 134). This management was particular as well as general. In particular, 
both the universities and even the secondary education had to be continually modernized to 
produce workforce with “qualification responding to the needs of potential investors” (SMRA, 
2014b: 8). In general, there was an “important match between the quality of environment 
(urban environment guaranteeing the quality of life, not only natural environment)” (CoB, 
2009b: 10) which connected the investment needs into built environment and transport 
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infrastructures with the quality of human capital. Brno had to become thus an attractive place 
to visit and live in to match the requirements of investment attractivity. 
The competitiveness-bias propels the rescaled dependency as the South Moravian 
coalition is enforced and incentivized to compete over both the FDI and the cohesion 
investment to sustain its regional comparative advantage. Within the region, the Brno´s 
dynamic development only replicates the national tendencies of “polarization” or “significant 
dichotomy” between the leading (regional) metropole and the “lagging” (regional) periphery 
(SMRA, 2018: 105, 109; SMIC, 2014: 5, 13). In the next section, the infrastructural fix of the 
visions of innovation-led competitiveness in Brno is discussed. 
6.4. Brno: Fixing the Innovation “Ecosystem” 
As the Table 6.2 documents, the Silicon Valley vision is a metropolitan strategy. It has been 
infrastructurally fixed only since the mid-2000s and through the strategic localization of the 
new built environment in the selected sites in Brno. Its spatial selectivity reinforces further 
the polarizing logic not only within the whole South Moravian Region but Brno´s metropolitan 
area as well. Forming large-scale urban development projects and amassed infrastructurally 
in Brno, the innovation infrastructures underpin the catch-up visions by being listed in the 
RIS, the Strategy for Brno, as well as the Development Programme (SMIC, 2014: 9-10; CoB, 
2016: 94-6; SMRA, 2018: 42-5). The new technology parks, centres of excellence and R&D 
centres are an outcome of rescaled investment process. Financed by the innovative OP, they 
are primarily organized by local actors, although their realization has been integrated into the 
hierarchies of decision-making, management and control of the cohesion governance. 
In return, their infrastructural realization legitimized the developmental purpose on the level 
of both the EU grand developmental strategies and Visegrád state agendas of moving to the 
higher-added-value economic activities. 
Moreover, the innovation infrastructures fix the catch-up visions of innovation-based 
competitiveness, while becoming institutional extensions of the local developmental 
coalition. Already before their initiation, the visions of increasing the region´s 
competitiveness relied on the “cooperation of scientific-research sphere and firms, as well as 
maximizing the benefits of scientific-research projects of International Clinical Research 
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Centre (ICRC) and Central European Technological Institute (CEITEC)” (SMIC, 2009: 4). “In the 
times of upcoming economic crisis”, these large innovation projects were “important” 
because they helped the “regional economy to diversify more, embed itself into local 
environment, and prevent thus maximally the departure of the production operations out of 
the region” (SMIC, 2009: 5). Even in their founding years, these infrastructures were imagined 
to solve the double task of catch-up and preventing the exit of foreign capital abroad to the 
cheaper production destinations. Following their establishment, they formed an “imaginary 
backbone of South Moravian research” (SMIC, 2014: 10). 
In the rest of this chapter, I explain how the innovation infrastructures are inscribed into 
the Brno urban development as a new layer of knowledge-based economy. First, it is shown 
how they are strategically localized to complement the FDI-driven, post-socialist urban 
restructuring. Second, I document how the cohesion investment enables the public sector 
and universities within the local coalition to become key developers which shape Brno´s 
urban redevelopment. What is more, the following subchapters explain how these 
infrastructures territorialize the particular visions of development which primarily benefit the 
coalition of foreign and local capital along with the local governments. 
6.4.1. Landscapes of Knowledge-Based Economy 
Accumulating “the total value of 17 billion Czech crowns“, that is more than 600 million 
EUR, from the „infrastructural projects (so-called OP RDI projects)“, the innovation 
infrastructures constitute one of many types of cohesion investment in Brno (SMIC, 2014: 14-
15). They are however prioritized in its catch-up strategies. Not only making the universities 
the city´s “biggest investors” which helped to “overcome the impact of declining construction 
sector” during the economic crisis, the new „infrastructures decisively shape the spatial 
characteristics and urban functions in the centre and especially the locations of the two 
university largest campuses in Brno“ (CoB, 2012: 13). Building a new “developmental pole” 
(CoB, 2009a: 28) of knowledge-based catch-up, these campuses are inscribed into Brno´s 
metropolitan landscape to complement or replace the old industrial poles and the FDI-based 
manufacturing poles. In result, the infrastructures materialize become key sites of South 
Moravian future socio-economic upgrade in the interregional competition. 
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Amassed around the BUT and MU´s university campuses (see Table 6.2) in Pod Palackého 
vrchem and Bohunice districts, the emerging poles form an alternative to the post-socialist 
“brownfields” of textile and manufacturing industries, while complementing the “greenfield” 
FDI infrastructures in advanced manufacturing and engineering (SMRA, 2012: 18-20, 39-40; 
CoB, 2009: 13, 47, 2016: 127). With respect to the later, these FDI-based infrastructural 
projects were established in two kinds at the turn of 1990s and 2000s: The industrial zone 
Černovická terasa and the Czech Technology Park. Forming the largest industrial zone in 
Czechia, Černovická terasa was initiated by the Flextronics´ building which was later acquired 
by Honeywell in the early 2000s. Since then, the zone attracted “global technological leaders” 
such ABB, Siemens, Dainkin or Bosch which localized both “important production capacity 
and develop here also capacities for R&D” (CoB, 2016: 29). Through such industrial zones, 
which were built in the cooperation of CzechInvest, Brno and South Moravian authorities and 
private developers, the regional economy retained its specialization in the complex 
manufacturing industries. It has become clear that “the consequences of world economic 
crisis and lower wage costs on Asian continent could lead to the relocation of this type of 
investment into other countries” (CoB, 2009a: 19, 2016: 29). Against this vulnerability, the 
Czech Technology Park facilitates a catch-up promise. Established through the cooperation of 
British real estate developer P&Q and the City of Brno, the park is assembled around the BUT 
campus. Together with the MU´s Bohunice campus, these sites become gradually 
foregrounded as poles for embedding the FDI and knowledge-based catch-up. 
Overlapping with the Czech Technology Park, the BUT campus is a crucial site for the 
innovation projects (see the Plate 6.1). Following its establishment in 2003, the SMIC resided 
in the campus to manage its first Technological Incubator, while transforming it into the 
INTECH which assists the start-ups in the IT sector. The campus hosts also the SMIC´s newest 
building INMEC which houses the start-ups in advanced materials and technologies. The third 
incubator INBIT for the growth of biotechnological firms complements the MU´s new campus 
for natural sciences in Bohunice. In the same pattern, the cooperation between the chamber 
of commerce and the universities resulted into the establishment of two technology parks 
with respective specializations in IT technologies and biotechnologies in the mid-2010s (see 
the Table 6.2). In the BUT campus, the “tight spatial neighbourhood” aims at the spill-over 
into the “concentration of human, commercial and research capacities” and the mutual 
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“positive synergy” (CoB, 2012: 14) between the foreign investors, local start-up, and the 
university. This involves technological TNC such as IBM, SAB, Vodafone or RedHat in the 
technological park. Meanwhile, Bohunice campus is to be further developed as a “prestigious 
project of university infrastructures in the framework of the whole Czechia” (CoB, 2012: 15). 
Therefore, the localization and the infrastructural design of innovation infrastructures is 
equally important as their purpose of technological transfer. Located in the two flagship 
buildings in both campuses, the CEITEC is exemplary of this. Already since before their 
construction, the CEITEC´s architectural design was advertised to underpin the visions of 
knowledge-based restructuralization. As the Plate 6.1 shows on the Czech Technology Park´s 
spatial plan, they are incorporated into its mapping to increase the city and the region´s 
attractivity. In result, the CEITEC and the R&D centres secure the visions of “long-term 
increase in the competitiveness” when facilitating conditions for merging the “scientific 
discovery at a globally competitive level“ with the „creation of new innovative companies and 
attraction of domestic and international investors“ (CEITEC, 2012: 5, 2013: 7-9, 2018: 8). In 
this sense, the infrastructures offer the knowledge-based spaces as the specialized 
“laboratories, training facilities and office space“, as well as the “ultra modern“ and „cutting-
edge equipment“ (CEITEC, 2012: 9, 2018: 5, 49). Through these spaces, it is possible not only 
to “catalyse the existing basic and applied research“ but finance the „growth and 
internationalization“ (CEITEC, 2018: 30) of Brno´s human capital as their integral part: the 
research and scientific staff. 
Through territorializing the new infrastructural layer of knowledge-based economy in 
Brno´s urban landscape, the innovation infrastructures fulfil several roles. As investment 
projects in the cohesion agenda, they match the national absorption rate of cohesion funding 
and the performance indicators inherent to their respective OPs above all. The resultant 
institutional and infrastructural development remains then “heavily dependent on 
competitive funding” on the national and European scale, while its “sustainability” must be 
simultaneously guaranteed by additional EU and national funds (CEITEC, 2019: 14). Hence, 
they underpin the modernization of national innovation domain, while infrastructurally 
guaranteeing Brno´s leadership and investment priority in the national catch-up with the 





















































































































6.4.2. Innovation Ecosystem 
The emerging assemblage of Brno-based private-public “institutions + networking + 
infrastructure” (SMIC, 2016) underpins thus the leading core of the developmental coalition. 
Envisioned as an ecosystem, it gains coherence through the preparation and realization of 
the RIS. Enabled by the cohesion funding, Brno universities became a keen urban 
entrepreneur in the coalition. They substitute the absence of strong domestic capitalist 
sectors after the post-socialist restructuring, while becoming prioritized in the city-regional 
strategies along with the foreign TNC and the locally headquartered innovation SME. The plan 
to become “the important centre of Central European education, science and research” (CoB, 
2016: 86) can be thus reconciled with the strategy of knowledge-based prioritization of the 
“key/strategic sectors” through establishing the cluster of large TNC and local SME (SMRA, 
2012b: 36, 2018: 109). In this ecosystem, the prospects of continuing cohesion investment 
dependency it then actively used to by the local actors and institutions as a strategy to locally 
embed the foreign capital interests. 
Despite the visions of knowledge-based upgrade, South Moravia remains still 
characteristic of the national orientation on manufacturing positions in the – engineering and 
electrotechnical – industries. The innovation infrastructures legitimize the future promise of 
sectoral upgrade and shift to a more knowledge-intensive and digital specializations. They 
underpin the strategies of “connecting” the industrial base with the knowledge-based sectors 
as “supporting” infrastructures in the shift to the “matrix” of future research capacities and 
the following “application sectors” (RIS, 2014: 18): advanced production and engineering 
technologies, accurate measurement devices, hardware and software development, 
medicaments, healthcare and diagnosis, technologies for aircraft industry. 
The members of the ecosystem, which supervise the designing and executing of the RIS, 
and the benefiters of the infrastructural development overlap. Besides the state managers 
from public authorities, the local agencies and the universities, this includes the local 
managers of TNCs and the managers of successful start-ups and SME. Within the RIS 4 
framework, such interests have been represented in the steering committee and working 
groups on the “firm competitiveness”, “attractivity of the region”, and “excellence in the 
research” (SMIC, 2020a, 2020b): These monitoring committees integrated the assemblage of 
institutions, infrastructures and networks which cut across the five sectors mentioned above. 
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Representing the interests of foreign capital, the local managers of Honeywell and Red Hat, 
have sat in these fora. Along with the Brno-based global antivirus firm Avast, the local SME 
were also represented either through Tescan, which specializes in the measurement devices, 
or the Y Soft. An electronic hardware company, Y Soft represents one of the “most successful 
firms incubated [in SMIC] whose products are known worldwide” (SMIC, 2011: 42-43) and is 
now headquartered in the Czech Technological Park. 
The regional labour is not represented but rather conceptualized as a problem of human 
resource management. Rather an exception from the rule, the local NGO specializing in the 
issues of social exclusion and the regional branch of national Employment Office have 
participated in the formulation of latest regional strategies (SMRA, 2018: 94). From this 
viewpoint, the new innovation infrastructures are only a “´hardware´ followed by a certain 
´software´ in the form of human capital which is reinforced by the involvement of foreign 
scientists and workforce in general” (SMRA, 2018: 94, 188). The innovation infrastructures 
are therefore envisioned as enabling “absorption capacity” and setting the “key task for the 
following programming period” to fund the reskilling of Brno and South Moravian populations 
(SMRA, 2014c: 66-7). This focuses on upgrading the secondary and university education and 
attracting the highly qualified labour such as scientists, researchers but also managers. 
Indeed, even though having “the second highest qualified labour after Prague”, the region´s 
qualification structure “has not responded to the demand of economy” (SMRA, 2018: 187, 
194). To resolve this contradiction, the consensus is to channel the EU “funding into the future 
(following the so-called ´Irish model´), that is into building infrastructure and qualification 
(education) of workforce” (SMRA, 2018: 94, 188). 
Without the innovation infrastructures, the transformation of the local developmental 
coalition under the visions of innovation ecosystem (SMIC, 2014, 2015: 3-5, 12, 2017: 12) 
would be thus hardly credible. The cohesion investment into the interregional competition as 
a strategy of embedding and upgrading the FDI-based economy has legitimized the catch-up 
visions and the particular interests of actors in the imagined ecosystem as both regional and 
national interests. At the same time, the ecosystem reinforced the region´s dependence on 
the external inflows as it not only relies on the reinforced inflow of national funds into the 
innovation infrastructures but the expectation that they will incentivize the TNC to localize 
activities with the higher added value in Brno. 
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6.5. Rescaled Dependency 
This chapter shows how the Visegrád dependent developmental states regulate the intra-
national inequalities in their uneven regional development. I show how they normalize the 
reproduction of the duality between the leading and lagging city-regions. This is the product 
of the TRPD-based rescaled dependency which promotes the two contradictory tendencies 
in the regional development as on the national level. First, mobilizing and materially enabling 
the regional developmental capacity, it incorporates the regional governance into the 
multiple-level hierarchies of cohesion governance. In effect, the neoliberal developmentalism 
translates into the competitive city-regionalism. Second, it supports thus the visions where 
interregional competition over the cohesion investment and the FDI leads to a sustainable 
regional catch-up. The Cohesion Policy fuels thus the differentiating process of inter-local 
competition rather than sponsoring the socio-spatial justice. In result, the rescaled 
dependency downscales the responsibility for the management of Visegrád dependency to 
the subnational level, while upscaling the decision-making hierarchies at the same time. 
The South Moravian project of Central European Silicon Valley evidences how the rescaled 
dependency skews the city-regional dilemma to the competitive city-regionalism. The 
prospects of cohesion investment mobilize the local actor coalitions and transform them into 
developmental coalitions which invest the external funds into their regional competitive 
advantages. In Visegrád states, this interregional competition is primarily over primarily 
attracting and retaining the FDI and upgrading local SME sectors. In the conditions of post-
socialist restructuralization, other actors such as universities rather than the non-existent 
regional large capital become urban entrepreneurs. The historical legacies of Visegrád uneven 
regional development play role in articulating the specific regional strategies of catch-up and 
the possibilities of their success. The result of this rescaled regulation of uneven regional 
development is the polarization between the leading regions, which accumulate both the FDI 
and the cohesion investment, and those lagging regions which tend to lose the competition. 
The contrasting cases of the NUTS North-West (see chapter 5) and South-East (see Table 6.1) 
show this. Moreover, Brno´s metropolitan project exemplifies that this Visegrád regional 
leadership produces a more embedded peripheral position but fails in the resolute catch-up 
with the EU´s core city-regions. 
197 
 
From the subnational scale, the TRPD is materially, institutionally, and also intellectually 
enabling the local coalitions, projects and their catch-up strategies as bottom-up initiatives. 
Through the rescaled dependency, the TRPD regulates the uneven inter-regional relations by 
responsibilizing the local private-public partnerships with dependency management. Against 
this background, the city-regional structures are mobilized only within the multi-level 
hierarchies of Visegrád developmental state projects and the EU´s developmental fixing. If 
the Visegrád state projects are transnationally organized to enable the national integrations 
into the EU through a combined competition over the same-type FDI and cohesion 
investment assistance, this competition is being simultaneously downscaled as a regional 
competition as well. The rescaled dependency is thus downscaling the developmental 
responsibilities in the conditions of inter-regional competition but upscaling the regulation of 





This Thesis is being finalized at the turn of two budgetary and programming periods of 
2014-2020 and 2021-2027 after the COVID-19 crisis. This turn is crucial because it is mutually 
shaped with the late phase of the post-Fordist order. Its cruciality consists also in 
reconfiguring the long-term trends within the hegemonic dilemmas explored by this Thesis 
(see Box 1.1). Studying the EU Cohesion Policy and Europe´s core-peripheral relations, I try to 
understand the dilemmatic dynamics of this post-Fordist order in a historical perspective and 
also from the CEE´s peripheral viewpoint. Focusing mostly on the trends until the mid-2010s, 
the Thesis does not fully appreciate the amassing multiple crises of the late 2010s. However, 
its historicizing perspective can provide a useful contribution to understanding both the past, 
contemporary, and future trajectories of EU and CEE integration(s) under the conditions of 
changing global capitalism. 
We can do it by answering and restating the research questions and the dilemmas involved 
in the current context: How has the Cohesion Policy shaped the core-peripheral relations in 
the EU´s enlarged capitalist order and vice versa over time? What hegemonic purpose has 
been evolving in the Cohesion Policy´s developmental strategies and how have they solved 
the question of uneven and dependent development in Europe? What sort of state 
transnationalization-cum-transformation has the Cohesion Policy enabled? Has it led to any 
variety of developmental arrangements and purpose inside Visegrád state projects and their 
catch-up strategies? If the Cohesion Policy as the EU´s de facto regional and urban policy 
promoted multi-level governance, what has been rescaled downwards within these state 
projects and through these catch-up strategies? 
Taking advantage of the preceding chapters, this concluding chapter is thus summarizing 
the answers to these questions as historical trends which allow us to open the inquiry for the 
post-2020 developments. I explain firstly why the political economy of EU Cohesion Policy as 
TRPD, which synthetizes the critical and institutionalist approaches, provides a helpful 
viewpoint on discussing the past and future of EU integration. Then, I ask about the future of 
Cohesion Policy. The text finishes by discussing the future of Visegrád development state. 
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7.1. Peripheral Perspective 
The Thesis´ theoretical contribution is the production of a political economy perspective 
on the Cohesion Policy when theorizing it as a TRPD. This is done in the chapters 1 and 2. I do 
it by synthetizing the multiple overlapping but still disconnected literatures. These include the 
EU Studies scholarship, the (critical) political economy of European integration and the CC 
scholarship on CEE varieties of capitalism. The synthesis both deepens and broadens the 
theory on the Cohesion Policy. The broadening happens by bringing the real case of Cohesion 
Policy into the theoretical debates on the political economy of European and CEE integrations. 
So far, the field has disregarded it as irrelevant for and thus marginal for discussing the EU´s 
regulation of its crisis-ridden economic diversity. The CC scholarship on CEE is meanwhile 
preoccupied with the FDI. By introducing the Cohesion Policy, I refine exactly their research 
profile on the inter-state power asymmetries and economic inequalities in the EU core-
peripheral relations. The broadening leads to the theoretical deepening because it nuances 
the EU Studies scholarship with this critical perspective on asymmetries and inequalities. 
Although substituting the neglect of political economy scholarship in studying the EU 
Cohesion Policy, the EU Studies tend to narrow the inquiry into the problem-solving questions 
solely on the policy´s institutional performance and effectiveness. 
Moreover, the TRPD brings together the often separate interests in the study of the 
European integration (Europeanization) and peripheral integrations (transnationalization of 
peripheral states). Let´s firstly address the transnational regulation (TR). Through the synthesis, 
we can highlight the Cohesion Policy as the EU´s main instrument in regulating its crisis-ridden 
economic heterogeneity which the transnational regulation attempts to temporarily and 
unstably resolve. This crisis tendency is driven primarily by the uneven and dependent 
development of European core-peripheral relations. While these relations are structured 
primarily by the inter-state redistributive negotiations between peripheral and core 
governments, our perspective allows for situating them into the broader transnational power 
and economic relations. The analysis allows for exploring how the inter-state negotiations are 
powerfully shaped by the transnational actors like the European Commission but the 
transnational capital as well. Therefore, the Cohesion Policy can be analysed as not only an 
enclosed institutional policy but rather integral part of the EU´s broader agenda of transnational 
regulation. Last, our inquiry can also show how the peripheral development becomes the 
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problem of European heterogeneity in the development purpose of this Commission-led 
regulation. This purpose becomes then the hegemonic content of developmental strategies in 
the peripheral states as a condition of receiving the EU structural funds. 
The Cohesion Policy is thus analysed as problematizing the peripheral development (PD) in 
the core-peripheral relations, while intervening to adjust it to the imperatives of core 
development. This transnational regulation emerged around the relations between the new 
South European periphery and old North-Western European core but has been enlarged with 
the new Eastern dimension since 2004. The main feature of economic periphery – both South 
European and CEE – is the lack of internal funds which makes it dependent on the external 
capital such as the FDI, trade exchange, foreign debt, and (as our theoretical framework adds) 
the EU funds. The TRPD framework is completed here by absorbing the CC literature on the 
CEE and its bias on the FDI dependency. During the eastern enlargement, the Europeanization 
of Visegrád states was organized and enforced by the Commission. This form of 
transnationalization established conditions for the expansion of West European transnational 
corporations into CEE which makes the Visegrád development dependent on the locational 
decisions of West European capital. Both processes transformed the Visegrád states and 
reoriented the developmental purpose of their economic strategies towards the FDI-based 
dependency. The Cohesion Policy is neglected in this analysis. Factoring it in as another source 
of dependency, we start to conceptualize its transformative impact on the Visegrád 
developmental strategies in relation to the FDI dependency. This can be done by finding the 
interrelationships between both dependencies rather than studying them apart. 
The TRPD fills thus the theoretical gap by studying the Cohesion Policy at the intersection 
of EU Studies literatures as well as the political economy scholarship on the EU and CEE 
integrations. Without neglecting the material and institutional dimensions of the EU´s 
manifold core-peripheral relations, the theorization offers the inquiry into the developmental 
purpose of their regulation in and through the Cohesion Policy. Offering to investigate the 
ideological content, the theorization of the Cohesion Policy as TRPD allows to investigate how 
this purpose fills the Visegrád dependency with the ideological content which reorients state 
catch-up strategies through foregrounding the EU funds-based strategies and also normalizes 
the region´s uneven integration into the EU´s core-peripheral relations. From this perspective, 
we can grapple with the aforementioned questions. 
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7.2. The Past and Future of Cohesion Policy 
In the chapters 3 and 4, the Thesis answers the following questions: How has the Cohesion 
Policy shaped the core-peripheral relations in the EU´s enlarged capitalist order and vice versa 
over time? What hegemonic purpose has been evolving in the Cohesion Policy´s 
developmental strategies and how have they solved the question of uneven and dependent 
development in Europe? These questions target the transnational regulation in the TRPD.  
By answering these questions, the chapters provided a historization of the Cohesion Policy 
as the TRPD. The TRPD had origins in the 1960s but became fully institutionalized only by the 
Cohesion Policy reform in 1988. Under the Commission´s transnational leadership, the reform 
institutionalized a core-peripheral consensus between the Southern and North-Western 
states. In this cohesion consensus, the core states approved the increase in the EU funds for 
the peripheral states under the heading of core solidarity. In exchange, this solidarity 
conditioned the EU´s transformation into a globalizing market-making order, while giving the 
Commission higher command and control powers over the effective EU funds investment in 
peripheral states. Moreover, the TRPD-based cohesion consensus is incubated a new 
developmental purpose for regulating the core-peripheral relations: neoliberal 
developmentalism. The neoliberal developmentalism highlights the developmental need of 
economic and social cohesion to solve the EU´s capitalist heterogeneity but prioritizes the 
neoliberal imperative of global competitiveness as the means to achieve it. 
Since the late 1990s by the mid-2010s, this cohesion consensus has been moreover 
eroding. The core solidarity for more cohesion continually declined, while the Commission´s 
control and command over the effective investment in peripheral states for more 
competitiveness become more disciplinary. Although not causing it, the eastern enlargement 
was an integral part of this erosion towards a more austerity-based, effectiveness- and 
competitiveness-oriented transformation. Following the global and Eurozone crises of the 
late 2000s and early 2010s, the historical result has been the consolidation of the EU as a 
regional order consisting of one North-Western core and the two peripheries: the debt-riven 
South and the FDI-based East. 
Can this historization tell us anything about future from the post-2020 turning point in the 
EU integration and vice versa? If the dilemmas of core-peripheral relations have been fixed in 
202 
 
favour of peripheral effectives and competitiveness by the late 2020s, can we identify the 
turn through observing the Commission´s discursive return to the “solidarity, cohesion and 
convergence“ (EC, 2020: 1) in the negotiations over the new MFF?  
First of all, we must recognize the continuing power asymmetry as the turn is primarily 
shaped by the core hegemony under German leadership in an attempt to re-establish the EU 
as a consensual order. Under the old funds and the new climate-related funds and along the 
new EU Next Generation (EUNG) financing, this also heralds a hegemonic rearticulation of the 
core-peripheral relations (EC, 2019d: 6; 2020). Therefore, the dedicated Commission and the 
major paymaster are willing to shape this turn as the strategies of the new Commission under 
the President Von der Leyen and the German in the Council suggest (EC, 2019d; Government 
of Germany, 2020). What is more, the new reform of Cohesion Policy has been prepared by 
the peripheral and originally socialist Commissioners, namely the Romanian Corina Crețu and 
Portuguese Elisa Ferreira.  
In effect, the cohesion consensus is being re-established with respect to both the Southern 
and Eastern peripheries. Following the COVID-19 crisis, a combination of “NGEU and MFF” 
(European Council, 2020: 1-2) has been offered by the Commission which extend the cohesion 
consensus in the volume of transfers. During the inter-state relations, it has been fiercely 
defended by the Southern state managers in cooperation with the Germany presidency 
against other core states under Dutch leadership. According to the Commission, the new 
funds are necessary as “if left to individual countries alone, the recovery would likely be 
incomplete, uneven and unfair” (EC, 2020: 3). Therefore, the core solidarity gains discursive 
primacy as the major incentive for organizing the post-2021 MFF. With the solidarity, the 
effectiveness remains. The “ex ante conditionalities” are simplified, but retained under the 
new brand of “enabling conditions” (EC, 2018a: 7). Despite this turn, the macroeconomic 
conditionality, which was formed to discipline the debt-driven South in the consequence of 
Eurozone crisis, remains in places. Reacting to the rise of right-wing populism in the East, the 
de facto “rule of law” conditionality is newly introduced (EC, 2018a: 5, 13; 2018b: 4).  
What about the neoliberal developmentalism as a hegemonic purpose of the Cohesion 
Policy? It is being rearticulated rather than overcome. After the Lisbon and Europe 2020 
agendas, the “European Green Deal” becomes the EU´s new flagship strategy (EC, 2019d: 5-
6; 2019f). The new grand strategy emerges from the historical merger of competitiveness and 
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cohesion within the visions of “European social market economy” (EC, 2019: 8). The 
hegemonic purpose blends now the “resilience and competitiveness” (EC, 2019f: 3; 
Government of Germany, 2020: 4) to recalibrate the EU´s regulation of uneven and 
dependent development under the heading of “competitive sustainability” (EC, 2020: 6). 
While the new strategy privileges the socio-ecological sustainability over the economic 
competitiveness, it remains constrained by the neoliberal institutional structures which 
developed during the last three decades. The strategic planning of the European Green Deal 
remains thus linked with the “European Semester process of macroeconomic coordination” 
(EC, 2019f: 3), while supporting the “ongoing economic reform process by Member States” 
(European Council, 2020: 22). The neoliberal developmentalism is thus being articulated away 
from competitiveness but remains serves to further embed the neoliberal bias to the open 
market-oriented order. 
Studying the Cohesion Policy as the TRPD, we could explore it as a product of the EU as we 
knew it especially since the end of 1980s. The study of its past can tell us that its form and 
content are likely to be reshaped but not overcome in the post-2020 integration trajectories. 
What is more, the change is likely to be reproduced with the two historical dilemmas between 
the core solidarity and peripheral effectiveness, as well as the European cohesion and global 
competitiveness.  
7.3. The Past and Future of Dependent Developmental State 
In the chapters 5 and 6, the Thesis answers the following questions: What sort of state 
transnationalization-cum-transformation has the Cohesion Policy enabled? Has it led to any 
variety of developmental arrangements and purpose inside Visegrád state projects and their 
catch-up strategies? If the Cohesion Policy as the EU´s de facto regional and urban policy 
promoted multi-level governance, what has been rescaled downwards within these state 
projects and through these catch-up strategies? These questions target the peripheral 
development in the TRPD. 
Relying on the historization above, the diagnosis is following. Despite of the lowering core 
solidarity and the increasing orientation on effectiveness and competitiveness, the Cohesion 
Policy has still supplied these states with a robust developmental assistance. The assistance 
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provides further evidence on why the Visegrád dependent market economies remain rather 
resilient after the global and Eurozone crisis, while retaining relatively sustainable socio-
economic development. Even in the post-crisis turn to a more economic nationalism 
especially in Poland and Hungary, these Visegrád state projects remain still oriented at 
providing physical and human infrastructures for the West European capital. These states 
however suffer from two contradictory tendencies. First, the EU funds are either invested 
under the Commission´s disciplinary supervision into the enhancement of the FDI-based 
competitiveness or captured by the political and economic elites of Visegrád states through 
grand corruption schemes. Second, with respect to the rescaled dependency, the neoliberal 
developmentalism translates into competitive city-regionalism. The competitive purpose of 
the EU funds fuels the increasing inter-local polarization between the leading city-regions, 
which win the dual competition over the FDI and EU funds, and the lagging city-regions losing 
such a competition. Therefore, the promise of developmental catch-up with the Western core 
is likely to remain intra-nationally unequal and internationally within the confines of 
sustainable and productive, yet peripheral integration into the EU. 
Can the contradiction be resolved or is about to further problematize the Visegrád 
peripheral development in the EU´s post-2020 turn? Is the developmental illusion still 
legitimize the integrative tendencies of the Visegrád states projects? Is the EU turn anyhow 
change the developmental purpose of their catch-up strategies? Last but not least, how can 
they overcome the polarizing tendencies in the regulation of their uneven regional 
development? 
Indeed, the developmental projects have hardly changed the developmental status of the 
convergent CEE periphery. Considered less developed during their EU accession, Visegrád 
economies are broadly categorized as such even after 15 years of their integration within the 
Cohesion Policy. With the exception of the capitals, Visegrád regions cover mostly the 
categories of less developed regions below 75% and only occasionally the status of the 
transition regions between 75% and 100% of the average EU´s GDP. As the Visegrád state 
managers increasingly rely on the cohesion investment to substitute the decreasing FDI 
inflows or overcome the FDI dependency, the future of Visegrád developmental projects 
remains highly dependent on the cohesion consensus in the EU. 
The economic nationalism in Poland and Hungary has so far remained within the confines 
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of the neoliberal developmentalism. The same can be said about the less prominent turn to 
internal development in the Czech and Slovak trajectories. After the global economic crisis, 
this shift has been a reaction to the disruptions of the FDI-led development. Although shifting 
the strategic developmental priorities from enabling the FDI inflows to the improvement of 
domestic firm structures, the scale of change has been gradual rather than radical. By 2020, 
we could nevertheless document that the two crucial sources of Visegrád dependent catch-
up – FDI and cohesion investment – have been gradually decreasing. On the side of cohesion 
investment, the EU budget and the relative share of Cohesion Policy therein were reduced in 
volume. Moreover, the Visegrád convergence was rather statistical when measured against 
the divergent Southern periphery in crisis. In effect, the reversed statistical effect – which 
affected the South after the eastern enlargement – made the Visegrád economies seemingly 
richer and thus less eligible for the cohesion funding due to the ever poorer South periphery. 
The threat to the developmental projects is thus made by the external dependency than the 
internal forces. 
The future opens the new dynamic in resolving the interrelated questions of capacity and 
autonomy of these states vis-à-vis the Commission and the core states. The institutional 
incapacities and corruption have been prioritized by the Commission as the major break on 
the peripheral convergence. The rise of conservative nationalist governments in Hungary and 
Poland and the Czech conflict of interests reinforce it. In the new EU turn, the Commission 
attempts to extend its command and control powers to cover also the “democratic resilience” 
and the “fundamentals rights and full respect of the rule of law” as conditionalities to receive 
the EU funding (EC, 2019f: 15). The prioritization of “our European values, rule-of-law and 
humanitarian standards” has been also supported by Germany (Government of Germany, 
2020: 18). The Council agreed thus on the “importance of the protection of the Union's 
financial interests” and “the respect of the rule of law” (European Council, 2020: 7, 15). This 
rule-of-law conditionality is thus likely to drive new forms of governmentalization and conflict 
in the next programming period for the Visegrád states. 
Under the European Green Deal, the developmental purpose of these state projects is also 
facing challenges due to the industrial character of their economies. The Visegrád regions fall 
still within the category of less developed and transition regions with an exception of the 
capital city-regions. Given the industrial nature of the leading regions and the carbon-
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oriented energy sectors in the lagging regions. Having hardly caught up in the traditional 
forms of underdevelopment, the Visegrád stares face fixed as underdeveloped in the terms 
of European Green Deal. They cover the category of “regions and sectors that are most 
affected by the transition [to the climate neutral development]” (EC, 2019f: 16). Therefore, 
the “Commission will work with the[se] Member States and regions” (EC, 2019f: 16) to 
provide them with the new developmental capital but also requirements to adapt their state 
and city-regional strategies of development. Whether this is to challenge the trajectories as 
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